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At school there were two sorts of boys: those who wanted to stay on and 
those who wanted to get away. Simple as. He was the second kind. […]  
Philip Green got his wish and went out to work when he was 16. “Obvi-
ously,” he said, “I was never going to be a scholar.” He laid an emphasis 
on the “obviously” that is both pre-emptive and pragmatic. It tells you he 
finds nothing wrong with book-learning, but it was not for him, and if 
you imagine that makes him a dunce, you've got another think coming. 
While others chose to sit in classrooms be-ing told what to think and 
how to pass exams, he was out in the real world with the grown-ups, ob-
serving how many beans make five (Vincent 2004).  
 
 
• Must be willing to work a part-time schedule from 7:00 AM-10:00 
AM M-F 
• 1+ years of Barista experience in a fast-paced environment 
• Maintain confidentiality and discretion within all aspects of this 
role 
• Excellent interpersonal skills 
• Team player; always willing to jump in when needed 
• Excited to be part of a fast-growing startup 
• Preferred college degree (cited in Lucas 2018) 
 
 
Philip Green is among the wealthiest businesspeople in the United Kingdom 
today. With an empire of retail brands, Green, who does not hold any formal 
qualification, is the controversial king of British high street retail. After leaving 
school at 16, he worked as garage attendant, and was later apprenticed in his 




thrived in the world of wholesale fashion. Before turning 30, Green had made 
his first million. 
Millions are not what applicants to a job ad posted on LinkedIn in late 2018 
can expect. The job on offer is to make coffee, part-time. A reasonable engage-
ment for students, most people would think. What caused an outcry on social 
media platforms was the ad’s last sentence: “College degree preferred”. Might 
the maker of our next latte be a specialist on Husserl or polycrystalline ceramic 
matrix composite materials?  
Philip Green is unusually successful by many standards. Not only did he 
achieve levels of economic success that the vast majority of people with his 
kinds of formal credentials can only dream about, on his way up he also sur-
passed virtually all of the more bookish types he sought to get away from in his 
teens. Even among the United Kingdom’s arguably most gifted and privileged 
students, those who graduated first class from a Russell Group university, only 
about 60% make it into a broadly defined elite occupation (Friedman and Lau-
rison 2019 p.39).1 But also in his own occupational group, “Chief Executives 
and Senior Officials”2 in companies that employ more than 250 workers, Green 
is an exception. According to estimates from the British Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) 80% of these top executives had some form of tertiary education in the 
spring quarter of 2018. Less than 3% report an apprenticeship as their highest 
qualification (Northern Ireland Statistics and Social Survey Division Office For 
National Statistics 2019, own calculations). 
Life stories like that of Philip Green or the philosopher turned latte artists 
are outliers. They do not reflect the experience of the vast majority of people 
who get an education to get a decent job and then work to make a living. And 
 
1 Among the entire workforce just 17% work in such positions. Friedman and Laurison de-
fine elite occupations as the “higher professional and managerial occupations” of the official 
British NS-SEC classification to which they add competitive positions in the cultural sector 
(Friedman and Laurison 2019 p.11). 




yet, such stories resonate widely in a world that is saturated with education 
and its symbols. They touch upon a common sentiment that education, after 
all, does not really teach what it takes to get ahead, and that what it teaches, is 
often far too removed from the real world to make a difference there.  
Six decades of social science research have provided overwhelming evi-
dence that this view is generally wrong. We know that education is the single 
best predictor of the location in society someone will end up in. We know that 
education is the factor that best explains why children of middle-class parents 
are so likely to remain middle class themselves, and why children from the 
working class are likely to remain there. This view is epitomized by the stand-
ard sociological model of occupational attainment introduced in Blau and 
Duncan’s (1978 [1967]) seminal book. This model, here reproduced as Figure 
1-1, documents that American men's occupational position is in the main a 
function of their education. If you know someone's education, the central 
claim is, you will be able to make a fairly accurate prediction about their posi-
tion in the occupational structure, and in society more general. 
Figure 1-1 Basic model of the process of stratification from Blau and 





And still. Most of us know someone who fits in more with the colorful story 
of the “underqualified” Philip Green or the highly educated precarity experi-
enced by an “overqualified” barista with years of university education.3 These 
are people who found their way into very advantageous careers despite a seem-
ing lack of formal education, or who remained stuck in less-prestigious posi-
tions even though they underwent training for far more difficult occupations. 
On the face of it, such “mismatched” cases contradict the bulk of theory in 
stratification research.4 To be sure, social science statements are probabilistic, 
they deal in average effects, tendencies and populations, not in individual 
cases. In the technical language of regression analysis, careers of people like 
Philip Green, philosopher baristas or the colleague from the PhD program who 
winded up as assistant to someone with a BA in Industrial Engineering, are 
residuals. They make up the error term in the dominant sociological model of 
status attainment. We may know their education, but for the mismatched, this 
carries little information about their later position in society. 
 
3 Green is underqualified in the sense of having less formal education and training than re-
quired or typical for his job. This may or may not imply a lack of actual skill to perform the 
role well. A college-educated barista, vice versa, is overqualified in the sense of having un-
dergone training that is typically not required in his position. For empirical studies on the 
degree of overlap between formal mismatch and (actual) under- and overskilling, see (Lev-
els, van der Velden, and Allen 2014; McGuinness and Sloane 2011; Sánchez-Sánchez and 
McGuinness 2015). 
4 Workers can be mismatched in a number of ways: part-time workers who would like to 
work more, workers employed in one city, who would like to live somewhere else and so on 
(Kalleberg 2008). If there is a qualification mismatch and people’s education does not fit 
their occupation or job, vertical mismatches can be distinguished from horizontal mis-
matches. In horizontal mismatches, workers’ field of training does not line up with that of 
their job. Vertical mismatches refer to under- and overqualification, where the level of qual-
ifications does not line up with requirements of the job. This dissertation is only about the 
latter phenomenon. Menze (2017) offers an insightful analysis of horizontal and vertical 





This dissertation moves this error term of residuals to the center of its atten-
tion. Its goal is to transfer the subject of education-to-job mismatches from 
the realm of the merely anecdotal into a methodologically rigorous social-sci-
entific examination. It is of course by no means the first study to investigate 
mismatches. However, few scholars study mismatches from a social stratifica-
tion and social mobility perspective (but cf. Vaisey 2006; Capsada-Munsech 
2019a; 2015). I aim to show that mismatches hold important insights for these 
fields.  
Three reasons motivate this endeavor. First, the fact that we all can think 
of mismatched school mates, colleagues and friends for whom the simple 
model of status attainment seemingly does not apply, signals that a sizable 
portion of social reality is left poorly accounted for by the standard model. The 
first reason to focus on mismatches is therefore that it can help us develop a 
more nuanced understanding of status attainment, beyond the conditional 
expectation of occupation given education. On the one hand, this means that 
we will be able to account for hitherto unexplained variance in occupational 
attainment. More importantly, however, is that this focus on atypical cases 
prompts us to theorize mechanisms of occupational access that do not operate 
chiefly through education (see also Erikson and Jonsson 1998 for an early at-
tempt). As we will see, this examination also reveals that the often used dis-
tinction between “achieved” and “ascribed” determinants of occupational ac-
cess is sometimes less salient empirically than often assumed (Moerbeek and 
Flap 2008). 
Second, a mismatch-perspective provides analytical leverage to inject new 
insights into other longstanding sociological problems. This may be termed 
an “instrumental” approach to studying mismatches because from this angle, 




No matter if sociologists investigate returns to education, the intergenera-
tional transmission of occupational status, or individuals' prospects of career 
mobility, they always rely on assumptions on how attained qualifications map 
onto likely occupational positions. But what is really a special case, the situa-
tion of a “correct” education-job match, is often the only way analysts think 
about this problem in many areas of applied research. If we systematically take 
into account that mismatch in fact does occur, and understand better in which 
situations it does, we will be in a better position to disentangle more precisely 
the mechanisms behind many of the processes that occupy stratification re-
searchers, even beyond questions of occupational access. 
The example I use to make this case is the debate on credential inflation 
and skill-biased technological change.  I show that analyzing the balance of 
supply and demand of education in terms of mismatches offers a novel and 
more direct way to test the core claims in this debate. Interestingly, this inno-
vative analysis is at odds with some of the received wisdom, suggesting that 
some of the bridging hypotheses relied on by previous studies do not hold.  
Third, I argue that mismatch is a an important and surprisingly common 
social phenomenon in its own right. In particular when it comes to underqual-
ification, it is also curiously understudied. This stance is more controversial 
than might appear. Among stratification researchers, there is debate on the 
ontological status of mismatch. Is it a subjectively real condition experienced 
by workers’ themselves?5 Is it an heuristic concept that analysts can employ to 
make sense of social dynamics, but that has no phenomenological validity to 
actors  (in the sense of a relevance in first-person accounts as understood by 
Martin 2011, p.16)?  Is it a mere statistical artifact? Or in the end just a clumsy 
way to rephrase some long-known truths? On  the one hand, this controversy 
 
5 Results of a qualitative investigation into this question are reflected upon in Grimm (2013). 
While somewhat preliminary, the conclusions drawn suggest that individuals are well 




arises from a disagreement about how to measure mismatches and from the 
fact that different ways of measuring it tend to produce different estimates of 
prevalence and effects (Sloane 2003; Hartog 2000; Quintini 2011; Leuven and 
Oosterbeek 2011; Verhaest and Omey 2006b; 2006a; Capsada-Munsech 2019b). 
On the other hand, there are established approaches in the sociology of social 
stratification and mobility that aim to conceptualize phenomena similar to 
those which occupy this dissertation without making any explicit reference to 
mismatch at all.6  
 
6 One example is the idea of “direct effects of social origins” (DESO) (Bernardi and Ballarino 
2016; Gugushvili, Bukodi, and Goldthorpe 2017; Erikson and Jonsson 1998), which is in-
spired by the classic OED-model of social reproduction (where social origin (O), education 
(E), and social destination (D) form a triangle and coefficients on the paths between them 
describe the dependencies between these concepts in a population). In the OED-model, a 
direct effect from origins to destinations (net of education) can be interpreted to imply a 
degree of mismatch: People with a certain background do better or worse than expected on 
the basis of their education. This is especially true, when destinations are measured in 
terms of occupational status scales, such as ISEI, which are largely a function of average ed-
ucation in an occupation (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992). In this case, the pres-
ence of DESO imply access to jobs for which people are over- or underqualified, relative to 
the average. The literature on “direct effects of social origins” is therefore closely related to 
the study of social origin effects on mismatches. I examine conceptual and empirical simi-
larities in Chapter 2 and argue that a mismatch-perspective offers some novel empirical in-
sights. Note also that a mismatch perspective, and an OED-perspective start from very dif-
ferent points. Mismatch-analysis starts from the actual situation of the individual, a mis-
match between occupation and education, as experienced by individuals, and seeks to ex-
plain it. An OED-perspective, by contrast, starts from the theoretical construction of the 
OED-triangle, which, importantly, is defined at the level of a population. It then goes on the 
examine its logical implications. In contrast to mismatch, a DESO can never be directly ex-
perienced by individuals. While both approaches talk about similar substantive phenom-
ena, they are therefore representative of different intellectual styles. Mismatches put actors 
at the center, OED-analyses, much in the tradition of social mobility research generally, 
population-level statistical relationships. 
A related example of a non-mismatch approach with mismatch-implications are studies of 
occupational attainment at the micro-level, for instance by regressing ISEI-scores on indi-
cators of education-quality for different origin groups (e.g. in Jacob, Klein, and Iannelli 
2015; Tomaszewski et al. 2019). In this tradition, the explanandum is occupational status, 
and de-facto mismatches are only present as the residual of the education-regression. Mis-
match-determinants, in turn, are identified as variables that predict occupational status net 
of education-quality. Like in a mismatch-approach, individuals’ experience, in this case of 




The position that I seek to defend in the course of this dissertation is that 
mismatch is a real phenomenon that has quantifiable consequences for the 
individual. True, different ways to measure mismatch produce different re-
sults, because they capture different facets of the phenomenon. But this ap-
plies equally to even the most basic concepts in stratification research. Few 
scholars dispute the use of studying poverty just because there are different 
techniques to measure it. Everyday understandings of poverty or mismatch 
may not map exhaustively onto a single measurement. This does not mean, 
however, that the phenomena they are referring to are unfit for scientific study. 
It merely asks analysts to specify exactly which aspect of a phenomenon they 
talk and can legitimately draw conclusions about when they use a certain way 
of measuring it. 
What about the ability of established frameworks to describe mismatch-
phenomena without making use of mismatch-language? Is mismatch in the 
end a superfluous concept? As I have argued in Footnote 6, an explicit mis-
match-perspective provides heuristic advantages for explaining mismatch-
phenomena over indirect strategies that center on notions like “underachieve-
ment”. What is more, the fact that their training and their occupation do not 
line up has important consequences for individuals, as my analyses in the fol-
lowing chapters show. If this is so, it deserves to be studied. Previous ap-
proaches might in theory be able to describe such consequences, but they 
 
the assumption of a primacy of the individual as a carrier of status-determining variables. 
These studies ask, which characteristics make individuals over- or underachieve net of their 
education: Who will get farther compared to the average of their education group? A mis-
match-approach, by contrast, tackles the problem from the occupation-side and asks, what 
characteristics of individuals can substitute for formal training in granting access to jobs: 
Who will get access to occupations for which more education is usually required? Essen-
tially, it asks about employers’ needs. A mismatch-approach therefore combines a focus on 
individual experience with explanations that focus on the interaction of social environ-




rarely have done so. If the language of mismatch helps us to see phenomena 
other approaches have glossed over, it is warranted. 
Mismatches, finally, are also very common. Measurement issues notwith-
standing, the best estimates suggest that up to half of all workers are either 
under- or overqualified for the job they are in (for two summary reports see: 
Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011; Quintini 2011). Among that mismatched half of 
workers one fourth to one half, depending on the definition used, has less ed-
ucation than required by their job. Although this, too, constitutes a significant 
share of all workers, we know even less about this population of underqualified 
workers than we do about overqualified workers. Mismatches are common and 
they are consequential, yet poorly understood. This dissertation aims to shed 
light on this curious phenomenon.  
Research questions 
How and when does mismatch come about? 
The research questions I seek to answer in the following chapters spring from 
this motivation. The first question is how, and under what circumstances mis-
matches come about, that is, how they can be explained. There are two sides 
to this question. One can ask about the micro-dynamics that lead some, but 
not others, into mismatch. One can also ask, however, under what macro-so-
cial conditions mismatch is more likely in the aggregate.  
In answering the first kind of question, I dedicate special attention to un-
derqualification. The reason for this focus is that underqualification has re-
ceived even less attention than overqualification as an employment situation, 
so there is much less we know about it.7 My research fills this gap. Compared 
 
7 A large literature in sociology and labor economics seeks to explain what kinds of workers 




with overqualification, underqualification is also the more puzzling phenom-
enon. It is always possible, if not always desirable, to work jobs that require 
less demanding training than one may have received in the past. But how is it 
possible for individuals to work jobs that require more training than they have 
received? Drawing on human capital and labor queue theory, as well as on so-
cial mobility research, Chapter 2 attempts an answer at the micro-level of in-
dividual careers. It turns out that the improbable career of Philip Green is in 
some respects representative of successful underqualified workers generally. 
Chapter 4 addresses the second kind of question on the macro-dynamics 
of mismatch. In contrast to Chapter 2, it adds the question under which cir-
cumstances overqualification is likely. Here, the concern is with technological 
change, globalization, educational expansion, and the change of the occupa-
tional structure. In what kind of labor market do we see what kind of mis-
match, and how has its incidence changed over time in different countries? 
The answer to that question has important implications for scholarship on ed-
ucational expansion, and on education and skill policy. 
What are the consequences of mismatch? 
The second research question I pursue, asks about the consequences of 
mismatches. In Chapter 2, I investigate the role of mismatch, in particular of 
underqualification, for processes of intergenerational mobility and reproduc-
tion. In principal, mismatch, under- as well as overqualification, could en-
hance or stymie intergenerational mobility – depending on who is more likely 
 
overskilled – meaning that formal mismatch status can be partially explained by skill-heter-
ogeneity within qualification levels (Levels, van der Velden, and Allen 2014; Capsada-Mun-
sech 2019a; Green and McIntosh 2007; Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann 2016). Other stud-
ies further suggest that it is mainly those of lower social backgrounds that are afflicted by 
overqualification (Capsada-Munsech 2015; 2019a; Erdsiek 2016). Due to language barriers 
and the limited transportability of human capital, immigrants are also at a higher risk of  
overqualification (Rafferty 2012; Chiswick and Miller 2008; 2009; 2010; H. Battu and P.J. 




to be affected by it, the children of lower classes or upper classes. Underquali-
fication could be a way for talented people of underprivileged origins to beat 
the odds, overcome the well documented disadvantages of lower-class stu-
dents in the education system, and realize their potential on a less-discrimi-
nating labor market. It could also act, however, as a safety net for privileged 
children without success in the education system. Resources, (non-cognitive) 
skills and orientations associated with a privileged origin might turn out to be 
helpful for occupational attainment even after leaving the education system. 
A priori it is hence far from clear, how underqualification relates to upward 
social mobility and the reproduction of privilege. 
Mismatches may also have more immediate effects on individuals. Chapter 
3 is entirely dedicated to these consequences. I investigate whether mismatch 
changes workers’ social and political attitudes and behaviors. Status incon-
sistency theory suggests that frequent qualification mismatches can have de-
stabilizing effects on societies, as mismatched individuals perceive labor mar-
kets as unfair, radicalize politically, and withdraw from social organizations 
(Lenski 1954). What is an easy question to ask turns out to be a hard question 
to answer, at least when the main effects of occupation and education are taken 
into account. So hard in fact that a large literature and a generation of scholars 
have devoted much attention to it, arguably without much success. In order to 
tackle this seemingly simple question of longstanding interest, I introduce a 
novel identification strategy that helps to overcome the stalemate in the pre-
vious literature. 
How is mismatch related to institutions of the labor market and 
the education system? 
The third research question I ask is about contextual variation in causes, con-




individual. It is, however, closely linked to the structure of the education sys-
tem and the labor market. Both are institutions that vary widely even across 
highly developed market economies. A long-standing tradition in sociology is 
clear about the fact that this variation has significant effects on individual ca-
reers, and patterns of status attainment in general. I investigate to what extent 
such institutional differences are associated with different patterns of mis-
match more specifically. As I explain in the following section, this is an over-
arching question that guides my research design throughout the dissertation. 
Research design 
An analysis to satisfactorily answer these research questions needs to fulfill 
different and even somewhat opposing demands. On the one hand, it requires 
data that are fine-grained enough to allow investigating the micro-mecha-
nisms of how mismatch comes about in the course of individual careers. On 
the other hand, the data also need to be encompassing enough to permit 
zooming out to get the big picture of longer-term trends and international 
variation. To date there is no single, harmonized source of data available to 
social scientists that allows such varied analyses in the study of mismatches. 
In the following, I lay out my strategy to build a database from different but 
comparable sources which allows such inferences and describe the steps I un-
dertake to provide an answer to my research questions. 
A multilevel country-comparison approach 
The analytic approach taken throughout the following chapters is to use high 
quality, nationally representative micro-data to examine the process of inter-
est in a fashion that is as detailed as possible. This satisfies the first of the above 
demands. In order to learn about international variation in patterns and pro-




institutionally different country. Concretely, I rely on a comparison of the 
United Kingdom to Germany. This allows me to combine the detail and rigor 
of micro-data panel analysis with a cross-national perspective that is crucial 
to answer my third research question. Since my research questions are placed 
at different analytical levels – some asking about micro-level mechanisms, 
some about macro-level trends – my analytical approach can be described as a 
multilevel country-comparison. Figure 2 provides a schematic representation 
of this approach and its relation to the organization of the dissertation. 
 
 
Figure 1-2 A multilevel approach to studying mismatches 
In the first and second empirical chapter, I study the micro-dynamics be-
hind individual-level mismatch: Who enters underqualification, what role 
does mismatch play in the intergenerational transmission of advantage, and 
what are the individual-level consequences of mismatch more broadly? As the 
double-headed arrow indicates, both questions are closely related. In the third 
empirical chapter, I shift my attention to the macro-level and examine how 
structural forces have changed the aggregate incidence of over- and under-




Throughout all these analyses, I compare results for the United Kingdom 
and Germany. This means that the individual studies are not just large-N, 
quantitative population studies. On the country-level they are also case studies 
of how institutional regimes relate to mismatch patterns and trends. The rep-
lication of the analysis in a different context is a powerful guard against overly 
sweeping generalizations on mismatch phenomena based on a single country-
case. At the very least, such a replication demonstrates the robustness of find-
ings. Should the conclusions from the micro-level studies prove indeed similar 
in the two countries, this is furthermore evidence that the mechanisms at play 
are fairly general – and take place at a level that is unlikely to by strongly influ-
enced by the workings of nationally specific institutions. If the comparison is 
set up more strategically – as I do it in chapter 4 – a country comparison can 
even shed light on how similar processes have operated differently in different 
countries. In the following section, I explain why the United Kingdom and 
Germany are especially insightful cases to compare. 
Choice of countries 
The selection of the two countries is guided by the idea of maximizing insti-
tutional difference, while keeping the availability of high-quality longitudinal 
data in mind. Contrasting Germany to the United Kingdom is somewhat of a 
classic in comparative stratification research (e.g. with a similar reasoning ap-
plied to life-course studies or firms' hiring decisions (Hillmert 2001; Windolf 
et al. 1988)). Although evolving from similar historical foundations (Thelen 
2010), the two country cases occupy opposite positions in a number of typolo-
gies of labor market organization (Crouch 1994), skill formation systems (Fi-
negold and Soskice 1988; Allmendinger 1989; Marsden and Ryan 1990), and 




High vs. low skill standardization in education? 
Moving to concrete differences between the British and the German education 
system, the most obvious one is in their quantitative expansion. A higher per-
centage of all students in the United Kingdom than in Germany undergoes 
some form of tertiary education (OECD 2019). In Germany, middling appren-
ticeship programs still attract a large share of youth (Powell and Solga 2011; 
Jacob and Solga 2015). In Britain high quality vocational education is rare, but 
a multitude of programs of lesser quality cater to young people who are neither 
in full-time work nor in tertiary programs (Wolf 2011; Wolf, Jenkins, and Vi-
gnoles 2006). Quantitative expansion is an important contextual factor for the 
study of mismatches, because more graduates of tertiary education mechani-
cally translate into more workers at a relatively high risk of overqualification. 
More graduates, similarly, mean that less people are at the risk of underquali-
fication. Expansion may also alter the balance of relative skill supply (by the 
education system) and demand (by employers) on the labor market (Collins 
1979; Horowitz 2018; Araki 2020). If education expands beyond the need of 
industry for qualified workers, widespread overqualification might ensue. I fo-
cus on this hypothesis in Chapter 4. 
There are, however, equally important qualitative differences between the 
British and the German education systems, relating to ability tracking, voca-
tional specificity, and the prevalence of dual forms of vocational education and 
training (Bol and van Werfhorst 2011). The first point, the way in which the 
selection of students into different tracks and qualifications is organized, has 
far-ranging consequences both for the signaling value of the credentials pro-
duced by an education system and the distribution of actual skills possessed 
by graduates of different programs (Allmendinger 1989; Bol and van de Werf-
horst 2011; Heisig and Solga 2015; Heisig 2018). Although ability tracking in 
secondary education plays a role in both contexts, it is more salient, more 




Regarding the second point, the British education system is traditionally 
regarded as putting an emphasis on general skills that can be exploited in a 
large range of occupations (e.g. by Hall and Soskice 2001).8 Germany forms a 
strong contrast, as its system aims to equip students with relatively highly spe-
cialized know-how in vocational training and even tertiary education (Bol et 
al. 2019; DiPrete et al. 2017; Busemeyer 2009). 
 Thirdly, in most countries, including the United Kingdom, both academic 
and vocational education and training overwhelmingly take place in the class-
room (cf. Gospel 1994). In Germany, however, many students receive a large 
share of their vocational education in a dual-system, partly as an apprentice at 
the workplace, partly at school (Thelen and Busemeyer 2011; Solga et al. 2014; 
Jacob and Solga 2015). Recent research shows that these institutional differ-
ences translate into sizeable differences in the internal skill homogeneity of 
educational groups (Heisig 2018). In this regard, Germany occupies a middling 
position internationally. The United Kingdom, by contrast, is the country 
studied with the most skill heterogeneity within educational groups among 
those with at least intermediate education. In other words, the nominal level 
of a British qualification is relatively uninformative about the actual ability of 
their holder, while this is not true for Germany. 
Ceteris paribus, occupational boundaries are therefore more salient in 
countries like Germany where tertiary and vocational education tend to be oc-
cupation-specific and where popular and functioning dual apprenticeship sys-
tems channel students into clearly defined occupational profiles early on. 
There should therefore be less vertical mismatch in German than in the United 
 
8 Many reforms since the 1980s have, however, have aimed to change that by incentivizing 
the uptake of highly specialized, vocational qualifications. The overwhelming failure of 
these reforms with respect to esteem and popularity of the resultant qualifications among 
both students and employers can be counted among one of the reasons why so many Brit-
ish students choose to go to university (Wolf, Jenkins, and Vignoles 2006; Wolf 2011; 2002; 




Kingdom. For the same reason, we would, however, expect that consequences 
of mismatch, when it occurs, are stronger in Germany with its tighter educa-
tion-occupation link than in the United Kingdom (see also the results in Bol 
et al. 2019; DiPrete et al. 2017; Di Stasio, Bol, and Van de Werfhorst 2016). 
Occupational vs. individualistic labor markets? 
Not only education systems, the structure of labor markets, too, varies widely 
between the United Kingdom and Germany. These differences can partly be 
related to corresponding differences in education systems. Where labor mar-
ket entrants are comparatively less, and less transparently, stratified regarding 
the level and the area of their skills, like in the United Kingdom, good matches 
between worker-skills and job-requirements will take longer to achieve, and 
be overall less frequent (DiPrete et al. 2017; Levels, van der Velden, and Di Sta-
sio 2014; Shavit and Müller 1998). Sorting processes after, as opposed to prior 
to, labor market entry are comparatively more important. The results is in-
creased occupational mobility and a reduced salience of occupations to both 
workers and employers (Longhi and Brynin 2010). In consequence, both un-
der- and overqualification should be more prevalent, but less consequential, 
in such contexts.  
According to a longstanding argument in the political economy literature, 
the structure of the labor market can be important in an even more fundamen-
tal way. Different occupation-groups require a different degree of specializa-
tion in their workers (Hall and Soskice 2001; Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 
2001; Streeck 2011). Many service-occupations, both at the lower (waiters, shop 
attendants) and at the upper (management, marketing) end of the labor mar-
ket require generalists. Many production-related occupations, by contrast, re-
quire relatively high skill-specificity in workers at different skill-levels (techni-
cians, engineers) (Streeck 1991). This makes unusual careers more likely in the 




manufacturing sector plays a larger role should see less occupational mobility 
and hence less mismatches. 
Labor market institutions and mismatch 
A third dimension on which British and German labor market contexts differ 
is the presence and strength of institutions such as unions, collective bargain-
ing, and work councils at the company level (Crouch 1994; Streeck 1991). 
Where organized labor is strong and well established, there should be less mis-
match. From the standpoint of insider-workers and unions, mismatch is un-
desirable. Overqualification means that a worker’s remuneration and work 
content is not adequate to his or her level of training. Underqualification 
should be even more unwelcome to the established parts of the workforce. 
Formal qualifications have always been not just a certification of technical 
skills, but also a means of social closure (Weber 1922 Chapter 1, §10; Collins 
1971; Parkin 1974). Qualification requirements limit the labor supply available 
in a given occupation. This allows workers in that position to improve their 
bargaining position vis a vis management and to extract rents that would not 
be available in a strictly competitive labor market (Sørensen 2000).9 Skilled 
workers currently in employment have therefore a strong interest in effectively 
enforced qualification requirements. If an employer was to hire less-skilled 
workers for a job, which is usually filled with qualified workers, this would un-
dercut the latter’s bargaining position.  
Labor market insiders, like established skilled workers, are the core con-
stituency of unions. Unions thus have powerful incentives to enforce qualifi-
cation matching and to oppose management attempts to erode insider-rents 
by recruiting underqualified workers. This is why formal qualification 
 
9 Historically, limiting the supply of labor available to a company has been the dominant 
strategy by local trade unions to pressure for increased wages in the United Kingdom. In 
effect, union officials decided who could apply for a job (Thelen 2010, Chapter 3). Manda-




requirements for certain occupations are often explicitly defined in the pay-
scales of collective agreements. Where collective bargaining is well established 
and collective agreements cover significant shares of the workforce, formal en-
try requirements to positions are thus clearly defined. The existence of works 
councils and the presence of employee representatives in hiring committees, 
finally, means that unions have some leverage to enforce these rules. A final 
hypothesis regarding contextual determinants of mismatch patterns is there-
fore that mismatch and especially underqualification should be less common 
where labor organizations, collective bargaining, and union influence on hir-
ing are stronger. 
Arguments like these suggest that mismatch is a highly context-dependent 
phenomenon. My dissertation examines, in how far the incidence, the predic-
tors, and the consequences of mismatch vary across countries with very differ-
ent institutional set-ups in the labor market and the education system.  
The logic of comparison 
Inference about the causal effect of a single institution or even a single typo-
logical dimension of difference is not the goal of this dissertation. With just 
two data points and many potential variables, this is any way logically impos-
sible. On a substantive level, it should be clear that countries’ education and 
labor market regimes are not an arbitrary assortment of different institutions. 
Political science scholarship extensively shows how education systems and la-
bor market institutions have co-evolved from their foundations in the middle-
ages in close interdependence (Trampusch 2010; Busemeyer and Trampusch 
2012). Links between different institutions are however not just historical 
(Thelen 2010), they are arguably functional as well (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
This means that different kinds of institutions, say, the way vocational training 




institutional environment is crucial to understand their effect on sociological 
processes – hence the common heuristic of institutional regimes.  
Comparing outcomes between two very different regimes allows for two 
possible inferences: If no difference is found, this is strong evidence that the 
process under study is likely independent from institutional context. If a dif-
ference is found, it likely lies at the upper bound of possible variation that ex-
ists between contexts from the population of highly developed market econo-
mies. A comparison such as the one undertaken in the following studies is 
therefore always explorative in the sense that it outlines the extent of contex-
tual variation in the processes studied. 
Data sources 
The empirical work in this dissertation is for the most part based on longitu-
dinal individual-level panel survey data collected in the United Kingdom and 
Germany. For Germany, I mainly rely on data collected by the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (GSOEP, Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007), while for 
the United Kingdom, I use data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study 
(UKLHS, Buck and McFall 2011). These datasets are among the largest, longest-
running and highest quality panel-survey datasets available to social scien-
tists. They are very similar in sampling strategy, questionnaire design, and con-
tent. It is hence possible to derive comparable measures from these two da-
tasets and perform longitudinal analyses of micro-dynamics largely in parallel. 
The concrete analytical steps taken for each study are described in detail in the 
respective chapters and their appendices. 
For the historical analyses in Chapter 4, I resort to a trend-file of seven har-
monized cross-sectional data sets from the UK, the Skills and Employment 
Surveys Series Dataset (UKSESS, Felstead et al. 2014), which offer additional 
self-assessment-based measures of under- and overqualification for the 




time. In that chapter, I also include information from official labor market sur-
veys, the (Quarterly) Labor Force Survey of the United Kingdom (Northern 
Ireland Statistics and Social Survey Division Office For National Statistics 
2019), and the German Mikrozensus (DESTATIS and GESIS 2017). These da-
tasets are even larger than the panel studies and hence allow me to precisely 
estimate labor market contexts’ characteristics, which take center stage in that 
chapter. 
Plan of the dissertation 
In the remainder of this text I present three empirical studies on the causes, 
consequences, and wider implications of qualification-to-job mismatches. 
Each study is presented in a separate chapter and is intended to function as a 
self-contained essay that can be published in a refereed social science journal. 
A final concluding chapter summarizes the contributions of the three studies 
for the sociology of labor markets, social mobility, and educational expansion 
in light of the above research questions. 
The empirical investigation starts out in Chapter 2, which is co-authored 
with Merlin Schaeffer.10 In line with the schematism of Figure 2, we begin by 
asking how it is possible that a sizeable share of the labor force ends up in 
occupations for which more education is required than they have. We draw on 
human capital and queuing theory to propose different mechanisms. We iden-
tify those mechanisms with different personality traits that allow some indi-
viduals to access occupations in which most workers command over higher 
 
10 The broad topic of this chapter, undereducation, is due to Merlin Schaeffer. Conceptual 
work on this chapter was shared between Schaeffer and Jonas Wiedner, who decided on the 
kinds of analysis to be performed, drew attention to cognitive and non-cognitive skills and 
contributed the focus on intergenerational mobility. All empirical analyses and data prepa-
ration were carried out by Wiedner. Writing was shared between Schaeffer and Wiedner, 
with the first largely being responsible for the introduction, and the section on skills, and 




qualifications than they do. Building on insights of social mobility research, 
we further argue that the resources conveyed through parents’ social status are 
of great importance in explaining underqualification. Empirically, we rely on a 
longitudinal analysis of the careers of respondents from the UKHLS and SOEP. 
To gain analytical leverage, we distinguish between two ways of moving into 
underqualification: entry from outside the employing organization and pro-
motion. Our results show that persons whose (non-)cognitive skills exceed 
their formal education are more likely to be underqualified in the cross-section 
and to enter underqualification employment or be promoted into it. Parental 
socio-economic status is a similarly important predictor of these outcomes. 
Using decomposition techniques, we can even trace a significant share of the 
effects of (non-)cognitive skills to it. To complete our intergenerational argu-
ment, we finally demonstrate that undereducation acts as an important path-
way in the intergenerational reproduction of earnings inequality – more so, in 
fact, than the avoidance of overeducation. These results are remarkably similar 
across the United Kingdom and Germany, although some country differences 
suggest higher skill-induced career mobility in Britain and stronger origin ef-
fects in Germany. 
In Chapter 3, I focus squarely on the consequences of mismatches for the 
individual. In doing so, I revisit the old debate on the concept of status incon-
sistency. Subject of this debate is the question, whether there are independent 
effects of a mismatch between different status-dimensions, such as education 
and occupation, on individual’s social and political attitudes and behaviors. 
The challenge in testing this claim is that statistical models to quantify the 
independent effects of occupation, education, and mismatch are not identi-
fied. This problem has led to a large but contradictory literature where differ-
ent methodological fixes are proposed and employed. I review these methods 
and show that they generally do not answer the purported research question. 




then introduce a novel identification strategy that relies on weaker, more gen-
eral, and transparent assumptions. Empirical results of OLS and fixed-effects 
models employing this new technique show that mismatch has independent 
effects on well-being, identity, and social integration – but not on political var-
iables. This suggests that mismatch is an important concept in studying the 
subjective experience of social stratification. As in Chapter 2, there is only very 
limited evidence of country differences. 
In the final empirical chapter, I zoom out from the individual level and ex-
amine historical trends in mismatch-incidence. This step documents, firstly, 
that mismatch-patterns need to be understood in their historical and labor 
market context. Secondly, it shows how a mismatch-perspective can lend ana-
lytical leverage to problems that have not previously been studied through a 
mismatch-lens. On a substantive level, Chapter 4 investigates the relationship 
between labor market change, the expansion of education, and qualification-
to-job mismatch. While educational expansion is recognized by sociologist as 
one of the major forces shaping social change, it remains debated whether it 
has outstripped the demand for qualified labor. The chapter therefore asks, to 
what degree the sharp expansion of education has been absorbed by the 
changing labor markets in the United Kingdom and Germany. I show that 
overqualification has increased and underqualification decreased in the 
United Kingdom since the 1980s, both over historical time and over cohorts. 
In West Germany, by contrast, mismatch-differences are minimal between co-
horts, but the overall incidence of underqualification increased, whereas over-
qualification decreased. Further analyses of cohort-differences in mismatch 
provide clear evidence that overqualification increased with educational ex-
pansion in the United Kingdom but not in Germany. These findings document 
that the United Kingdom experiences credential inflation, whereas West Ger-
many is affected by a mild skill-shortage, mainly among middling positions 




patterns of educational expansion and labor market change, which are rooted 
in the contrasting institutional logics discussed above, have a crucial effect on 
aggregate levels of mismatch.   
The concluding chapter revisits the three research questions raised above 
and examines the empirical results of the three studies for answers. I put spe-
cial emphasis on how the combined findings shed light on my third research 
question regarding the relationship between institutions and mismatch pat-
terns. The final chapter also takes stock of the contributions the dissertation 
can make to various current debates in sociology and policy. I then sum up the 
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A significant share of employees in Europe has less formal training than 
is required by their job; they are undereducated. We use harmonized 
panel data from the United Kingdom and Germany to investigate the 
skills and resources allowing the undereducated to develop careers in 
occupations supposedly beyond their reach. Our theoretical approach 
complements individual-centered labor market theory with an inter-
generational mobility perspective which regards undereducation as a 
form of family status maintenance. Our empirical results show that 
persons whose (non-)cognitive skills exceed their formal education are 
more likely to be undereducated in the cross-section, and to enter un-
dereducated employment or be promoted into it throughout the life 
course. Yet beyond individual merit, parental socio-economic status is 
a similarly-important predictor of these outcomes; our analyses even 
trace a significant share of the importance of (non-)cognitive skills to 
it. To complete our intergenerational argument, we finally demonstrate 
that undereducation acts as a pathway to the intergenerational repro-
duction of earnings inequality – more so, in fact, than the avoidance of 
overeducation. These results are remarkably similar across the UK and 
Germany, although some country differences suggest higher skill-in-
duced career mobility in Britain and stronger origin effects in Germany. 












A large literature in sociology and related fields studies the causes and conse-
quences of overeducation, that is, people attaining a certain level of education 
but finding no appropriate employment thereafter (for reviews see Kalleberg, 
2007; McGuinness, 2006). On the flipside, some 5% to 25% of employees in 
Western labor markets are undereducated, meaning that they have less formal 
schooling than is required by their current job (Rohrbach-Schmidt & Tie-
mann, 2016; Sloane et al., 1999; Verhaest & Omey, 2006). While there is an 
ongoing debate among social scientists on how to conceptualize their situa-
tion, for employees themselves over- and undereducation are real phenomena. 
Self-assessment studies show that a sizeable proportion of workers self-iden-
tify as mismatched (Verhaest & Omey, 2006). In line with this, qualification-
mismatched employment has measurable consequences in terms of life and 
job satisfaction or even civic engagement as status inconsistency theory pre-
dicts (Vaisey, 2006; for a review and most recent results see Wiedner, 2020). 
Undereducation is a phenomenon among the less educated, because the 
chances to find employment in an occupation where requirements are higher 
than one’s own qualifications diminish with increasing education. Unfortu-
nately, we know very little about the undereducated, since social science schol-
arship is preoccupied with overeducation. This lack of attention is unfortunate 
against the fact that many less educated workers who reach middle income 
and status positions actually work as undereducated employees.  
The curious phenomenon of undereducation poses two questions. One 
might wonder why the undereducated did not gain a better formal education 
to begin with, that is, why they apparently dropped out of school too early. But 




and ask: Which skills and resources allow the undereducated to successfully 
develop careers for which the majority of their colleagues need significantly 
more formal education?  
In setting out to answer this question, this article combines two ap-
proaches. Our starting point are classic labor market theories. Seeking to re-
dress some of their blind spots with regards to undereducation, we propose 
that it must be certain worker qualities, such as general cognitive ability and 
specific non-cognitive skills, which go beyond the skill set indicated by per-
sons’ formal education, that allow them to compensate for their lack of formal 
education. We complement this individual-centered approach by secondly 
proposing an argument based on intergenerational reproduction. This type of 
explanation regards undereducation as a form of status maintenance among 
persons who failed to attain a level of education that reflects their parents’ so-
cio-economic status. Importantly, this perspective also implies that undered-
ucation mediates the intergenerational transmission of earnings. Ours is thus 
the first study to relate undereducation to questions of intergenerational social 
reproduction. 
Using panel data, we investigate various implications of these two ap-
proaches across the careers of employees: the overall likelihood of underedu-
cation, extra-firm entry into undereducation, within-firm promotion into un-
dereducation, and finally the role of undereducation vis-á-vis (avoidance of) 
overeducation in the intergenerational transmission of earnings inequality. 
Moreover, by analyzing harmonized data from two institutionally highly dis-
similar countries, the UK (2009-2015, UKLHS) and Germany (2004-2016; 
SOEP), we hope to demonstrate that our arguments generalize across different 
labor markets and their linked education systems. 
We indeed find largely similar results across the UK and Germany. In sup-
port of the idea that individual characteristics can partially substitute for 




or who are characterized by what we refer to as an ‘entrepreneurial’ personality, 
who are more likely to work as undereducated employees and to be promoted 
into undereducation, especially in the UK. At the same time, parental occupa-
tion is, especially in Germany, a systematic predictor of these outcomes, too. 
Subsequent results of mediation analyses, which bring together the individ-
ual-centered with our intergenerational perspective, suggest that this is par-
tially due to class-specific transmission of beneficial cognitive and non-cogni-
tive traits. Counter standard expectations, we find no evidence that social cap-
ital utilization in terms of job search strategies accounts for the importance of 
family background. We finally show that undereducation is an important 
channel for the intergenerational transmission of earnings inequality, and ac-
tually matters more than the (avoidance of) overeducation. 
 
Theoretical background 
In every economy some people work in jobs that do not fit their formal level of 
qualification. Scholarly work on such job-education mismatches was sparked 
off in the 1970s by concerns that the educational expansion of the 1960s may 
have led to wide-spread overeducation and declining returns to education 
(Collins, 1979; Freeman, 1976). A vast literature has since investigated the ori-
gins and consequences of overeducation (for reviews see Kalleberg, 2007; 
McGuinness, 2006). Since the 1980s other macro level developments 
(postindustrialism and nowadays digitalization) lead to the opposite concern 
about a skills shortage in the economy (Handel, 2003; Leitch, 2006). Yet, a 
comparable interest in the undereducated never arose. The reason is probably 
that undereducation is not regarded as a disadvantage or social problem for 
the individual employee. Having overcome career barriers that restrict most of 




latter (McGuinness, 2006), and do not even feel overburdened by their job 
tasks (Pecoraro, 2016; Rohrbach-Schmidt & Tiemann, 2016). But what allows 
them to achieve this? 
We maintain that certain skills and resources allow for career trajectories 
into undereducation. Below, we introduce two types of arguments in favor of 
this general claim. Our review of classic labor market theories suggests that 
undereducation may be the outcome of individual characteristics that are not 
accurately reflected in formal degrees, especially general cognitive ability and 
non-cognitive skills. We complement this individual-centered approach by 
secondly proposing an intergenerational mobility perspective according to 
which undereducation should be understood as a form of family-status 
maintenance enabled by beneficial parental resources, so that undereducation 
acts as pathway for the intergenerational transmission of advantage.11 
Undereducation as the Outcome of Individual Skills 
Two labor market theories dominate the field of job-education mismatch re-
search (McGuinness, 2006). Human capital theory assumes a competitive la-
bor market in which employers try to hire the most productive workers at the 
lowest cost (G. S. Becker, 1964). Queuing theory assumes jobs (not applicants) 
to be more or less productive and that employers sort applicants according to 
 
11 Both arguments raise the question why the educational system did not allow the future 
undereducated to attain a higher level of education to begin with, and why the labor mar-
ket is permeable enough to eventually compensate for the apparent mislabeling of pupils. 
While this question is an interesting one, it is also beyond the scope of this article. But by 
analyzing panel data from two countries with highly dissimilar education systems and asso-
ciated labor markets, the UK and Germany, we hope to demonstrate that our findings hold 
under general institutional configurations: Germany’s stratified and vocationally-oriented 
education system is tightly interlinked with a comparatively regulated labor market, char-
acterized by deep-rooted occupational profiles. The UK’s more comprehensive, general-ed-
ucation system, on the other hand, has fuzzy links to a liberal labor market (Allmendinger, 
1989; Hall & Soskice, 2001). As a result, formal qualifications are of lower signaling value in 




how well they appear to be trainable to perform a given job well (Thurow, 1975). 
By default, research in either tradition tends to equate applicants’ productivity 
or trainability with their formal education because it is a reliable and easily 
observable indicator. Undereducation therefore poses a problem to strict in-
terpretations of these theories. In response, economists have devised assign-
ment and search models, which consider that search is costly to workers and 
firms. From the perspective of employers, hiring undereducated workers may 
thus be preferable to continued search (Sattinger, 1995). These models accom-
modate the existence of mismatches in the aggregate, but they do not explain 
who will be undereducated. To do that, conventional perspectives need to rec-
ognize that the undereducated must have skills which are not well captured by 
their formal education; skills that (if indirectly) render them more productive, 
that signal higher trainability than their formal education alone would indi-
cate, or that shape their job search behavior. 
To further theorize these skills, it is useful to summarize the little we know 
about the undereducated, most of which is unsystematized bycatch from re-
search on overeducation. Their wage-advantages over similarly educated peers 
are driven by their more complex job tasks (Rohrbach-Schmidt & Tiemann, 
2016). Nevertheless, they do not report to lack important skills more frequently 
than their correctly-matched colleagues (Allen & van der Velden, 2001; Green 
& McIntosh, 2007). They might have gained these skills because in comparison 
to correctly-matched or overeducated employees they tend to receive more for-
mal on the job training (Buchel et al., 2004; Verhaest & Omey, 2006; but cf. 
Korpi & Tåhlin, 2009), and report to be better at informal learning during work 
(Buchel et al., 2004). 
An obvious first candidate of what could qualify the undereducated is 
therefore general cognitive ability, as often measured by IQ tests. Cognitive 
ability is highly predictive of labor market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006; D. 




workers to understand complex job tasks, increase their skills with work expe-
rience, and benefit from further education. From an employers’ perspective, 
formal certification may simply be not as important if workers are able to 
demonstrate cognitive ability. In line with these arguments, numeracy skills 
indeed partly explain the wage-advantages of the undereducated over their 
similarly educated peers, and many of those, who are mismatched with re-
gards to their education, appear to be matched regarding their actual skill-
levels (Levels et al., 2014; Rohrbach-Schmidt & Tiemann, 2016). From a career 
trajectory perspective, it seems most plausible that cognitive ability matters 
only for within-firm promotions into undereducation, that is, when employers 
were able to observe actual performance. But smarter workers might also have 
smart job-search strategies allowing them to directly enter undereducation 
when joining a new firm. 
According to another tradition, employers are not only concerned with 
finding able workers, but also with getting them to work diligently (Shapiro & 
Stiglitz, 1984). From this perspective, monitoring and aligning workers’ incen-
tives to their employer are central features of the employment relationship. 
Because monitoring is costly, compliance enhancing characteristics might be 
rewarded (Bowles et al., 2001). A corresponding empirical literature aims to 
show that non-cognitive skills, such as conscientiousness, agreeableness, or 
emotional stability, are similarly important on the labor market as is cognitive 
ability (Borghans et al., 2008; Farkas, 2003; Heckman & Kautz, 2012). In line 
with these claims, field-experimental correspondence tests reveal employer 
preferences for such non-cognitive skills over cognitive ability, particularly 
with respect to less educated applicants (Protsch & Solga, 2015). This pattern 
finds further support by content analyses of job advertisements (Jackson, 
2007). It could thus be that the undereducated compensate for their lack of 
formal education by being particularly reliable, compliant, and conscientious. 




and their conformist mobility strategies (Bourdieu, 1984). These skills could 
be observable to employers during the application process. But they should 
matter particularly for job performance and hence for promotions into under-
education. 
As a final alternative, we could ask which non-cognitive skills persons must 
possess in order to aspire to, dare, and actively search an unusual career be-
yond their level of formal education. Following Bowles et al. (2001), we might 
call such personality facets entrepreneurial traits. Taken from this angle, it is 
notable that some studies report positive wage effects of openness (Heineck, 
2011), which might indicate workers’ willingness to expose themselves to un-
certain and challenging work situations. Two related traits are risk tolerance 
(for a review see: A. Becker et al., 2012) and an internal locus of control, which 
describes the belief in the ability to determine one’s own future (Rotter, 1966). 
Insofar as these traits shape job-search behavior, they will play a role in enter-
ing new employment situations. But according to Collins (1979, Chapter 2), 
they can also drive the active pursuit of job success within organizations and 
affect undereducation through promotions. 
Undereducation as Status Maintenance 
The idea that people seek to reproduce parents’ socio-economic status (SES), 
is fundamental to research in intergenerational social mobility (Breen & 
Goldthorpe, 1997). The predominant strategy by which people try to achieve 
this is educational attainment. Nevertheless, two strands of literature in the 
field of social mobility document that parental SES continues to matter over 
and beyond one’s formal level of education. The first line of work demon-
strates so-called ‘direct effects of social origin’ (DESO). That is, adult children 
of higher-class families achieve significantly higher occupational positions 
and incomes than children from a lower-class background, even when their 




Jonsson, 1998). Beneficial resources constitute ‘glass floors’ (Gugushvili et al., 
2017) or ‘compensatory advantages’ (Bernardi, 2014; Bernardi & Ballarino, 
2016) that ensure intergenerational reproduction of advantage. The second 
line of work emphasizes that the importance of parental SES is reduced at 
higher levels of education, so that a university education seems to equalize op-
portunities across people of varying parental SES backgrounds (Karlson, 2019; 
Torche, 2011; Brand & Xie, 2010; Hout, 1988; but also see the discussion in Bal-
larino & Bernardi, 2016). 
In this section, we propose to think of these two strands of literature in 
terms of job-education mismatches, and to thus consider undereducation as a 
form of status maintenance among persons who failed to attain an education 
that reflects their parents’ socio-economic status. With respect to the first line 
of work, we suggest that DESOs are, to a considerable extent, driven by less-
educated persons with high SES parents benefitting from opportunities to 
work as undereducated employees. With respect to the second line, we note 
that our argument could explain why the intergenerational transmission of ad-
vantage is often reduced at higher levels of education: Undereducation among 
less-educated persons with high SES parents is a more important pathway of 
intergenerational reproduction than the avoidance of overeducation among 
better-educated persons with high SES parents. Our argument therefore con-
trasts with existing research that instead sees DESOs primarily as the result of 
high-educated persons with low SES parents facing the risk of overeducation 
(Capsada-Munsech, 2015). 
Which family-related resources can higher-class children draw on to com-
pensate for a lack of formal education? We focus on two kinds of resources 
proposed by DESO scholarship: Social capital, and the outcomes of class-spe-
cific socialization (Bernardi & Ballarino, 2016; Erikson & Jonsson, 1998). In the 
following we explain how social capital may help entry into undereducation 




behavior potentially accounts for intra-organizational promotion into under-
education, too.12 
From the outset of social capital research, job access has always been con-
sidered as one of its main benefits (Granovetter, 1973; N. Lin et al., 1981). Ac-
cording to this perspective, people from privileged backgrounds find it easier 
to gain access to jobs, because they know about vacancies via their networks, 
and because they are more likely to be acquainted with those who take the 
relevant hiring decisions (Flap & Völker, 2008). Social capital stemming from 
one’s social origin might thus explain potential SES-origin advantages of ex-
ternally entering undereducation, but it is doubtful that it increases or com-
pensates for the job-performance that is necessary to be promoted into under-
education.  
By contrast, traits and preferences due to origin-specific socialization can 
account for that just as well. Sociology has long argued that class-specific so-
cialization patterns are chief drivers of the intergenerational reproduction of 
social status (Bourdieu, 1984; Jæger & Karlson, 2018). While this tradition fo-
cuses on various differences in socio-cultural practices, which are hard to cap-
ture comprehensively in a study like ours, recent research suggests that general 
cognitive abilities and non-cognitive skills are also influenced by class-specific 
socialization styles (Conger & Donnellan, 2007; Farkas, 2003), and as such me-
diate the effect of parental status on children’s educational and occupational 
attainment (Bourne et al., 2018; Gugushvili et al., 2017; Shanahan et al., 2014). 
We thus hypothesize that one reason why children of high SES parents may be 
more likely to enter undereducation is that they command over more of the 
 
12 Instead of our focus on resources stemming from one’s parental SES background, one 
could also argue that the mere motive of status maintenance might drive parental SES ef-
fects on undereducation. Note however, that this implies a theory about the ambition to 
decrease the relative difference between one’s own and one’s parents’ socio-economic sta-
tus. Section G in the Online Supplement discusses why any such relative measure of social 
origin is difficult to operationalize in our set-up, and presents results from two different ap-




skills and traits that give access to it: If cognitive ability and non-cognitive 
skills are class-specific and related to undereducation, they should account for 
class differences in undereducation. 
Data and methods 
We base our analyses on harmonized data from the UK Longitudinal House-
hold Study 2009-2016 (UKHLS; Buck & McFall, 2011) and the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study 2004-2016 (SOEP; Goebel et al., 2018). This allows us to 
test the generalizability of our results across institutional contexts. Both panel 
surveys are comparable with respect to their sampling strategies, their field-
work, and even the wording of most of the instruments we rely on. 
Overall, we restrict the analytic sample to men and women between 20 and 
60 years of age, who are currently not enrolled in full-time education or train-
ing. We exclude self-employed respondents, because our discussion of labor 
market theories does not apply to them. Finally, we restrict the UK sample to 
respondents who have joined the study prior to wave three, and the SOEP sam-
ple to respondents who participated at least in round 2006 or 2012; our key 
predictors were collected in or before these survey years. To account for une-
qual sampling and attrition probabilities, we employ provided post-stratifica-
tion weights. 
Dependent variables 
Our first dependent variable is a binary indicator of undereducation status 
which identifies respondents who have substantially less formal education 
than what is typical in their current occupation. This variable is available for 
every UKHLS and SOEP survey wave. The crucial factor in measuring under-
education is the operationalization of the typically-required formal education 




relies on the observed distribution of years of schooling in each occupation 
(for a review see: McGuinness, 2006). We distinguish occupations via the 
ISCO88 classification on a three-digit level and estimate occupation-specific 
mean years of schooling and standard deviations from that mean based on the 
poststratification-weighted overall UKHLS and SOEP samples (see Section A 
in the Online Supplement for details and Section J for sensitivity analyses). 
Following standard practice, we define respondents as undereducated if their 
personal years of schooling are less than one occupation-specific standard de-
viation of their current occupation’s mean years of schooling: 
 
Undereducation𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝟙(Edu𝑖𝑗𝑘 < (Edu𝑗𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ −  SD(Edu𝑗𝑘))), 
where i indexes employees and j indexes occupations. Because of significant 
regional differences, k indicates East Germany or London. 
Although binary indicators are intuitive, they come at the loss of fine-
grained information. Section E of the Online Supplement therefore reports 
results for the metric depth of undereducation and details the steps in our con-
struction of these variables. Where the results diverge meaningfully from the 
binary specification, we report them in the main article. Some of our analyses 
use these metric depths of under- and overeducation as explanatory variables 
(see Section 4.4). 
For Germany, we are able to test the robustness of our findings against an-
other indicator of undereducation that is based on respondents’ self-assess-
ment of their job’s qualification requirements. We are thus able to address con-
cerns regarding the quality of measurement in the job-education mismatch 
literature (Leuven & Oosterbeek, 2011). Results using this alternative measure 
largely confirm our main findings (see Section D of the Online Supplement). 
Our second dependent variable is log-transformed monthly gross labor in-




under- vis-á-vis overeducation for the intergenerational transmission of ad-
vantage. In both datasets, we rely on labor income variables that were imputed 
by the data provider (Knies, 2018, p. 88ff; Frick & Grabka, 2014). 
Predictor Variables 
The key predictors of our analyses are respondents’ cognitive and non-cogni-
tive skills, and parental SES. Table 1 shows the survey years during which time-
varying variables were collected. Direct measures of general cognitive ability 
are a rarity in population surveys. The UKHLS and SOEP contain such 
measures, although the tests are somewhat different and hence not directly 
comparable. UKHLS respondents solved logical puzzles, subtraction exer-
cises, and tests of their everyday numeracy skills (McFall, 2013). SOEP re-
spondents had to match a range of symbols to numbers according to a prede-
fined key (Schupp et al., 2008). Unfortunately, only a random 25% sub-sample 
of the SOEP was assessed each time. Because the other 75% are missing com-
pletely at random (MCAR) we imputed their cognitive ability scores (see be-
low). 
Our measures of non-cognitive skills are directly comparable across the 
UKHLS and SOEP. To assess the Big-5 personality dimensions, both surveys 
rely on identical short versions of the FFM personality inventory (Dehne & 
Schupp, 2007). For each survey year, we performed a varimax rotated princi-
pal-component analysis of the 15 items, which are measured on 7-point scales. 
As predictors in our analysis we use factor scores based on a five-component 
solution reflecting the Big-5 personality dimensions. The two other concepts 
we investigate, risk aversion and locus of control, were measured using stand-
ard single item scales in both surveys13 
 
13 Risk aversion: `Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try 
to avoid taking risks?’ with an eleven-point scale ranging from `avoid taking risks’ to `fully 




To facilitate ease of interpretation in our longitudinal models, we use con-
firmatory factor analysis to reduce the various measures of non-cognitive skills 
to two scales that reflect our theoretical approach: The compliance enhancing 
traits scale comprises of all items that inform the subscales of conscientious-
ness and agreeableness; the entrepreneurial traits scale consists of openness, 
locus of control, and risk tolerance items (for details on scaling and model fit 
see Section K in the Online Supplement). 
We measure parental SES by using respondents’ recollection of their par-
ents’ occupation when they were 14/15 years old. In particular, we use the aver-
age of parents’ international socio-economic index (ISEI) to measure socio-
economic origin.14 Section F in the Online Supplement discusses results for 
parental years of education as an alternative indicator. To illuminate potential 
sources of parental SES effects we additionally use a SOEP item on whether the 
current job was found ‘through friends or relatives’ to test the social capital 
mechanism. 
Control variables 
The baseline controls across all models include age (also squared), gender, im-
migration status and generation, scores from the MCS-12/PCS-12 mental and 
physical health component scales (Andersen et al., 2007), survey year fixed ef-
fects, and dummies for East Germany or London. Most importantly, all results 
are controlled for respondents’ years of education, because undereducation is 
more prevalent among the less educated. Controlling for own schooling pre-
vents us from merely estimating determinants of low education. Our models 
of undereducation also include a squared term for education to improve model 
 
beyond my control’ with a six-point scale ranging from `strongly disagree’ to `strongly 
agree”. 
14 For the UKHLS, we obtain ISEI-values through a translation routine pro-vided by the 




fit. Our longitudinal models of extra-firm entry into undereducation addition-
ally control for employment status in the previous survey wave, or in the pro-
motion models for overtime worked, part-time employment, and tenure. 
For our longitudinal analyses we additionally estimate a second specifica-
tion, which aims to compare transitions into undereducation among persons 
with similar prior career trajectories. This strategy results in a very conserva-
tive test of our claims, because all cumulative career effects of our predictors 
are effectively purged. What remains is simply whether workers can success-
fully signal or exploit their skills and resources at any specific point of transi-
tion. We control for prior-career trajectories via fixed effects for respondents 
last reported occupational position and industry.15 We exclude respondents for 
whom these variables are undefined because they never worked. In conse-
quence, our longitudinal analyses focus on workers’ career trajectories after 
their initial school-to-work transition has taken place. It thus complements 
existing research on the importance of non-cognitive skills and social back-
ground for school-to-work transitions of low-achieving adolescents 
(Holtmann et al., 2017). Finally, our longitudinal models of within-firm pro-
motions into undereducation additionally condition on company size and pre-
promotion wages. 
Modelling strategy 
We use linear probability models (LPM) with (cluster-)robust standard errors 
to regress undereducation on our predictor variables. LPMs allow us to com-
pare coefficients across models and samples (Breen et al., 2018). Section C of 
the Online Supplement provides results, which are similar in conclusion, 
based on generalized linear models. We also use linear models with (cluster-
 
15 Occupational position is measured by NS-SEC classification (UKHLS) and the comparable 
classification of the German Federal Statistical Office (SOEP). Industry is measured by the 




)robust standard errors to regress logged labor income on parental SES along 
with metric measures of under- and overeducation.  
Across all analyses, the predictor variables are measured as recently to the 
outcome as possible, but always prior to it, so as to prohibit reverse causality. 
For cross-sectional analyses of the UKLHS we regress our two dependent var-
iables measured in Wave 4 on our predictors measured in Waves 1, 2, and 3. 
For cross-sectional analyses of the SOEP we regress our two outcomes meas-
ured in 2007 or 2013 on predictors measured in 2004 to 2006 or 2009 to 2012 
respectively. Among SOEP respondents who participated in 2007 and 2013, we 
choose the more recent observation. These analyses draw on all measures in-
dicated by X in Table 1. All our longitudinal analyses make use of the consecu-
tively measured undereducation indicator (indicated by O in Table 2-1). We z-
standardize all continuous predictors and report LPM coefficients in terms of 







     W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Survey year      ‘09/’10 ‘10/’11 ‘11/’12 ‘12/’13 ‘13/’14 ‘14/’15 ‘15/’16 
IQ        X     
Big5        X     
Locus of control       X      
Risk aversion      X       
Undereducation         X O O O 
SOEP survey year ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 
IQ  X      X     
Big5 X    X    X    
Locus of control X     X  X   X  
Risk aversion  X  X X X X X X X X  
Undereducation   X O O O O O X O O O 
Table 2-2-1 Timing of measurements 
If information on an independent variable is missing, we rely on 100 impu-
tations by chained equations (Van Buuren, 2012). The imputation models use 
information from all variables included in the actual analysis, and from in-
formative background variables. The imputation equations entail past, pre-
sent and future values of the dependent variable, and their interactions to en-
sure an adequate temporal structure. 
In a first step, we predict the general cross-sectional probability of under-
education on the person level. In a second step, we predict extra-firm entry 
and within-firm promotion into undereducation. The analysis of extra-firm 
entry into undereducation focuses on respondents, who will enter a new com-
pany the following year and who are currently unemployed, nonworking, or 
who are employed but not undereducated. We then investigate which of these 
entries into a new company are also entries into undereducation. Our analysis 
of within-firm promotion into undereducation looks at those who were em-
ployed with the same employer for at least two consecutive years. In the spirit 
of discrete-time duration models, we estimate employees’ probability to tran-




year before. To capture only meaningful promotions into undereducation, we 
demand that respondents actually change their 3-digit occupation. Respond-
ents stop being at risk of experiencing a transition if they change company, or 
after being promoted into undereducation. We account for the possibility that 
promotions into undereducation might depend on time spent in a position 
(i.e., duration-dependence), by adding a linear term for tenure with an em-
ployer (transformations of that variable did not improve model fit). For both 
types of analyses, we add dummies for the current number of employment 
spells eligible for extra-firm entries or within-firm promotions. In a third step, 
we revisit our initial cross-sectional model and investigate in how far parental 
SES effects are mediated by social capital and class-of-origin-specific (non-) 
cognitive traits. In a fourth and final step, we again use the cross-sectional 
model and investigate in how far under- and overeducation as well as (non-) 
cognitive traits mediate DESOs (i.e. the effects of parental SES adjusted for 
educational attainment) on labor income. 
Results 
According to our realized matches indicator and population definition, con-
siderable shares of 14.04% (±0.60 percentage points (pp.)) and 12.35% (± 
0.90pp.) of all employees were undereducated in 2014 in the UK and Germany 
respectively. Which skills and resources allow these individuals to develop ca-
reers in occupations in which their colleagues tend to be significantly better 
educated? And in what way do these two figures reflect on the intergenera-
tional transmission of advantage? 
Probability of undereducation 
Figure 2-1 is a coefficient plot of our cross-sectional results. It visualizes the 




associated with a standard deviation increase in any of the respective predictor 
variables, adjusted for the discussed covariates. 
At the top of Figure 2-1 we see that general cognitive ability that goes be-
yond the ability indicated by one’s formal qualification is a systematic predic-
tor of undereducation. Additional analyses presented in Section H of the 
Online Supplement show that this result (and the following ones) cannot be 
explained by final school grades. The importance of cognitive ability therefore 
really goes beyond formally certified skills. This finding is particularly strong 
in the UK, where a standard deviation increase in cognitive ability statistically 
increases the probability of undereducation among employees by 2.79pp.. In 
Germany, by contrast, the result is only marginally significant and indicates a 
0.99pp. increase. One could interpret this as a first tentative sign of country 
differences. But our additional results in the Online Supplement based on the 
metric depth of undereducation (Section E), generalized-linear models (Sec-
tion C), and a more lenient definition of undereducation (Section E) all sug-
gest that cognitive ability is a significant predictor of undereducation in Ger-
many. We therefore regard these results as weaker, although nevertheless sup-
portive evidence for ability effects in Germany, too. At first glance the magni-
tude of both effect sizes may seem very small. But because undereducation is 
rather rare, these coefficients correspond to considerable increases of 19.87% 






Figure 2-1 Linear probability models predicting undereducation 
Note: LPM estimates with 95 and 90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. 
Estimates that do not reach a marginal level of significance are displayed in grey. Results are 
controlled for region, years of schooling, years of schooling2, gender, migration status, year, 
and health. 𝑛UK = 10,964, 𝑛DE = 12,348. Full regression results are displayed in Table B.1 in 
the Online Supplement. 
The idea that compliance enhancing traits can effectively compensate for a 
lack of schooling finds no support. The Big-5 contain three dimensions that 
might reasonably be interpreted as aligning workers’ behavior with manage-
ments’ needs: Conscientiousness, emotional stability (i.e. low neuroticism), 
and agreeableness. But according to Figure 2-1, none of the three correspond-
ing personality traits shows a significantly positive relationship with undered-
ucation in either of the two countries. The undereducated are not rewarded 
for (petty-bourgeois) diligence. 
What then about the somewhat opposing perspective that emphasizes the 




our cross-sectional data are consistent with this argument. Openness to expe-
rience and an internal locus of control are very similarly associated with a 
higher probability of undereducation in both countries (locus of control is 
only marginally significant in Germany in the LPM-specification, but just as 
IQ a consistently significant predictor in the alternative specifications reported 
in Sections E and C in the Online Supplement). The estimated effect sizes for 
these variables all lie between a 0.67pp. (5.42%) and a 1.10pp. (8.90%) increase 
in the probability of undereducation per standard deviation. Only the third 
entrepreneurial trait, risk tolerance, does not predict undereducation. 
Turning to our second argument, according to which undereducation is an 
expression of status maintenance, we indeed see that being from a high-SES 
family substantially increases one’s probability of undereducation. Figure 3 
shows results for parental ISEI, but similar conclusions hold if we use parental 
education (see Section F in the Online Supplement). Children of high-status 
parents are often able to offset unsuccessful education careers. Interestingly, 
the results for parental background reverse-mirror those for cognitive ability 
with respect to our two countries. That is, whereas cognitive ability seems to 
be somewhat more predictive of undereducation in the UK, parental SES is a 
stronger predictor in Germany. 
Career trajectories into undereducation 
What are typical career trajectories into undereducation? Table 2-2 reports the 
annual probability of a transition into undereducation (given employment the 
following year; ‘outflow’) and the last employment states of the newly under-
educated (‘inflow’) for people with a history of employment. The annual prob-
abilities to advance into undereducation are only about 2.82% in the UK and 
3.24% in Germany, respectively. Low transition probabilities are especially ev-
ident among workers who stay with their firm, whereas the annual probabili-




new employment spell. Nevertheless, the inflow rates document that about 
37% of newly undereducated workers in the UK and 44% in Germany were 
employed with the same employer before their transition into undereduca-
tion; despite relatively low transition rates, a large share of the undereducated 





 Last employment status Outflow Inflow 






External entries …  13.62 12.08 63.01 55.94 
… of which from … 
… outside the labor 
force 
14.26 9.93 16.76 10.83 
 … unemployment 17.28 16.22 18.78 14.21 
 
… employment  
(with different em-
ployer) 
11.62 11.60 27.47 30.90 
Employment (with same em-
ployer) 
 1.20 1.68 36.99 44.06 
Overall  2.82 3.24 100.00 100.00 
N  67905 99429 1928 4175 
Table 2-1-2 Outflow and inflow rates into undereducation (in %) 
Note: Weighted results for waves 2-7 of the UKLHS and the years 2005-2016 of the SOEP. 
Do the earlier identified skills and resources predict extra-firm entries and 
within-firm promotions into undereducation? Figure 2-2 presents results of 
two model specifications. Model 1 mirrors the design of the model presented 
in Figure 2-1, but now predicts extra-firm entries and within-firm promotions 
into undereducation. Starting with extra-firm entries, the results only reflect 
our earlier findings with respect to the importance of parental background in 
Germany. That is, the children of upper-class parents are more likely to enter 
a new firm as undereducated employees in Germany. But apart from that, we 
are unable to systematically predict extra-firm entries into undereducation. 
Turning to within-firm promotions, and thus to career-trajectories of per-
sons who have left an impression on their supervisors, we see most of the ear-
lier reported patterns. That is, non-cognitive skills that we identified as ‘entre-
preneurial’ traits predict within-firm promotions into undereducation. Com-
pliance enhancing traits, by contrast, remain unrelated to promotions into un-




differences in the relative importance of (non-)meritocratic characteristics. In 
the UK persons with high cognitive ability have a higher probability to be pro-
moted into undereducation. In Germany, by contrast, employees with higher 
SES parents can more often convince their supervisors to promote them. The 
results of Figure 2-2 therefore tentatively suggest that the UK labor market 
might offer more meritocratic post-education careers than the German, where 







Table 2-2 Linear probability models predicting entry into undereducation 
Note: LPM estimates with 95 and 90% confidence intervals based on cluster-robust standard 
errors. Estimates that do not reach a marginal level of significance are displayed in grey. Re-
sults are controlled for region, age, age2, years of schooling, years of schooling2, gender, mi-
gration status, year, health, and repeated spells. Tenure, part-time, and share overtime 
worked are also controlled in promotion models. Controls for past attainment include indus-
try, occupational position of the last job, and company size and wages earned (promotion 
only). 𝑛obs, UK, promotions = 27,594, 𝑛persons, UK, promotions = 10,256, 𝑛obs, UK, extra-firm entry =
3,696, 𝑛persons, UK, extra-firm entry = 3,191; 𝑛obs, DE, promotion = 53,304, 𝑛persons, DE, promotion =
13,904, 𝑛obs, DE, extra-firm entry = 7,161, 𝑛persons, DE, extra-firm entry = 4,926. Full regression results 






Figure 2-2 further contains results of another set of models, which condi-
tion on past career attainment, that is, estimates which are purged of possible 
confounders, but also of cumulative career effects. We do not suggest this to 
be a better, but rather a different test. What effectively remains in these con-
servative models, is whether skills and resources can be successfully signaled 
or exploited at any potential point of transition. The results confirm that even 
compared to persons on similar career trajectories, workers in the UK can ex-
ploit high cognitive abilities and entrepreneurial traits to increase their prob-
ability of being promoted into undereducation in the coming year. Vice versa, 
German workers seem to be able to exploit whatever resources higher parental 
SES offers, when it comes to entering undereducation externally and through 
promotion, even when we limit the comparison to workers who have had iden-
tical career paths up until that point. This finding further highlights the pat-
tern of the continuing importance of social background in Germany versus the 
relevance of individual traits in the UK. 
Mechanisms of parental SES effects on undereducation 
Figure 2-1 documents large social background effects on undereducation like-
lihoods. Social origin also matters to explain career trajectories into undered-
ucation, at least in Germany. How can we explain such ‘glass-floors’ or ‘com-
pensatory advantages’ in post-school occupational attainment? To answer this 
question, we now revisit our initial models (Figure 2-1) and test whether two 
explanations that are prominent in the social mobility literature apply to the 
case of undereducation. We do so by calculating the share of the parental SES 






Figure 2-2 Decomposition of social background effects on undereducation 
Note: LPM estimates with 90 and 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, 
or non-parametric 90 and 95% confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap replications. See 
Section I in the Online Supplement for underlying regression models. 
Figure 2-3 displays our findings. In the upper panel, it reports the raw social 
origin coefficient estimated in a model featuring only basic control variables 
and the size of the reduced social origin coefficient estimated in a model that 
additionally features the mediator of interest. In the bottom panel, it displays 
the relative share of the social origin coefficient that can be accounted for by 
the respective mediator. According to our estimates, between 24.4% (UK) and 
6.3% (Germany) of background effects result from class-differences in (non-




Even using relatively crude measures of origin-class-specific attributes, these 
results demonstrate a significant role of social-origin-related traits in account-
ing for background effects in undereducation careers, especially in the UK. 
Importantly, this also means that a significant share of the above-mentioned 
importance of (non-)cognitive skills in fact reflects parental SES. 
Nevertheless, these figures leave plenty room for mediation via social cap-
ital, which, however, we can only test for Germany. Are people from higher 
status backgrounds more likely to be undereducated, because through their 
social networks they can draw on personal references, better information 
about vacancies, or outright patronage? Figure 6 does not show any evidence 
that this might be the case. The percentage change in the social origin under-
education association if we control for how workers found their current job, 
which includes “through friends or family”, is negligible and far from being 
statistically significant, which is in line with previous research on DESOs 
(Gugushvili et al., 2017). 
We further test for heterogeneous effects by parental SES (see Section I in 
the Online Supplement). This additional test answers to a frequently-raised 
argument, according to which class-specific network quality, rather than the 
mere quantity of network use, matters for labor market success. That is, draw-
ing on social capital leads to advantages only in resource-rich networks (Moer-
beek & Flap, 2008). But according to our analyses the degree to which job-
search methods (including social capital utilization) matter for undereduca-
tion does not depend on one’s SES background. In line with Shanahan et al. 
(2014), however, there is evidence that (non-)cognitive traits are more im-





Undereducation and the intergenerational transmission of ad-
vantage 
So far, the results are in line with our intergenerational perspective: Persons 
from advantaged backgrounds are more likely to be undereducated, enter un-
dereducation, or be promoted into undereducation. Moreover, even the  
(non-)cognitive skills that similarly predict these outcomes can partly be 
traced back to parental SES. But this evidence remains suggestive with respect 
to our claim that DESOs are driven by undereducation, which we also sug-
gested as a potential explanation for why DESOs have been shown to be 
stronger among the less as compared to the better educated. Focusing on labor 










 Complete sample Non-graduates Graduates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 UK 
Parents' average ISEI 0.0575*** 0.0282*** 0.0501*** 0.0400*** 0.0566*** 0.0330*** 0.0573** 
 (8.20) (4.23) (7.33) (5.79) (7.62) (4.58) (3.04) 
SD undereducated  0.371***  0.316***  0.374***  
  (22.48)  (19.77)  (21.23)  
SD overeducated  -0.409*** -0.351***     
  (-25.68) (-21.84)     
N 10584 10584 10584 10584 8980 8980 1604 
 Germany 
Parents' average ISEI 0.0493*** 0.0252** 0.0429*** 0.0321*** 0.0529*** 0.0316*** 0.0324* 
 (5.91) (3.11) (5.12) (3.94) (5.48) (3.37) (2.10) 
SD undereducated  0.225***  0.222***  0.245***  
  (14.59)  (14.59)  (15.42)  
SD overeducated  -0.210*** -0.206***     
  (-12.79) (-12.46)     
N 12594 12594 12594 12594 10494 10494 2100 
Table 2-1-3 Mediators of the direct effects of social origin on logged-labor-income 
Note: OLS estimates with t-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. Results are controlled for age, age squared, 
years of education,16 mental and physical health scores, migration origin, gender, region, and survey year. 
 
 










Column 1 of Table 2-2 reports estimates of the direct effects of social origin 
on labor income for both the UK and Germany. A standard deviation increase 
in parental SES goes along with a statistically significant increase in earnings 
of about 5.8 and 4.9%, respectively, despite holding education constant. There 
is thus evidence of significant earnings DESOs in both countries.17 Adding un-
der- and overeducation, Column 2 shows that about half of these DESO esti-
mates can be traced to educational mismatches. Yet the distinct advantage of 
our focus on undereducation becomes apparent only in Columns 3 and 4, 
which each contain only one of the two mismatch types. The two columns re-
veal that DESOs operate more through undereducation than they do via (the 
avoidance of) overeducation: In both countries more than 30% of the DESOs 
can be accounted for by undereducation, while overeducation only accounts 
for 13%. In line with our claim, parental advantage is passed on more strongly 
through promoting undereducation of lower attaining children than through 
shielding highly educated children from overeducation. Our perspective 
thereby reveals that ‘glass-floors’ and ‘compensatory advantages’ are more im-
portant than ‘boosting effects’ in explaining the intergenerational transmis-
sion of inequality net of education. 
Is there also evidence for the second part of our claim, according to which 
the importance of undereducation provides an explanation for stronger 
DESOs among non-graduates? We begin our test by calculating DESOs for 
 
17 This is at odds with Grätz & Pollak’s (2016) analysis of the same data for Germany, and 
Vandecasteele’s (2016) analysis of the 2008 BHPS sample. Using a wide variety of specifica-
tions, we were able to come close to their reported null-finding only when taking analytic 
decisions that we belief are inferior to the ones we adopt in this paper (e.g. casewise dele-





employees with and without a university diploma (Column 7 and 5 respec-
tively). This exercise reveals that the pattern of larger DESOs among lower ed-
ucated employees is present only in Germany but not in the UK. It is thus im-
portant to note that the implied second part of our claim fully applies to the 
German case only. To which extent can undereducation explain the difference 
between the DESO among graduates as compared to non-graduates? The cru-
cial test lies in the comparison between the DESO estimates of Column 6 and 
7 for Germany. It appears that controlling for undereducation among non-
graduates in Column 6 yields an estimate of the remaining parental influence 
that is all but identical to the corresponding estimate for graduates in Column 
7.18 In other words, were it not for non-graduates’ opportunities to work in jobs 
beyond their qualification level and the fact that those from upper class back-
grounds exploit these opportunities over-frequently, earnings DESO would 
not differ between employees with and without higher education credentials 
In Germany. We can thus confirm that, to the degree they are present, higher 
DESOs among the non-tertiary educated operate through undereducation. In 
the UK, an absence of undereducation would even result in earnings DESOs 
among non-graduates that are lower than those among graduates.  
Conclusion 
According to our results, roughly 13% of all workers are undereducated in the 
UK and Germany. This article is the first to explicitly investigate the undered-
ucated by asking what skills and resources set them apart and allow them to 
develop careers in occupations in which most of their colleagues are 
 
18 This is at odds with Grätz & Pollak’s (2016) analysis of the same data for Germany, and 
Vandecasteele’s (2016) analysis of the 2008 BHPS sample. Using a wide variety of specifica-
tions, we were able to come close to their reported null-finding only when taking analytic 
decisions that we belief are inferior to the ones we adopt in this paper (e.g. casewise dele-





significantly better qualified, and, in consequence, to enjoy the associated 
wage benefits over their similarly educated peers. Beyond an approach focus-
ing on workers’ skills exclusively, we suggested that undereducation should 
also be regarded as an important form of intergenerational status mainte-
nance. This perspective implies that direct effects of social origin (DESOs) in 
part come about, because children of high SES parents find ways to offset low 
educational attainment and access employment for which they are formally 
undereducated. 
We identified three types of skills, which, if not accurately reflected in for-
mal degrees, may explain undereducation: While employers might value skills 
that increase productivity and trainability, or skills that increase the compli-
ance with employer interests, a final set of entrepreneurial skills may shape 
workers’ opportunity-seeking behavior. Our analyses reject the second per-
spective, but largely confirm the first and the third. General cognitive ability 
goes along with a considerably increased probability of being undereducated. 
In the UK, it also predicts career transitions into undereducation. The idea of 
undereducation as a reward for compliance and diligence, by contrast, finds 
no support. Moreover, we found that entrepreneurial traits are positively asso-
ciated with undereducation. But in contrast to the idea that such traits operate 
through affecting search behavior on the labor market, our results suggest that 
they drive the pursuit of within-firm success: Entrepreneurial workers are 
more likely to be promoted into undereducation.  
Beyond individual-centered approaches, our analyses also document that 
social origin is a main determinant of undereducation. To our best knowledge, 
ours is thereby the first study to explicitly relate undereducation to questions 
of intergenerational social reproduction. Parental SES is among the strongest 
predictors of undereducation, but only in Germany does it also predict longi-
tudinal career trajectories into undereducation. Our subsequent analyses of 




capital mechanisms. Consistent with explanations that center on durable 
qualities of individuals themselves, our analyses demonstrate that  
(non-)cognitive traits mediate social origin effects, especially in the UK. In 
other words, our analyses show that a significant share of the importance of 
(non-)cognitive skills can be traced to parental SES. 
To underline the relevance of our intergenerational argument, we finally 
demonstrated that so-called direct effects of social origins in terms of earnings 
are driven by undereducation. We find that between 30% and 35% of earnings 
DESOs come about because less-educated children of high SES parents are 
able to enter careers that lie beyond their formal qualification level. The cor-
responding estimate for overeducation, and the idea that high SES parents can 
support their better-educated children to find appropriate employment, is just 
13%. This suggests that the intergenerational transmission of advantage 
mainly takes the form of ‘glass floors’ (Gugushvili et al., 2017) or ‘compensatory 
advantages’ (Bernardi, 2014; Bernardi & Ballarino, 2016). We further show that 
the finding that privileged origins generate labor market advantages primarily 
among the less educated (cf., Karlson, 2019; Torche, 2011; Hout, 1988) can, 
where it is present, be accounted for by undereducation: Were it not for un-
dereducation, parental influence would be equally strong among employees 
with and without a university education in Germany. 
We compared the UK to Germany and found overall very similar results 
across the two heterogeneous contexts. This underlines the generalizability of 
the core set of our findings. Nevertheless, we also found an important differ-
ence: Individual skills and in particular cognitive ability play a stronger and 
more systematic role in the UK, while parental SES is a stronger and more de-
cisive factor in Germany. This general pattern is quite robust across models 
and specifications. The fact that parental SES in Germany mirrors the role of 
individual skills in the UK indicates an interesting difference between the two 




British labor markets are more permeable in allowing workers with higher cog-
nitive skills than implied by their schooling to embark on undereducation ca-
reers. To a degree then, British (internal) labor markets correct a mislabeling 
of students by the education system, allowing them to realize some of their 
potential. We find less evidence for such processes in Germany. Yet, rather 
than attributing this result to the UK’s permeable labor market, one could also 
see it as the result of a more effective German education system, which misla-
bels fewer skilled pupils than the British one (Heisig, 2018). Against this 
follow-up puzzle, future research should engage deeper with what characteris-
tics of institutions, occupations and industries allowing talented versus privi-
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3 Political and Social Conse-
quences of Qualification 
Mismatches. 







A significant number of employees work in jobs that do not match their 
level of formal education. Status inconsistency theory (SIT) argues that 
mismatches result in stress, political alienation, and social withdrawal. 
As the number of mismatched workers rises in many countries, status 
inconsistency may pose a threat to social cohesion and political mod-
eration there. However, the existing evidence on the social and political 
consequences of mismatch is neither conclusive nor convincing. Previ-
ous SIT scholarship does not fully appreciate two identification prob-
lems: Selection bias and the perfect collinearity among the effects of 
occupation, education, and mismatch. These issues lead to contradic-
tory conclusions, as different methodological fixes are proposed and 
employed. I review these methods for their theoretical content and 
show that they generally do not answer the purported research ques-
tion. To address these problems, I build on recent advances in the mod-
elling of age, period and cohort effects. My approach is based on rela-
tively weak, transparent assumptions that are grounded in sociological 
theory to partially identify mismatch effects and estimate bounds on 
effect sizes. The empirical analysis draws on comparable large-scale 
survey data from the United Kingdom (UKLHS) and Germany 
(GSOEP). Cross-sectional and panel fixed-effects models show strong 
mismatch effects on work-related identities, satisfaction, and wages. 
Contra the SIT hypothesis, I find no evidence that mismatch effects 
spill over into the political domain. My results suggest that the effects 
of mismatches do not arise from cognitive dissonance, as theorized by 
SIT, but from an expectation formation mechanism. Despite large in-







Many employees work in occupations for which they have not been trained 
(Rohrbach-Schmidt and Tiemann 2016; Sloane, Battu, and Seaman 1999; 
Vaisey 2006). This paper investigates consequences of such qualification-job 
mismatches for political and social attitudes of workers who are vertically mis-
matched (i.e. workers who are under- or overqualified for the occupations they 
work in).  
Social scientists have asked for more than half a century, whether such sta-
tus-inconsistent employment situations lead to stress, poor health, dissatis-
faction, social withdrawal, opposition to achievement ideology, political alien-
ation, and in the last consequence to societal instability and unrest (Blocker 
and Riedesel 1978; Burris 1983; Goffman 1957; Hope 1975; Lenski 1954). Empir-
ical research has generally produced highly mixed results, but more recent 
studies find an association between mismatches, in particular overqualifica-
tion, and measures of these outcomes (Vaisey 2006; Zhang 2008; Zhu and 
Chen 2016). Given increasing rates of overqualification in countries like the 
United Kingdom and the United States, these results are clearly worrying 
(Felstead et al. 2007; Horowitz 2018; Vaisey 2006). 
However, existing empirical work suffers from two major shortcomings 
that severely limit our understanding of the effects of mismatches. First, vir-
tually all studies that investigate the effects of mismatches use cross-sectional 
data and infer effects from observed correlations. This approach makes con-
clusions vulnerable to selection bias. The second problem is rooted in the dif-
ficulty to empirically separate the effects of someone’s education, occupation, 
and of mismatches proper, since they are linearly dependent: a mismatch is 
the difference between education and occupation (Blalock 1966). To identify 
effects, previous work had to rely on strong assumptions about the nature of 




but hidden in the mechanics of the respective statistical model used. The re-
sult of these ad-hoc fixes has been a sharp disagreement in main conclusions 
between different studies.  
This study reviews earlier efforts to model mismatch effects and makes 
their sometimes questionable theoretical positions explicit. In a second step, I 
propose a novel methodology to addresses the problems of previous research. 
Firstly, I provide the only analysis of the effect of mismatches on social and 
political attitudes exploiting longitudinal data. Secondly, I tackle the funda-
mental identification problem in mismatch research by building on recent ad-
vances in the modelling of age, period and cohort effects, which suffers from a 
similar identification problem (Fosse and Winship 2019b). My approach 
makes explicit use of relatively weak, and more importantly, transparent as-
sumptions about the data generating process to partially identify mismatch 
effects. Throughout, I focus on social and political outcomes, which, once at 
the center of debate, have received relatively little attention in recent research. 
I employ data from two comparable longitudinal population surveys with 
large sample sizes, the United Kingdom Longitudinal Household Study 
(UKLHS; Buck and McFall 2011) and the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP; Deutsches Institut Für Wirtschaftsforschung 2017). The UK and Ger-
many are interesting cases to study, because of the large differences that exist 
in their organization of labor markets, education systems and political cleav-
ages. Comparing results across these two very different countries can serve as 
a first test into the generalizability of my main findings. If there is any contex-
tual variation in the relationship between mismatches and political attitudes, 
I would expect it to be present in this comparison. Vice versa, if the results 
prove to be similar in these countries, they should generalize to other (West-
ern) countries, too. 
Overall, the results of my analyses document that qualification-job mis-




of individuals, even net of the main effects of education and occupation. How-
ever, the analyses also provide evidence that the consequences of mismatches 
for the political domain have been overstated in previous research. 
Theory and previous research 
In this section, I first discuss the original hypotheses put forward by status 
inconsistency theory (SIT) and their empirical record, before I explain the fun-
damental identification problem using a numerical example. In a next step, I 
then examine previous approaches to handle the problem for their theoretical 
content. Finally, I propose a bounding approach to estimating mismatch ef-
fects, which avoids some of the pitfalls of older work. 
Status inconsistency theory 
Why should a qualification mismatch result in stress, dissatisfaction, social 
withdrawal, and political alienation? Qualification mismatches were first in-
vestigated as a source of political dissatisfaction in the context of sociological 
status inconsistency theory (Lenski 1954). SIT originated in the post-war 
United States and had important conceptual affinities to role theory, Par-
sonian functionalism, and the social psychology of the time (see Stryker and 
Macke 1978 for a review).  
The micro-mechanism suggested by SIT starts from the premise that actors 
seek to achieve cognitive consonance in their self-image, and that this is ham-
pered by incongruous positions on different dimensions of social status. Ac-
cording to SIT, four channels through which status inconsistency19 creates psy-
chological stress and eventually results in political unrest can be 
 
19 I will use the terms inconsistency and mismatch interchangeably. I speak of inconsisten-





distinguished: First, status inconsistency creates cognitive dissonance through 
uncertainty about one’s identity, which leads to stress (Festinger 1962; 
Geschwender 1967; Jackson 1962). Second, status inconsistency makes it hard 
for others to determine the appropriate role of actors in social interactions, 
and hence make it less likely that actors experiences interactions as rewarding 
(Lenski 1956). Third, status inconsistency in terms of education and occupa-
tion can take the form of overqualification, which implies that past expecta-
tions about the future, as instilled by education and training, have not been 
realized. Such “underrewarded inconsistency” leads to frustration 
(Geschwender 1968). The fourth and final causal relationship hypothesized by 
SIT is that status inconsistent individuals will eventually externalize these 
sources of stress and seek to change the social environment that they blame 
for their dissatisfaction (Goffman 1957). Originally, analysts hypothesized that 
this would result in left-wing activism and voting, but other contributions also 
argue that frustration can be expressed by endorsing far-right politics (Portes 
1972; Stryker and Macke 1978). 
It is worth noting that each of the four causal channels in original SIT has 
implications that are to a large degree testable in separation. The first channel 
implies that any mismatch should lead to dissatisfaction and stress, regardless 
whether it is one of over- or underqualification. It is the absolute difference 
between actual and common education that matters, regardless of its sign. The 
second channel implies that mismatch should affect not only cognitive states, 
such as satisfaction, but have effects on social behavior, e.g. membership in 
voluntary organizations, as well. The third channel implies that effects of over-
qualification should be stronger than those of underqualification, since it is 
especially when realized states fall short of anticipated ones that disappoint-
ment can be expected. The combination with the first channel thus suggests a 
pattern where both types of mismatch affect satisfaction negatively, but more 




the effects of mismatches exceed the personal level and affect political and so-
cial attitudes and behaviors. 
What empirical evidence on these dynamics has mismatch scholarship 
produced? The SIT literature has resulted in a large number of inconsistent 
findings, with some reporting strong evidence for (Geschwender 1968; 
Goffman 1957; Jackson 1962; Jackson and Burke 1965; Lenski 1954, 1956; Vaisey 
2006; Zhang 2008), and others reporting strong evidence against mismatches 
as sources of personal and political discontent (Blocker and Riedesel 1978; 
Jackson and Curtis 1972; Olsen and Tully 1972; Portes 1972).  
In the following I will explain, why this lack of agreement is rooted in con-
ceptual and methodological difficulties in defining and modelling mismatches 
(Blalock 1966; Duncan 2005; Hope 1975; Lenski 1964; and Sobel 1981). As I will 
elaborate, these complications also put the evidential value of the existing em-
pirical literature into question.  
The fundamental identification problem of mismatch theory 
Conceptual and methodological difficulties in inconsistency research are 
due to a fundamental identification problem. This issue is often regarded as a 
merely methodological one, but my intention is to show that it cannot be sep-
arated from theory. To clarify this claim, I distinguish between three levels: the 
actual data generating process (DGP) in reality, the theoretical “structural 
model” of that process, and the empirical (“reduced form”) model which is 
statistically estimable.  
The basic problem is already apparent in Lenski’s seminal statement of the 
basic hypothesis of status inconsistency research: “individuals characterized 
by a low degree of status [consistency] differ significantly in their political at-
titudes and behavior from individuals characterized by a high degree of status 
[consistency], when status differences in the vertical dimensions are con-




a third variable – the degree of consistency, which is itself a function exclu-
sively of education and occupation – is proposed to influence experiences, at-
titudes, and behavior, net of education and occupation.  
Applied to an example, Lenski’s hypothesis suggests that a lower-level ho-
tel-manager with a college degree in business administration experiences 
more stress than one, who underwent the vocational training typical for his 
position, conditional on their respective actual levels of education, and that 
this is because the former perceives a stressful difference between his high-
status education and his relatively lower status occupation, whereas the two 
fall together for the latter.  
In order to illuminate the fundamental identification problem, I now in-
troduce a simple formal framework to represent Lenski’s conjecture. I concen-
trate on two dimensions of status, education and occupation, and on linear 
relationships. This is because the identification problem is limited to the linear 
components of the relationships. Any non-linear deviations from them are 
identified without problems, a fact I discuss below (see also Fosse and Winship 
2019b). 
A linear version of Lenski’s hypothesis can be represented as proposing a 
non-zero 𝛽𝑀𝑀 in the model 
𝑌 = 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝐸 + 𝛽𝑂𝑋𝑂 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂), (Eq. 3-1) 
where 𝑌 is the outcome of interest, and 𝑋𝐸 and 𝑋𝑂 are education and occupa-
tion, two different metric z-standardized dimensions of social status, for in-
stance job prestige and years of education. Since they are standardized, they 
indicate an individual’s relative position on that dimension in the population. 
(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂) represents the linear mismatch term. It is positive for over- and neg-
ative for underqualified workers. Eq.1 is best thought of as a structural model 
of the true DGP: 𝑌 is produced from combinations of 𝑋𝐸 and 𝑋𝑂 according to 




Returning to my example, the term (𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂) is zero for the hotel manager 
with the required vocational education, because the relative status of his edu-
cation and his occupation are identical. However, (𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂) is positive for the 
college graduate, because the relative status of his occupation is lower than 
that of his education. If 𝛽𝑀𝑀 is nonzero, as hypothesized by Lenski, this third 
term will affect 𝑌 above and beyond 𝑋𝐸 and 𝑋𝑂 for the mismatched graduate. 
The framework of Eq.1 is important, because it shows that the structural 
model proposed by Lenski is empirically unidentified. Three distinct parame-
ters (𝛽𝐸 , 𝛽𝑂 , 𝛽𝑀𝑀) govern the relationship between just two independent vari-
ables (𝑋𝐸 and 𝑋𝑂) and the outcome (Blalock 1966). This means that given iden-
tical combinations of education and occupation (𝑋𝐸 and 𝑋𝑂), an infinite num-
ber of combinations of the structural parameters 𝛽𝐸, 𝛽𝑂, and 𝛽𝑀𝑀 could theo-
retically result in the same 𝑌. For the hotel-managers, this means that the same 
observed values of stress (e.g. 𝑌matched = 10; 𝑌mismatched = 11.25) could result 
from identical independent variables (e.g. with the relative statuses as 
𝑋𝐸,college = 15; 𝑋𝐸,voctrain = 10 and 𝑋𝑂, hotel man. = 10) through radically differ-
ent data generating processes (e.g. with 𝛽𝐸 = 0.25, 𝛽𝑂 = 0.75, and 𝛽𝑀𝑀 = 0 or 
with 𝛽𝐸 = −0.25, 𝛽𝑂 = 1.25, and 𝛽𝑀𝑀 = 0.5 ).
20 
For a researcher who observes 𝑋𝐸, 𝑋𝑂 and 𝑌 and wants to understand the 
true DGP as represented by the structural model in Eq. 3-1, it is therefore never 
possible to decide without further assumptions, whether the relative stress lev-
els of the college-educated manager compared to the vocationally trained one 
 
20 This is shown by the following simple calculations, which plug in the respective values 
into Eq. 1., once for the first set of structural parameters (2a and 2c) and once for the sec-
ond set (2b and 2d):  
𝑌matched = 10 = .75 ∗ 10 + .25 ∗ 10 + 0(10 − 10) 
=  1.25 ∗ 10 − 0.25 ∗ 10 + 0.5(10 − 10) 
𝑌mismatched = 11.25 = .75 ∗ 10 + .25 ∗ 15 + 0(15 − 10) 





are affected by his mismatch, or exclusively due to processes resulting in higher 
levels of stress among the higher educated. 
At its core, this fact is due to the nature of the DGP, but its implications 
appear as methodological problems to researchers. The fundamental problem 
of mismatch research is that because different structural parameters can pro-
duce the same data, the data and empirical models alone cannot reveal the 
true DGP. Data alone can therefore never provide an answer as to whether mis-
matches indeed have effects on social and political outcomes. Thus, in order 
to identify mismatch effects, assumptions about the DGP, that is restrictions 
on the structural model of one kind or another, are indispensable. As I will 
show below, such theoretical assumptions are present even in the approaches 
which try to hide them. However, good scientific practice asks to justify con-
straints on substantive grounds and to make them transparent. The identifi-
cation problem that mismatch research has faced cannot therefore be solved 
by methods, it must be solved by leveraging prior knowledge with careful and 
transparent theoretical examination 
Theories about the structure of mismatch effects 
Throughout the last 60 years, different fields with different research questions 
have approached mismatch-effects. The different strategies to study mismatch 
effects were often framed as purely methodological proposals. But really they 
are theoretical statements about the process that generates the data. Theoret-
ical models like Eq.1 do not have in themselves a unique solution in terms of 
𝛽𝐸, 𝛽𝑂, and 𝛽𝑀𝑀. Previous strategies achieved a unique solution only by im-
plicitly assuming various structures that differ from that in Eq. 3-1. The fact 
that different proposals lead to different estimates of  𝛽𝐸, 𝛽𝑂, and 𝛽𝑀𝑀 resulted 
in the confusion that has plagued the literatures on mismatches since the early 
1960s. Even worse, as I have shown above, these estimates cannot be distin-




data. What is needed, therefore, is a review of the theoretical commitments 
different research strategies imply and an informed discussion in which situa-
tions they are appropriate. In the following, I offer such a discussion.  
Sociologists and their cross-tables 
An important class of early strategies to test for mismatch effects were the so-
called square additive models. Originally, they were formulated in a cross-ta-
ble context, but here I translate them into a linear equation framework, with 
which modern researchers are more familiar. These empirical models compare 
the variance explained by a baseline model of additive main effects of educa-
tion and occupation (𝛽𝐸 and 𝛽𝑂 in above model),  
 
𝑌 = 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝐸 + 𝛽𝑂𝑋𝑂 + 𝜖, (Eq. 3-2) 
with the variance explained by models that allow for separate inconsistency 
parameters (e.g. dummies for over- and underqualified workers) (Duncan 
2005:90ff.). After fitting a baseline model like Eq. 3-2, researchers regarded sig-
nificant effects of such dummy-variables as evidence of inconsistency effects. 
But recalling the example for the case of two hotel managers, data which 
was in fact generated by linear mismatch effects can easily be described using 
a constrained baseline model like Eq. 3-2 (compare footnote 3). However, this 
comes at the price of estimates of the remaining 𝛽s that do not correspond to 
the true DGP. The estimates of the main effects in the baseline model will ab-
sorb the linear component of mismatch effects. This is problematic, because 
what is left for the additional mismatch-parameters to pick up in additive 
models are merely the non-linear components of mismatch-effects. All linear 





Omitting the linear component may give a very distorted picture of the true 
effects of mismatches. This is illustrated by the fictitious example in Figure 3-
1. Assume the values of stress on the y-axis are in reality produced from the 
values of mismatch on the x-axis according to the DGP represented by the 
dashed line. We see decreased stress among the under- and increased stress 
among the overeducated. The mismatch effects an additive model will return, 
on the other hand, are given by the solid line. These estimates, or any approx-
imation of them, only contain the non-linear components of the true mis-
match effects. Based on these values, we would wrongly conclude that 





underqualification has a stress-increasing effect, whereas the true stress-en-
hancing effect of overqualification would be underappreciated.21 
Square additive models are an example of a strategy to identify point esti-
mates of mismatch effects that rely on a theoretical commitment to one of the 
structural linear components in Eq.1 being zero in reality. If this assumption is 
true, one of the three terms of Eq. 3-1 vanishes, and the two remaining struc-
tural parameters match two independent variables and can be uniquely and 
unbiasedly estimated from the data. If it is not true, however, the structural 
model that is being parametrized is different from the process that produced 
the data, resulting in the problems I have illustrated.  
If the goal is to learn about the true DGP, strong assumptions like those 
embedded in additive models should be carefully defended. In general, there 
is arguably no good reason to believe that there is no linear mismatch param-
eter in the structural model. After all, the existence of these effects is what the 
empirical examination is supposed to reveal. As has been noted before, this 
makes the results of the square additive model literature questionable (Blalock 
1966; Hendrickx et al. 1993; Hope 1975; Sobel 1981). 
As a reaction to these problems, the so-called diamond model, which al-
lows linear mismatch effects in the structural model, was proposed (Hope 
1975). However, to achieve this, Hope had to reformulate the structure implied 
by Eq.1 in a way that amounts to a full-blown restatement of SIT. In Hope’s 
model, any multidimensionality of social status that is consequential for an 
outcome appears as an inconsistency effect.  
 
21 In this example, the true relationship between mismatch and stress, net of education and 
occupation, is given by 𝑌 = 0.09(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂)
4  +  0.25(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂)
3 + 0.6(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂)
2 +
3(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂), whereas the square additive model would return at best 𝑌 = 0.09(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂)
4  +
 0.25(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂)
3 + 0.6(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂)
2 − 0.65(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂). This is because the linear approximation 





Hope regards social status as a latent, vertical, unidimensional construct. 
In practice, this general status index is constructed as some weighted average 
of, for instance, education and occupation.  According to Hope, inconsistency 
refers to any non-zero value on a dimension of social status apart from this 
general vertical index. Such non-vertical dimensions could be, for example, 
the variances in education or occupation that do not fully align with general 
status. In other words: As soon as the constituent empirical referents of the 
general status dimension (say a diploma or a job role) do not correlate per-
fectly, agents are thought to feel strain from inconsistent statuses. But such a 
view leaves open, how the latent status dimension proposed by Hope is sup-
posed to become socially effective or even be perceived by actors. So while pa-
rameters of the structural model implied by the diamond model may be esti-
mated from data without problems, it comes at the cost of positing an unob-
servable, intangible concept and an unspecified causal mechanism. 
Technically, the separation into vertical and non-vertical components can 
be achieved by the cross-table techniques (the diamond-model) described in 
Hope (1975) or by principal component analyses and similar methods. How-
ever, it is important to note that such procedures do not offer any new identi-
fying information. They merely rotate the existing status matrix and relabel 
the dimensions. In Hope’s example of a diamond model, the columns of the 
rotated matrix, (i.e. the first variable in a linear model) represent the vertical 
status, defined simply as the mean of the two main dimensions, and the rows 
(i.e. the second variable) indicate linear inconsistency values, defined as the 
difference between the constituent dimensions, e.g. education and occupa-
tion.  
For the case of hotel managers, this would mean that the matched manager 
receives a vertical status score of 10 ((10 + 10)/2) and an inconsistency values 
of 0 ((10 − 10)/2), the mismatched manager a vertical status of 12.5 ((10 +




model would return an inconsistency parameter of -0.5.22 Note that in this 
model, the higher level of stress in the mismatched manager will be regarded 
as evidence of inconsistency effects, regardless of whether it is due to a sepa-
rate mismatch-parameter in the sense of Eq. 3-1 or simply due to an independ-
ent effect of education, net of occupation (compare footnote 3). More gener-
ally, Hope’s model will return inconsistency effects, whenever the main dimen-
sions of Eq. 1 differ in the strength of their association to the outcome. This 
criterion for inconsistency effects is clearly weaker and substantively different 
from that implied by Lenski’s original formulation. 
Economists and the refined Mincer equation 
A second perspective on mismatch-effects emerged in the 1980s among econ-
omists, who saw them as a way to test different theories of labor market allo-
cation. The so-called ORU decomposition (Over-, Required, and Underedu-
cation) splits up the attained education (E) term in a wage equation into three 
components: required education, the amount of education that is required in 
a worker’s job (𝑅, to which I here refer to as 𝑂 for “occupation” in order to 
maintain consistency with the SIT literature); overqualification (𝑂𝑄), the years 
of education of a worker beyond of what is required, and underqualification 
(𝑈𝑄), the years of education a worker is short of requirements, such that 𝐸 =
𝑂 + 𝑂𝑄 − 𝑈𝑄, where 𝑂𝑄 = 𝐸 − 𝑂, if 𝐸 − 𝑂 > 0 and 0 otherwise, and  
𝑈𝑄 = 𝑂 − 𝐸, if 𝑂 − 𝐸 > 0 and 0 otherwise, resulting in the wage equation 
 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑂𝑄𝑂𝑄 +  𝛽𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝑈𝑄𝑈𝑄 + 𝜖  
(Duncan and Hoffman 1981). 
(Eq. 3-3) 
In an important advance over the classic Mincer equation, the 𝑂𝑄 and 
𝑈𝑄 parameters in this specification allow analysts to investigate whether 
 
22 The respective equations are 11.25 = 1 ∗ 12.5 − .5 ∗ 2.5, for the mismatched worker, and 




mismatched workers differ from matched workers with respect to 𝑌 in an oc-
cupation with the same education requirements.  
From the perspective of the general framework of Eq. 3-1, Eq. 3-3 amounts 
to omitting 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝐸, the term that captures the main effect of education. The 
ORU decomposition is hence another example of an identification strategy 
that proposes one linear term of Eq. 1 to be zero in the structural model. In 
addition, Eq. 3 splits up the term 𝛽𝑀𝑀(𝑋𝐸 − 𝑋𝑂) into 𝛽𝑂𝑄𝑂𝑄 and 𝛽𝑈𝑄𝑈𝑄, that 
is, it allows for a nonlinearity in mismatch effects. Since only two linear effects, 
𝛽𝑂 and the shared linear component in 𝛽𝑂𝑄 and 𝛽𝑈𝑄 have to be estimated, the 
model is uniquely identified.  
The structural model implied by this strategy is one, where past education 
does not play a role beyond occupational positions and potential mismatch. 
Applied to the hotel manager example, all differences in stress between the 
matched and the mismatched manager are regarded as stemming from their 
differing mismatch status – but not from their differing education. In this view, 
an enduring, independent role of socialization through education for later life 
outcomes is excluded.  
How convincing is such a perspective on labor market careers? Arguably, 
this very much depends on the outcome of interest. We have to distinguish 
between outcomes that result exclusively from the current employment situa-
tion and outcomes that reflect a more complex layering of experiences over the 
life-course. For instance, decades of research have documented that many po-
litical and social attitudes and behaviors are relatively stable and partially 
formed early in life, among other things by educational experiences (for re-
views, see Sears and Brown 2013). For these outcomes, a structural model as 
proposed by ORU models seems to poorly reflect reality. However, for out-
comes, which economists have investigated with it, a structural model in the 
form of an ORU model is much more plausible. It is difficult to conceive of a 




properties of her current employment situation. So, while ORU models are 
plausible in typical applications in economics, they should not unthinkingly 
be applied in sociological research.  
Recent trends 
The most recent studies of mismatch effects have abandoned the traditional 
cross-table models of mismatch effects and instead relied on more flexible re-
gression techniques. Public health researchers, for instance, have rediscovered 
the original claims of SIT and produced a series of studies that link qualifica-
tion mismatch to higher levels of stress, poorer self-rated health, and in-
creased mortality (Dudal and Bracke 2019; Dunlavy, Garcy, and Rostila 2016; 
Smith et al. 2012; Zhu and Chen 2016). Some of these studies claim that mis-
matches have potentially important health-consequences, which may be asso-
ciated with decreased social and political activity. Studies in this literature are 
of course equally affected by the identification problems I have pointed out. 
Closer examination reveals that the empirical models in this literature assume 
different structural models, most often ones, which exclude the main effect of 
occupation. They thereby assume that people’s current occupation is unre-
lated to their health status – an unlikely situation. It is hence not clear, how 
much evidence of the health consequences of qualification-mismatches, net 
of occupation, there actually is. 
In sociology, two papers have renewed the discipline’s longstanding inter-
est in inconsistency effects. In the first, Vaisey (2006) claims that workers in 
the United States, who are overqualified are more politically liberal and less 
achievement oriented than workers in a similar job, who are not inconsistent. 
His work relies on the ORU decomposition. This approach is descriptively 
valid and informative. But as I have argued above, from a DGP perspective it is 
questionable, whether the structural model implicit in ORU approaches (i.e. 




is a valid representation of the process of attitude formation. In the second, 
Zhang (2008) explicitly proposes a test of SIT for the case of inconsistencies in 
income and education. However, his empirical models are only identified, be-
cause he constrains the effect of inconsistency to have the same sign, regard-
less of the direction of a mismatch. While a symmetric mismatch-term 
(strictly equal effects of under- and overqualification, 𝛽𝑂𝑄 = 𝛽𝑈𝑄) is a feature 
of Lenski’s original statement of SIT (he assumed a squared relationship be-
tween outcomes and mismatch, which implies symmetry), I think that its ex-
istence should be concluded a posteriori from the data, rather than required a 
priori for a method to work. Note that similar to the square additive model, the 
assumption of symmetric effects of inconsistency claims that the linear com-
ponent of the mismatch effect is zero in the DGP. Hence, all the caveats I dis-
cussed above apply. It is unclear in how far the results in Zhang (2008) depend 
on these problematic assumptions. 
A bounding approach to mismatch-effects 
My literature review has shown that past attempts to test for mismatch effects 
were implicitly wed to very specific theoretical models of the mismatch pro-
cess. In the following I introduce a new approach to investigate mismatch ef-
fects that allows us to use prior knowledge and theoretical analysis to flexibly 
and transparently specify a theoretical model that better reflects the true DGP. 
To do this, I follow recent work of Fosse and Winship in the context of 
modelling age, period, and cohort (APC) effects (Fosse and Winship 2019a, 
2019b). The bounding-approach developed by Fosse and Winship (2019b) is 
based on the idea that prior knowledge can be used to formulate explicit con-
straints on the parameters of a structural model that is empirically non-iden-
tified. If some values of structural parameters can be discarded a-priori on the-
oretical grounds, this limits the range of values other parameters in the model 




The starting point of a bounding analysis is that even though single param-
eters of a general structural APC- or a mismatch-model are not uniquely iden-
tifiable from the data, combinations of them are (O’Brien 2014). In the case of 
mismatches, we can identify the empirical parameters 𝜃1 and 𝜃2, with 
𝜃1 =  𝛽𝐸 + 𝛽𝑂 and (Eq. 3-4) 
𝜃2 =  𝛽𝑂 − 𝛽𝑀𝑀, (Eq. 3-5) 
where the 𝛽s are the structural coefficients from Eq. 3-1 (Fosse and Winship 
2019b).  The fact that 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 are uniquely identified creates dependencies 
in the parameter space that analysts can exploit to arrive at partial identifica-
tion of a structural parameter of interest. By making an informed assumption 
about the sign and potentially the magnitude of 𝛽𝐸 and 𝛽𝑂, it is possible to 
create finite bounds around empirical estimates of 𝛽𝑀𝑀. By rearranging Eq. 3-
5 and substituting 𝛽𝑂 in Eq. 3-4 we get two restrictions which 𝛽𝑀𝑀 has to sat-
isfy:  
𝛽𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝑂 − 𝜃2 and (Eq. 3-6) 
𝛽𝑀𝑀 =  𝜃1 − 𝜃2 − 𝛽𝐸. (Eq. 3-7) 
If it can now be assumed that 𝛽𝑂is larger than some minimal value, 𝛽𝑂 >
 𝛽𝑂
𝑚𝑖𝑛, and similarly that 𝛽𝐸 >  𝛽𝐸
𝑚𝑖𝑛, we know that  
𝛽𝑂
𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝜃1 < 𝛽𝑀𝑀 < 𝜃1 − 𝜃2 − 𝛽𝐸
𝑚𝑖𝑛, (Eq. 3-8) 
which represent the bounds within which the true linear mismatch effect 
lies. In other words: if prior knowledge and theoretical examination suggest 
that the true main effects of education and occupation are larger than some 
values, this results in finite bounds for the structural mismatch effect. The 
same holds if both education and occupation effects are negative and can be 
assumed to be below some value. Instead of relying on implicit and ad-hoc 
constraints to arrive at point identification, the Fosse and Winship approach 
allows using weaker, theoretically justifiable, and, most importantly, transpar-




which are consistent with the theoretical assumptions (represented by 𝛽𝑂
𝑚𝑖𝑛 
and 𝛽𝐸
𝑚𝑖𝑛) and the data (represented by 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 in Eq. 3-8). 
What do we know about the relative importance of education and occupa-
tion? 
Since they define the structural model, the identifying assumptions in Eq. 3-
8, 𝛽𝑂
𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝛽𝐸
𝑚𝑖𝑛, have to be carefully specified. Large literatures in sociology 
and political sciences have shown that social and political attitudes and be-
haviors vary strongly and partially independently with education and occupa-
tion (e.g. Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Extant re-
search is also clear about the fact that education and occupational status co-
vary with our outcomes of interest in the same directions. Therefore Eq. 3-8, 
which requires that both main effects have the same sign, is applicable: the 
theoretical constraints I impose on the structural model in Eq. 3-1 will result 
in finite bounds for the estimates of the linear mismatch parameter 𝛽𝑀𝑀 in Eq. 
3-1 for all of our variables of interest. 
But recalling my discussion of the applicability of ORU models in different 
domains, we can go one step further. On the basis of substantive reasoning, it 
is possible to distinguish between two types of dependent variables, those with 
a socialization component, where experiences made during the education-
phase are likely to have a lasting impact, and those that are produced directly 
by actors’ experiences and behavior in the workplace. As I have argued, it is 
theoretically hard to conceive of a scenario in which education directly (that 
is, net of occupation and mismatch) affects wages and, arguably, job satisfac-
tion. For this second type of outcome, there is more specific prior knowledge 
than for the first type, where we usually just know that both education and 
occupation have some non-trivial effect of the same direction. As a result, I am 
able to present plausibly point-identified estimators of mismatch effects on 




But what about the first type of variables? Here, the width of the bounds, 
that is the amount of information conveyed, partially depends on the amount 
of prior information available. However, it is difficult to extract from existing 
research precise lower bounds for main effects of education and occupation. 








𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 3𝛽𝑂  (Eq. 3-9) 
In other words: I assume that the effect of occupation is at most three times as 
strong as that of education and vice versa. This leaves plenty of room for em-
pirical differences to play out: If 𝛽𝑂were 1, 𝛽𝐸 could range between 0.3 and 3. 
While plausible, this choice of relative weights is admittedly arbitrary. I there-
fore present results obtained using other, even less restrictive values in Sup-
plement D.  
To sum up, in contrast to earlier efforts, which assumed an arbitrarily 
stunted versions of Eq. 3-1, I propose to work with a structural model that pre-
serves all the features of the general model in Eq. 3-1. Instead of indiscrimi-
nately claiming that one entire term is zero, as most previous approaches im-
plicitly did, I merely claim that both occupation and education have some as-
sociation with our outcomes – except in cases, where substantive reflection 
suggests otherwise.  
Data and methods 
I base my empirical estimates of mismatch effects on two harmonized data 
sources from two countries: the UK Longitudinal Household Study 2009-2016 
(UKLHS; Buck and McFall 2011) and the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
1984-2016 (SOEP; Deutsches Institut Für Wirtschaftsforschung 2017). UKLHS 




of private households with high-quality fieldwork. Both studies rely on similar 
sampling strategies, questionnaire design, and often even use the same items. 
I restrict the analytical sample to non-self-employed working men and 
women between the ages of 20 and 60, who are not currently enrolled in full-
time education or training. For the cross-sectional analysis, I restrict the SOEP 
sample to the years after 2004, because important control variables were col-
lected only after that date. Throughout, I employ the post-stratification 
weights provided with the data to account for unequal sampling and attrition 
probabilities. 
Measuring education, occupation and mismatch 
I rely on a generalized version of the ORU decomposition to model the effects 
of vertical qualification mismatch that allows including a separate term for the 
main effect of education. My central independent variables are therefore 
measures of actual education (𝐸), required education in someone’s occupation 
(𝑂) and of mismatch. In line with the ORU tradition, I rely on virtual years of 
education and the so-called realized matches approach to identify the re-
quired education in an occupation (see McGuinness 2006 for an overview of 
measurement approaches, and Section A  in the Online Supplement for details 
on the coding of years of education). Concretely, I distinguish occupations us-
ing the 3-digit ISCO88 classification and estimate the mean years of education 
in each occupation in the post-stratified UKLHS and SOEP samples as a meas-
ure of required education. Overqualification (𝑂𝑄) and underqualification 
(𝑈𝑄) are defined as explained above. Note that while 𝑂 is regarded in the ORU 
tradition as a measure of qualification requirements, it can just as well be in-
terpreted as a measure of occupational status as in the SIT-tradition. Indeed, 
the empirical correlation between the occupation mean years of education and 
the ISEI, an accepted measure of occupational status, is 𝑟 = 0.87 in Germany 





In the cross-sectional analysis I control for a rich set of personal characteris-
tics, including age, age-squared, measures of cognitive ability, BIG-5 person-
ality, risk aversion, locus of control, parental occupation, parental education, 
immigration background, gender, as well as for region and survey year. Details 
on the measurement of these variables can be found in Online Supplement A. 
I also ran separate analyses by gender, but results were largely identical. Gen-
der specific results can be found in Supplement C. In the longitudinal models, 
I only adjust for age, the tenure in the current position, and survey year. 
Not all controls were measured in all years or for all respondents. If infor-
mation is missing, I carry forward the latest observation of a respondent. If a 
control variable has never been measured, I rely on 10 imputations from a 
chained equations model (Van Buuren 2012). The multiple imputation models 
take into account all variables that feature in the analysis models and addi-
tional variables that may help to reduce prediction uncertainty. 
Outcomes 
In order to comprehensively capture the relevance of mismatch, I consider 
nine different facets of social, political and occupational behaviour, involve-
ment, identities and satisfaction, as well as trust and income. While the items 
I rely on are designed to capture identical concepts in the two surveys, it is 
important to note that sometimes the wording is not strictly identical in SOEP 
and UKHLS. The Online Supplement A documents the questions and re-
sponse categories used in the two countries. 
Table 3-1 shows how many data points, from how many respondents the 
two datasets provide on these variables. These figures equal the sample sizes 




waves, my analytical samples differ for different dependent variables, and in 
Germany for different specifications. 
Trust, satisfaction with democracy, job and life satisfaction, and the respec-
tive importance of politics/one’s profession were measured using standard Lik-
ert scales in both questionnaires. In order to increase comparability between 
these measures, I z-standardize them, so that one unit corresponds to one 
sample specific standard deviation.  
Left vote, far-right vote, and member of an organization are binary variables 
that indicate whether a respondent expresses left-wing/far-right voting inten-
tions or reports being the member of at least one organization. I refer readers 
to Supplement A for details on my coding of parties.  
My last dependent variable is hourly gross labour income. I derive this var-
iable from the imputed gross labour incomes in the datasets, which I divide by 
the reported contracted monthly working hours. I report results for the un-





































789 22 112 84 428 77 446 20 528 21 599 84 661 59 687 59 687 11 838 
NResp 
14 
789 14 964 25 955 24 334 14 631 15 227 25 990 20 749 20 749 11 838 
Mean  number of 
waves/person 1 1.47 3.25 3.18 1.40 1.41 3.25 2.87 2.87 1 








771 17 353 124 858 124 858 40 624 40 682 122 666 45 928 45 928 21 368 
NResp,pooled 
17 
383 13 331 28 377 28 377 22 597 22 619 27 769 14 157 14 157 14 332 
NObs,FE 
14 
977 22 112 202 729 205 849 45 387 45 387 201 381 83 225 83 225 34 436 
NResp,FE 
11 
825 14 964 36 625 37 491 23 358 23 358 36 730 20 707 20 707 18 040 
Mean  number of 
waves/person 1.26 1.47 5.53 5.49 1.94 1.94 5.48 4.01 4.01 1.90 
Longest gap 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 





I proceed in two steps. In the first, I estimate a generalized version of the cross-
sectional ORU decomposition on pooled samples. In the second, I estimate a 
specification of this model that includes person-specific fixed-effects and 
hence rules out confounding by unobserved time-constant variables. 
The model I estimate in the first step is given by the equation 
 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝑂𝑄𝑂𝑄 + 𝛽𝑈𝑄𝑈𝑄 + ∑ 𝛽𝑋𝑗𝑋𝑗 + 𝜖, (Eq. 3-10) 
where 𝑂, 𝐸, 𝑂𝑄, 𝑈𝑄 refer to the parameters discussed above and 𝑋𝑗 is the j
th 
control variable. This specification corresponds to a general structural model, 
which contains a perfect linear dependency between 𝑂, 𝐸, and the shared lin-
ear component of 𝑂𝑄/𝑈𝑄. Eq. 10 is partially identified through the constraints 
in Eq. 3-9. I refer to this as the E-ORU specification, since it contains all four 
terms of 𝐸, 𝑂𝑄, 𝑂 and 𝑈𝑄 simultaneously. Note that I report results with 𝑂, 𝐸, 
𝑂𝑄, and 𝑈𝑄 in a years-of-education-metric, while the constraints in Eq. 3-9 
refer to standardized coefficients. 
In the E-ORU specification, the bounded OQ and UQ parameters reflect 
the change in the outcome associated with one additional year of under- or 
overeducation, net of actual education, required education, and other covari-
ates. The E-ORU model is estimated using constrained least squares. I base 
inference on standard errors that are clustered at the person-level. 
The pooled-data E-ORU specification addresses the linear dependency of 
O, E and MM. However, it is still susceptible to selection bias. I address this 
problem using a person-fixed-effects (FE) approach. This design eliminates all 
time-constant confounders that might bias the relationship between mis-
matches and outcomes. 
In this step, I make use of all the survey years available to us, in which the 




since 1984. Table 3-1 lists the number of gap years between measurements for 
the dependent variables, and the mean number of observations per respond-
ent that I draw on to estimate the FE models. I only make use of data from 
respondents, whose education has remained constant throughout the obser-
vation period and use only mismatch-changes that I can relate to job-changes 
as indicated by changes in the 3-digit ISCO occupational title, ignoring periods 
of unemployment and inactivity. 
If the E-ORU specification is applied in a FE context, the E-term is ab-
sorbed by the demeaning-procedure, yielding the ORU-FE specification. 
Again, assuming only linear effects, both 𝛽𝑂 and 𝛽𝑀𝑀, the shared linear com-
ponent of 𝛽𝑂𝑄 and 𝛽𝑈𝑄 have to be estimated from the same changes of occu-
pation. There is hence again an identification problem. As in the cross-sec-
tional case, the combination of both parameters is identified as 𝜃2 =  𝛽𝑂 −
𝛽𝑀𝑀. In order to learn something about, 𝛽𝑀𝑀 we must make assumptions 
about 𝛽𝑂. Unfortunately, 𝛽𝑀𝑀 and 𝛽𝑂 may take the same direction, so that con-
straining the sign of 𝛽𝑂 is usually not informative about the range of values 
𝛽𝑀𝑀 can take. Instead, we must specify a maximal effect size for 𝛽𝑂 in order to 
infer 𝛽𝑀𝑀.  
Since it is impossible to know such a maximal effect size a priori, I gauge 
the potential for causal mismatch effects by again resorting to bounded esti-
mates. The endpoints of the bounds are comprised of the two extreme cases: 
that the linear effect of changing occupation is entirely due to the linear mis-
match-component, and that there is no linear effect of mismatch.  To the re-
spective estimates of 𝛽𝑀𝑀 I add the non-linear components of mismatches. 
Concretely, I allow different coefficients for moving deeper into overqualifica-
tion, relative to actors’ multi-year average, and vice versa for moving deeper 
into underqualification, relative to actors’ multi-year average. This procedure 




overqualification. In many cases, it allows demonstrating or ruling out mis-
match-effects, even when the relative size of the linear component is unclear. 
Results 
Is there any evidence that mismatched workers are affected by the dynamics 
hypothesized by SIT scholars? In the following, I report results from two sets 
of models: the pooled E-ORU specification and the ORU-FE model. 
Cross-sectional results 
Figure 3-2 shows the ranges of estimates of under- and overqualification effects 
that are compatible with my assumptions about the DGP and the data in the 
E-ORU specification. I refer readers to Supplement B for a comparison of these 
results to those obtained from a conventional ORU decomposition. Black bars 


























Figure 3-2: Social and political attitudes, and wages among mismatched workers 
Note: Constrained least squares models estimated on pooled data. 95% confidence intervals based on cluster-robust standard errors and ten imputations. UQ: Underqualifi-





I find that overqualification is associated with lowered life satisfaction, a 
lower likelihood of organizational membership, and, in the, UK with a clearly 
decreased salience of workers’ professional identity and an increased proba-
bility to express voting intentions for a left-wing party. Underqualification, on 
the other hand, goes along with a heightened professional identity, and in the 
UK also with increased life satisfaction, and a lower likelihood to support the 
extreme right. The strength of these associations is often small, but arguably 
of substantive importance. A median effect size of about 0.03 SD implies that 
somebody who is overqualified by three years, which roughly corresponds to 
the difference between the main educational categories, reports, for example, 
about a tenth of a standard deviation lower life satisfaction than someone with 
a similar occupation and job, who is not mismatched. 
For all other variables, I cannot safely conclude effects of mismatch.  Either 
the identification bounds or the confidence intervals overlap with zero, which 
means that DGPs that are compatible with my assumptions about the relative 
weights of 𝛽𝑂 and 𝛽𝐸  could have produced the data with a linear mismatch 
term of zero. I need to highlight, however, that, especially in my application, a 
failure to refute the null-hypothesis of no mismatch-effect does not imply sup-
port for the null hypothesis. My tests are very conservative, because prior 
knowledge about the true main effect of education and occupation is weak. In 
fact, for virtually all dependent variables, DGPs that imply non-zero mismatch 
effects are compatible with the data. To rule out mismatch effects in these 
cases, or to show their existence, stronger assumptions, or more data, are nec-
essary. 
Such stronger assumptions are available for two of our dependent varia-
bles: job satisfaction and wages. I have argued that they represent instances, 
where a direct effect of education can safely be assumed away. The first panel 




satisfaction, whereas underqualification goes together with higher satisfaction 
in the UK.  This is true for a model using the assumption of zero education 
effects, represented by the circle marker, as well as for an E-ORU model, where 
I instead use the assumption of non-zero/equal-sign effects of both main-di-
mension. In this case, the returned mismatch effects are even more drastic, 
but possibly overstated, because they require that education per se increases 
job satisfaction.23   
 
23 One might even argue that the main effect of education should be negative, representing 
the idea that more schooling makes workers more demanding. I pursued this idea but did 
not find the evidence in its favor compelling. In a model, where the main effect of educa-
tion is equal to the main effect of typical education, none of the main dimensions’ effects is 
significantly different from zero. What is more, this model would indicate that overeduca-





Note: Constrained linear probability models estimated on pooled data. 95% confidence 
intervals based on cluster-robust standard errors and ten imputations. UQ: Underqualifi-
cation, OQ: overqualification. Results controlled for personal characteristics. 
What could drive the association between mismatch, satisfaction and the 
other relationships I have documented? Wages are an obvious candidate. But 
when I turn to the second panel of Figure 3-3 and thus to the results for hourly 
wages, the first thing to note is that in both countries overqualified workers 
earn about 0.03 log-points, i.e. about 3%, more per hour than matched workers 
in the same occupation, and that underqualified workers earn less, net of all 
the personal characteristics I control for. This pattern is represented by the 
circle markers. As I have noted above, when the main effect of education is 
assumed to be zero in the E-ORU model, it collapses to the conventional ORU 




decomposition. And indeed, my results on job satisfaction and wages echo 
findings from that literature (Korpi and Tåhlin 2009; Vaisey 2006).  
However, I can also compare mismatched to matched workers with similar 
education. This approach highlights the opportunity costs to mismatching and 
takes into account that while overqualification might result in higher wages 
within one occupation, wages might have been even higher had overqualified 
workers found matched employment. Technically, this amounts to replacing 
required education (R) with actual education (E) in an ORU regression. The 
triangle markers provide the estimates of this OEU specification. In line with 
the rest of my results, I find that underqualification is associated with signifi-
cant net-gains, and overqualification with large net-losses.  
The first conclusion to draw from the empirical analysis is that the propo-
sition of mismatch-effects without any linear component is not borne out by 
the data. This casts doubt on results obtained from the square additive model, 
from Zhang’s model, and on Lenski’s original formulation. For virtually all de-
pendent variables, I find that over- and underqualification are associated with 
an outcome in opposing directions, even though my empirical model does in 
no way require such a pattern.  
This is also an important finding for status inconsistency research on a the-
oretical level. While mismatches are clearly consequential for many outcomes, 
it does not appear to be the first and second psychological mechanisms pro-
posed by status inconsistency theory, i.e. role conflict and cognitive disso-
nance, that result in dissatisfaction and withdrawal. It is not inconsistency per 
se that causes discontent. Rather, the negative consequences of mismatches 
expected by SIT are only present among the overqualified. This pattern is com-
patible with the third channel discussed above. It predicts opposing conse-
quences for under- and overqualification as a result of an expectation for-
mation mechanism: Discontent arises because prior expectations of occupa-




The underqualified, vice versa, report, if anything, higher levels of satisfaction. 
Presumably, this is because they exceed their own expectations, and hence ex-
perience the socio-economic environment as particularly fair.  
My results are less clear about the fourth mechanism in SIT, which claims 
that mismatch-experiences in the occupational domain spill over into the do-
main of political attitudes and behaviors. While all indicators that pertain di-
rectly to the world of work are clearly connected to mismatches in the E-ORU 
model, such patterns are weaker for political variables, which hardly reach sta-
tistical significance. What seems rather robust, however, is that the overqual-
ified are less likely to be members of organizations. 
One potential point of skepticism regarding these findings arises from the 
fact that in the E-ORU model mismatch effects are partially identified by ex-
plicit assumptions about the relative importance of education and occupation. 
How sensitive are my conclusions to these assumptions? I provide results for 
weaker assumptions in Online Supplement D. Here I note that the core of my 
results, i.e. those for job and life satisfaction, the importance of one’s profes-
sion, wages, left-vote and organizational membership, are substantively unaf-
fected by the choice of identifying assumptions. 
Fixed-effects results 
My discussion so far has assumed that mismatches cause views and behav-
iours. But this need not be so. People who end up in overqualification may 
have been different even before they became overqualified. I test the robust-
ness of my results in the face of such concerns using fixed-effects models that 
control for all time-constant heterogeneity between individuals. This is only 
possible, however, for variables, where repeated measurements are available. 
In my models, I allow for heterogeneous mismatch effects depending on 




above (relative overqualification) or below (relative underqualification) the 





Figure 3-4: Changes in social and political attitudes, and wages after changes of occupation 
Note: Constrained least squares fixed effects models. UQ: Underqualification, OQ: overqualification. 95% confidence intervals based on cluster-robust standard 




Figure 3-4 gives the bounded estimates of mismatch-effects (bars) and the 
point estimates that result from assuming equal linear effects of mismatch and 
of occupation (circles). As explained above, the bounded estimates represent 
results for assuming that between all and none of the linear portion of effects 
are due to the mismatch component.  
The results of these very conservative tests confirm the findings from the 
cross-sectional analysis. I find that outcomes close to the employment rela-
tionship are affected by changing mismatch-states. Relative overqualification 
decreases wages and satisfaction (the satisfaction variables are, however, not 
statistically significant in the UK). If we are willing to believe that half of the 
observed change in the personal importance attached to one’s profession is 
due to the changing mismatch (as opposed to occupational) status (circle 
marker), we also find an effect on this outcome in Germany.  
The effects of increasing relative undereducation appear to be weaker, but 
are present in the case of organizational membership, wages, and the im-
portance of a professional identity in Germany – if we are willing to assume 
that some of the effects of job-changes are due to mismatches. Interestingly, I 
find that German workers, who move into relative underqualification, likely 
earn a bit less then implied by the occupation-change alone, whereas British 
workers likely earn a bit more. While my weak assumptions do not allow a de-
finitive conclusion, this pattern seems to suggest that relative underqualifica-
tion is less penalized in the UK than in Germany. Once we move towards atti-
tudes and behaviours relating to politics, there is hardly any evidence for an 
effect of mismatch-changes, or, for that matter, of occupation changes, at all. 
Again, this echoes the results of the cross-sectional analysis. Across all out-
comes, I find more statistically significant effects in the German data. This 
could be interpreted as a country difference. However, my longitudinal Ger-
man data is much richer, because of the larger number of observations and 




all likelihood the result of lower statistical power in the British sample, rather 
than a reflection of genuine differences between the countries. All things con-
sidered, the results of the longitudinal models thus support the conclusions 
from the cross-sectional analysis. 
Conclusion  
Do qualification-to-job mismatches have consequences for the social and po-
litical attitudes of affected workers? This article started out with a critique of 
previous efforts to answer this question. I argued that the theoretical commit-
ments of conventional strategies do not permit an answer except under very 
specific circumstances. Referring to the most recent age-period-cohort litera-
ture, I instead introduced a framework that uses explicit restrictions on the 
theoretical model based on substantive reflection to bring us closer to a solu-
tion in a wider range of scenarios. 
I find that under weak and plausible assumptions, mismatched differ from 
matched workers beyond what is implied by their differing occupations and 
qualifications alone in well-being, identity, and social integration. Mismatch 
or inconsistency is therefore an important concept in studying the subjective 
experience of social stratification. Conservative fixed-effects estimators that 
tackle the issue of selection bias confirm the gist of my cross-sectional find-
ings. 
While I was able to show that mismatch or status inconsistency does have 
important consequences for the individual, my analyses nevertheless refute 
some of the core hypotheses of status inconsistency theory. First, I find that 
the most important psychological mechanism assumed by status incon-
sistency theory, cognitive dissonance, is unlikely to account for the observed 
patterns. The predicted pattern of dissatisfaction, distance from professional 




overqualified. The underqualified, however, despite their mismatch, are more 
satisfied, identify more with their professional role and are not more critical 
of the democratic system. In this sense, undereducation does not seem to be a 
problematic condition. All this suggests that it is not role incongruences as 
such, but the specific experience of underachievement that is at the root of the 
strains described by status inconsistency theory. 
Second, while scholarly debate has strongly focused on the wider political 
and societal consequences of pervasive mismatch, neither the cross-sectional 
nor the longitudinal analyses provide convincing evidence for such a relation-
ship. This suggests that any link between mismatch and political dissatisfac-
tion is at most weak and likely not causal. Hence, while I was able to demon-
strate that overqualification poses problems for the wellbeing of individuals 
even in a conservative within-person comparison, rising rates of mismatch are 
unlikely to cause widespread political alienation. 
The results of my analyses are very similar between the UK and Germany. 
Methodologically, this builds confidence into my core results, as it demon-
strates that conclusions can be replicated using a different survey study and 
slightly different questionnaire wording. Substantively, the evident similarity 
suggests that the processes I investigated take place on a rather basal psycho-
logical level and are less affected by the respective institutional context. 
In the end, the substantive contributions of this study may appear some-
what paradoxical. On the one hand, the analyses have shown that classic in-
consistency theory as pioneered by Lenski is hardly suited to explain the expe-
rience of mismatched workers. On the other hand, however, the main result 
of this study – that a mismatched employment situation affects the wellbeing 
of individuals beyond occupation and education – provides an occasion for 
sociology to reinvigorate research into the multi-dimensionality of social sta-




of exceeding them, seems to provide workers with an independent source of 
strain, or satisfaction, respectively. 
Beyond the question of mismatches, I would like this study to be seen as 
an application of a broader conceptual point. As the conflation of mismatch 
and education effects in the ORU model demonstrates, the fact that a quantity 
is readily measurable does in no way mean that it corresponds to the process 
that actually generated the data. Vice versa, the fact that a parameter is not 
empirically identified does not mean that it is theoretically, or indeed in real-
ity, meaningless. In this sense, sociological research can profit from distin-
guishing much more sharply between theoretical (“structural”) models of the 
data generating process and the empirical (“reduced form”) models that can 
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4 Skill-Shortages or Credential-
Inflation? 
A cohort-analysis of qualification-mis-





Over the past century, completion of educational programs at all levels has 
increased dramatically. This dramatic expansion of education has been rec-
ognized by sociologist as one of the major forces shaping social change. 
However, it remains debated whether educational expansion has out-
stripped the demand for qualified labour, resulting in credential-inflation, 
or, whether, despite increases in education, modern economies face a skill-
shortage. Focussing on the United Kingdom and West Germany, two highly 
developed, but institutionally dissimilar countries, this paper therefore asks 
to what degree the sharp expansion of education has been absorbed by la-
bour markets. I point out shortcomings of traditional wage-centred analyses 
and develop an alternative approach that focuses on period and cohort 
trends in self-reported mismatches between individuals’ education and their 
jobs, that is, on over- and underqualification.  Based on repeated surveys 
(UK: Skills and Employment Survey, 1986-2017; Germany: Socioeconomic 
Panel Study, 1984-2016) and on official labour force surveys, I show that over-
qualification has increased and underqualification decreased in the United 
Kingdom since the 1980s, both over historical time and over cohorts. In Ger-
many, by contrast, mismatch-differences are minimal between cohorts, but 
the overall incidence of underqualification increased whereas overqualifica-
tion decreased. Further analyses of cohort-differences in mismatch provide 
clear evidence that overqualification increased with educational expansion 
in the United Kingdom but not in Germany. I document that credential in-
flation at the tertiary level trickled down the qualification hierarchy in the 
United Kingdom, suggesting a labour queue mechanism and a positional 
value of education. My findings document that the United Kingdom experi-
ences credential inflation, whereas West-Germany is affected by a mild skill-
shortage, mainly among middling positions that require vocational training. 
I relate these findings to well-documented differences in patterns of educa-
tional expansion between the United Kingdom and Germany that are rooted 






Over the past century, completion of educational programs at all levels has 
increased dramatically. In 1953 just 19% of 17 year old Britons attended full time 
schooling or training, but in the 2010s close to 90% did (House of Commons, 
2012). By 2018 half of 25 to 34 year olds had undergone tertiary programmes 
(OECD, 2019). In West Germany, 79% of 7th graders attended Volksschulen in 
1952 and were thus bound to graduate by the age of 15. As a result, just 8% of a 
cohort enrolled in tertiary education in 1960. In 2010, by contrast, almost 40% 
did (Geißler, 2014: 335 ff.).  This dramatic expansion of education has been 
recognized by sociologist as one of the major forces shaping social change 
(Baker, 2014; Collins, 1979). However, there is disagreement as to whether ed-
ucational expansion has outstripped the demand for qualified labour, or, 
whether, despite increases in education, modern economies increasingly face 
a shortage of highly educated labour (Collins, 1979; Goldin and Katz, 2010; 
Wolf, 2002). I refer to these diagnoses as the credential-inflation and the skill-
shortage hypothesis, respectively. 
Focussing on the United Kingdom and Germany, two highly developed but 
institutionally dissimilar countries, this paper therefore asks the following two 
questions: First, to what degree has the sharp expansion of education been 
absorbed by labour markets? Do we witness an inflation of credentials or is 
there a skill-shortage? Second, to which extent does this differ between the 
United Kingdom and Germany with their different institutions and patterns 
of expansion? 
Traditionally, answers to similar questions are based on analyses of changes 
in the relative wages of qualification groups (Tinbergen, 1956; Goldin and Katz, 
2010). Such analyses suffer from the fact that wages are the product of market 
as well as of institutional forces. Wage-based analyses have therefore been crit-




confounded by factors such as changing minimum wage legislation, collective 
bargaining, or firms’ degree of monopsony power. According to this line of cri-
tique, wage trends alone are not an adequate measure of the supply and de-
mand of skills (Cappelli, 2015; Kristal and Cohen, 2017). I thus argue that the 
question whether we face a skill-shortage or an education glut is still open. 
I develop an alternative approach that focuses on period and cohort trends 
in self-reported mismatches between individuals’ education and their jobs, 
that is on over- and underqualification. I regard prevalent overqualification as 
indication that educational expansion has outstripped the upgrading of the 
occupational structure. Vice versa, I argue that widespread underqualification 
indicates that there are more jobs requiring high qualifications than there are 
adequately educated workers to fill them. My approach adds to an emerging 
literature that uses alternative measures to assess the labour market absorp-
tion of educational expansion more directly (Horowitz, 2018). 
Mismatches do not only offer a fresh analytical angle, they are also socio-
logically important in their own right (Vaisey, 2006; Kalleberg, 2008). Over-
qualification, for instance, is often regarded as an indication of inefficient in-
vestments in human capital (McGuinness, 2006; Berg and Gorelick, 2003), and 
has been linked to lower wages, and lower job- and life-satisfaction (Korpi and 
Tåhlin, 2009; Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Battu et al., 1999; Wiedner, 2020), 
possibly also causing political discontent (Burris, 1983; Lenski, 1954; but cf. 
Wiedner, 2020). Underqualification, on the other hand, opens up pathways to 
the reproduction of social status outside the education system (Wiedner and 
Schaeffer, 2019). Since mismatches concern the link between individuals’ ed-
ucation and their occupation, they bear directly on models of intergenera-
tional  social mobility (Bernardi and Ballarino, 2016; Capsada-Munsech, 2015, 
2019b). Historical trends in mismatch incidence are therefore indicative of the 
general development of systems of status attainment and should thus be of 




The first contribution of my paper is therefor to provide comparable esti-
mates of mismatch-trends for the period 1986-2017 and for cohorts born be-
tween the 1920s and 1980s for the United Kingdom and Germany, and to offer 
a cohort-based perspective on the relationship between increasing educa-
tional levels and qualification. A cohort perspective naturally accommodates 
the process of educational upgrading, which essentially takes place between 
generations. However, existing research has so far mainly sought to identify 
the relationship between educational expansion and overqualification from 
cross-sectional variation between countries and regions (Di Pietro, 2002; Ver-
haest and Van der Velden, 2013; but cf. Horowitz, 2018). 
The second contribution is to include underqualification into the analysis, 
and to systematically consider expansion at different qualification levels. Pre-
vious work has largely been confined to the study of overqualification, often 
limited to graduates and tertiary expansion. Underqualification, however, is 
arguably of similar importance from the individual’s point of view, and accord-
ing to my data quite frequent. It should thus be taken into consideration in 
order to get a full picture of the relationship between macrosocial forces and 
individual’s occupational attainment. Similarly, I show that educational ex-
pansion has had strong effects on qualification mismatch patterns below the 
graduate level. 
The third contribution of this paper is to show that the relationship be-
tween educational expansion and qualification mismatch is highly contingent 
on contextual factors. Educational expansion went hand in hand with increas-
ing over- and falling underqualification in the United Kingdom, but not in 
Germany.  
I arrive at these conclusions by studying time-series of mismatch-inci-
dence based on repeated surveys from the United Kingdom (Skills and Em-
ployment Survey, UKSES, 1986-2017) and Germany (Socioeconomic Panel 




capitalism with vastly different education systems, industry structures, and la-
bour market rules (Wren, 2013; Müller and Gangl, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 
2001). I complement these microdata with contextual information from labour 
force surveys and estimate statistical models, which link patterns of educa-
tional expansion to under-/overqualification rates. My models exploit differ-
ences in education within historical time and regions between cohorts to esti-
mate the relationship between a cohorts’ incidence of mismatch and its qual-
ification structure. 
Skill biased labour market change, ed-
ucational expansion, and the role of 
institutional context 
The two most prominent theories of the changing value of formal qualifica-
tions provide contradictory assessments of the labour market absorption of 
educational expansion. The skill-biased technological change hypothesis 
(SBTC) highlights growing demand for education due to technological devel-
opment. SBTC largely treats educational expansion, the supply of skill, as ex-
ogenous. But at some point, SBTC argues, demand for skill has outstripped 
supply. Labour markets thus increasingly experience a shortage of skilled 
workers. The sociological credential-inflation literature, on the other hand, fo-
cuses on the supply side and proposes mechanisms causing educational ex-
pansion. Typically, these are thought of as largely separate from technical de-
velopment. But if forces other than technology-induced demand are behind 
increased qualification-uptake, inflation theorists argue, there should be an 




their evidence.24 I then examine the education systems and labour markets of 
the two cases under study and provide an argument, why the global forces pro-
posed by the two theories need to be understood in the context of national 
institutions. 
Skill-biased technological change 
The dominant view in on the changing balance between educational expan-
sion and skill-demand in economics is that of an increasing skill-shortage (at 
least at stable prices, i.e. wages).25 To be sure, SBTC theory’s main concern is 
with increasing wage-inequality, but the mechanism it assumes is that of a 
skill-shortage. This analysis is rooted in the idea that technological innova-
tions complement the productivity of workers with higher levels of education, 
but often substitute for less-educated workers (Acemoglu and Autor, 2012; 
Goldin and Katz, 2010; Tinbergen, 1956). Technological progress thus in-
creases the relative demand for skilled vs. unskilled workers. Education's value 
on the labour market therefore depends on a “race between education and 
technology”: If the rate of technological innovation outpaces the expansion of 
education, the economy’s skill demand will outstrip supply, increasing skilled 
relative to unskilled wages (Goldin and Katz, 2010). A large literature in labour 
economics argues that this mechanism explains much of the increases in 
 
24 A third neo-institutionalist position sees the question of whether there is “too much” ed-
ucation as ill-posed and argues that increased educational uptake has changed the very na-
ture of contemporary societies in ways that go beyond simple demand-supply-relations 
(Baker, 2014).I do not have the space to explicitly consider this criticism in this paper, but I 
note that the fact that there are significant numbers of people who say that a lower qualifi-
cation than theirs to perform their current role shows that, at least to some workers, over-
qualification is a real phenomenon. 
25 Of course, the concept of “skill-shortage” is ill-defined from a strictly economic perspec-
tive, because in a flexible economy market forces will ensure relative wage-levels that re-
flect the scarcity of different kinds of labor, which will in turn lead firms to reorganize pro-
duction efficiently (Arrow and Capron, 1959). The term “skill-shortage” thus implies that 
consequences of the relative scarcity of a qualification-group have consequences that are 




wage-inequality that have occurred in rich societies, but particularly in the 
United States since the 1970s (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Katz and Murphy, 
1992; Machin and Reenen, 1998). From an SBTC perspective, increasing wage 
inequality thus reflects a shortage of skilled labour. A related strand of research 
in sociology documents that occupational structures in Europe have indeed 
upgraded dramatically, suggesting that relative skill-demand has in fact in-
creased (Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017; Oesch, 2013; Oesch and Piccitto, 
2019) 
Credential inflation and relative education 
SBTC-research is based on the human capital theory of education, which holds 
that education and qualifications are valued by employers and students be-
cause they create and certify relevant skills, which then translate into high 
productivity and earnings. By contrast, many sociological approaches high-
light that education’s function goes beyond technical know-how. Prominent 
theories around the notion of credential inflation argue that schooling is im-
portant to policy makers, parents, students and employers, because it instils 
obedient work-attitudes, legitimizes social stratification, equips students with 
cultural currency that gives access to closed occupational positions, is a means 
of self-realization, or a symbol of family prestige. From the perspective of these 
theories, educational expansion is thus either an ideological deception which 
creates the mere appearance of upward-mobility (Bourdieu and Passeron, 
1970; Bowles and Gintis, 1977), the result of struggles for cultural hegemony 
and occupational closure (Collins, 1979), or an expression of a growing desire 
for personal development (Baker, 2014). In any case, these ideological, politi-
cal, or cultural reasons for expansion bear preciously little connection to tech-
nological requirements. Expansion for these non-technical reasons is there-




Other social scientists point to micro-level processes, which lead rational 
actors to acquire education beyond labour market demand. The central argu-
ment in such analyses is that education has a relative rather than an absolute 
value. According to the labour queue model, education is a signal of future 
productivity or trainability and employers rank applicants according to their 
level of qualification (Thurow, 1975). The value of a given person’s qualification 
therefore depends on the levels of education of others in the queue. This 
mechanism is therefore described as the relative or positional education hy-
pothesis (Horowitz, 2018). If education is positional, educational expansion 
translates into a heightened incentive to obtain yet more education, in order 
to preserve one’s relative position (Bol, 2015). Since education essentially be-
comes a race for the highest degree, overqualification, relative to actual skill-
requirement, will be very prevalent, as firms’ hiring standards escalate. The 
implications of the arguments sketched in this section for mismatch trends are 
clear: If forces other than technology-induced demand are behind increased 
qualification-uptake, there should be an excess-expansion of education. Hold-
ers of higher degrees will find it increasingly hard to find fitting work and rates 
of overeducation will rise across cohorts and historical time.  
Evidence on credential inflations and skill-shortages 
Even though they are mutually contradictive, there are compelling arguments 
for the idea that modern societies face a skill-shortage as well as for the idea 
that expansion has dramatically outstripped demand. Existing empirical stud-
ies likewise produce inconsistent results. Wage-based analyses often conclude 
that there is a skill-shortage, but studies using other approaches overwhelm-
ingly find support for the credential-inflation thesis. This section summarizes 
the lessons and limitation of these studies. 
Work by economists on the United States documents dramatically increas-




to the stagnation of college completion rates since the 1970s (Goldin and Katz, 
2010; Katz and Murphy, 1992). Variants of the skill-shortage thesis of SBTC are 
hence widely accepted among US economists (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; but 
cf. Card and DiNardo, 2002). In Germany, increases in wage inequality have 
been much more moderate, which might reflect the substantial expansion of 
the education system since the 1950s. Nevertheless, studies conclude that 
SBTC, and hence skill-shortages, had a part in increasing wage inequality in 
Germany (Dustmann et al., 2009). In Britain, educational expansion was even 
more pronounced. At the same time, however, between education-group ine-
quality, and wage inequality overall, rose dramatically, suggesting that institu-
tional changes may have played a dominant role there (Gosling and Lemieux, 
2004). In sum, economics analyses provide some evidence for the skill-short-
age thesis, although the British pattern does not fully square with the domi-
nant perspective. 
However, studies that infer changes in the ratio of skill-demand to its sup-
ply from wage data face increasing criticism (Cappelli, 2015; Kalleberg, 2011). 
In order to provide evidence in favour of SBTC, they must assume that observ-
able wage changes are due to shifting demand or supply, and not to other fac-
tors. But much research demonstrates that factors such as changing minimum 
wages, de-unionisation and other forms of rent-destruction and -creation have 
contributed significantly to increased wage-inequality (for examples, see Kris-
tal and Cohen, 2017; Weeden and Grusky, 2014; Fitzenberger et al., 2013; Gos-
ling and Lemieux, 2004). At least in simple wage-analyses these forces act as 
omitted variables and bias estimates of excess-demand for skill. 
If we take this criticism seriously, the conclusion that wage inequality rose 
because of a shortage of skilled labour is premature. Vice versa, this also puts 
important evidence in favour of the skill-shortage thesis into question. Above, 
I have introduced rates of qualification mismatch as an alternative measure of 




SBTC rates of overeducation should decrease, as employers seek to exploit the 
capacities of highly qualified workers. At the same time, rates of undereduca-
tion should increase, as firms hire workers for positions above their formal 
level of education to avoid interruptions of their business. Credential inflation 
approaches would expect the inverse pattern: rising overqualification, and 
sinking underqualification, as education becomes the sole mean to allocate 
desirable jobs. What do the findings of previous research tell us about these 
relationships?  
In contrast to wage inequality analyses, mismatch analyses tend to find ev-
idence against the skill-shortage and in favor of the credential-inflation hy-
pothesis. The analysis of mismatch rates started in earnest with Di Pietro 
(2002), who analysed the aggregated country-level incidence of overeduca-
tion. He reports a positive relationship of overqualification rates with educa-
tional expansion. Croce and Ghignoni (2012) apply a similar cross-country 
comparative design, but fail to find a robust relationship between qualification 
supply and graduate overeducation in a sample of European countries. Simi-
larly focusing on graduates and a country-comparison, Verhaest and van der 
Velden (2013) find that their indicator of graduate oversupply, essentially the 
difference between a country’s relative graduation rate and its relative research 
and development spending, is strongly predictive of overqualification rates. 
Between-country analyses thus suggest that educational expansion goes hand 
in hand with higher rates of overqualification. 
While suggestive, between-country analyses suffer from limitations. 
Firstly, there might be omitted variables at the country level that simultane-
ously affect expansion and growing overqualification. Secondly, another prob-
lem arises from aggregating information at the country level. In aggregate 
data, compositional differences cannot be adjusted for. But a higher propor-
tion of degree holders in the population does not just mean higher competi-




more workers at risk of overqualification in the first place. Aggregate regres-
sions thus overstate the relationship between expansion and overqualification. 
Two studies apply more nuanced strategies. These, too, support the idea 
that educational expansion has outstripped demand. Davia et al. (2017) use 
repeated measures from different countries to estimate the effects of changes 
in the supply of graduates on  graduate mismatch rates in a two-way fixed-
effect design, which purges the estimates of country- and period-confounders. 
They find that increases in their measure of “excess educated labor supply” go 
hand in hand with increases in the share of overqualified people. Horowitz 
(2018) brings the analysis to the cohort level and reports that the skill-utiliza-
tion-bonus conferred by a college degree in the US is diminished in birth-co-
horts with higher graduation rates. Because this is not true for wage-bonuses, 
Horowitz concludes that wage-based studies suggesting unmet demand for 
high-skilled workers likely suffer from omitted variable bias.  
Mismatch scholarship puts the dominant skill-shortage thesis into ques-
tion. However, given the limited number of studies employing alternative 
measures, more careful research is needed before any conclusion can be 
reached. In this contribution, I add to this literature and extend it in three 
important ways, by considering expansion and possible displacement dynam-
ics below the tertiary level, by covering undereducation, and by acknowledg-
ing that the relationship between educational expansion and mismatches de-
pends on the economic and institutional context. These extensions are crucial 
to systematically evaluate the question of education-absorption with mis-
match-indicators and outline its social consequences.  
Credential inflation and skill-shortages in different contexts 
In order to highlight the importance of contextual moderators in shaping the 
relationship between educational expansion and mismatch trends, I compare 




countries exemplify different institutional environments and socio-economic 
models. In the following I argue that the United Kingdom has experienced, 
first, stronger mismatch dynamics and, second, credential-inflation. Germany, 
by contrast, should show better qualification-to-job matching and, if any-
thing, a shortage of qualified labour. 
In general, mismatches will be more prevalent, when workers with differ-
ent kinds of qualifications are easier to substitute for one another. Much re-
search has documented that in the United Kingdom’s general skills regime the 
signalling value of qualifications is low, and the correspondence of education 
to jobs is weak, whereas Germany’s occupation specific labour markets and 
training pathways are in many ways the polar opposite (Heisig, 2018; Bol and 
Weeden, 2015; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Müller and Gangl, 2003). In the German 
context, a higher level of qualification can even penalize applicants if the field 
of training does not match the vacancy (Di Stasio, 2017). As a strategy for oc-
cupational attainment, overqualification in Germany is less likely to pay off 
(Di Stasio et al., 2016). 
But institutions’ influence on mismatches is even more fundamental. In-
stitutional regimes shape what kinds of jobs and what kinds of workers there 
are in the first place. In Germany, a tracked school-system and limited access 
to university act as a brake on credential inflation (Mayer et al., 2007; Powell 
and Solga, 2011). Occupationally distinct pathways between secondary educa-
tion, training and employment create little incentive to invest in surplus qual-
ifications as a strategy to stay ahead of the labour queue (Di Stasio, 2017).  In 
Britain, by contrast, expanding education at all levels has long been a policy 
priority among both Labour and Conservative governments. There are now 
many routes into higher education and an outright competition for students 
among providers of education (Busemeyer, 2014). The generalist nature of the 
British education system also means that there is a high individual incentive 




The result is that according to the British Labour Force Survey (see below) 
about 19% of those born in 1953 went on to acquire tertiary education, while 
37% did not attain any qualifications at all, but among those born in 1986, fully 
44% graduated from a tertiary institution, whereas just under 7% reported no 
qualifications at all by their 30th birthday.26 In Germany, the share of tertiary 
graduates (including from universities of applied sciences) expanded more 
mildly from 15% in the 1953 cohort to 24% in the 1984 cohort and the share of 
people without any vocational qualification fell from around 16% to 14%, ac-
cording to the official micro census (see below). While expansion has therefore 
been substantial in both countries, these figures reveal that it has been more 
pronounced in the United Kingdom. 
On the demand side of the labour market occupational upgrading, the shift 
of employment from less-skilled to more skill-intensive occupations, has been 
the dominant trend across the last 40 years in both countries. Nevertheless, 
when it comes to more nuanced differences, prominent theoretical arguments 
suggest that the United Kingdom and Germany responded to the challenge of 
technological and economic change in path-dependent ways (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Iversen and Wren, 1998; Wren, 2013). According to such argu-
ments, growth in liberal market economies like the United Kingdom is driven 
by high- and low-skill services, while growth in political economies dominated 
by Christian democracy, like Germany, is driven by high-value added manu-
facturing that continues to require technically trained middle-skill workers 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999: 111 ff.). That is, institutional foundations determine 
the shifts in what kind of jobs are created as economies modernize. However, 
empirical assessments of these claims remain debated. While they agree that 
a general upgrading has taken place, scholars disagree about the precise form 
and extent shifts in the occupational structure took in the two countries 
 
26 For the sake of comparability, I focus on birth cohorts for which the labour force data 




(Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017; Oesch and Piccitto, 2019; Oesch and Ro-
driguez Menes, 2011). Hence, I treat the degree to which occupational has 
matched educational upgrading as an empirical question. I turn to this ques-
tion after introducing the data and analytical strategy. 
Data and Methods 
Data sources 
I rely on two kinds of data sources. For information on individuals, I use rep-
resentative repeated surveys with a focus on matters of employment and qual-
ifications, the United Kingdom Skills and Employment Survey Series 
(UKSESS; with seven surveys in the period 1986-2017; Felstead et al., 2014), and 
the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP; with yearly rounds be-
tween 1984-2016; Wagner et al., 2007), respectively. Both studies collect com-
parable data in face-to-face interviews using well-documented sampling 
plans. A rarity in population surveys, both studies also asked respondents 
about the qualifications required for their jobs, the crucial measure to estimate 
time-series of vertical mismatch rates (see below). For information about pat-
terns of educational expansion and the composition of the labour force across 
cohorts, I rely on the large official population surveys carried out by the re-
spective statistical office, the Labour Force Survey in the United Kingdom 
(UKLFS, 1979-2017), and the Mikrozensus in Germany (GMZ; 1976-2013). Us-
ing these data, my models can draw on information from people born between 
1927 and 1986 (United Kingdom) and 1926 and 1983 (Germany). The UKLFS 
was fielded biannually from 1979 to 1983 and annually 1984 and 1991. From 1992 
on, I draw on the spring-sample of the quarterly LFS, which is collected be-
tween April and June. The GMZ was collected biannually from 1976 to 1995 




values in the various time series with the average of the last and the following 
year. 
Measuring mismatch for comparative analysis 
The dependent variable is an individual’s vertical mismatch status, that is, 
whether he/she is underqualified, overqualified or adequately qualified rela-
tive to the job he or she is performing. To determine mismatch status, I com-
pare respondents’ subjective assessment of the required qualification in their 
current job with their own qualification. In contrast to other measurement ap-
proaches, this so-called self-assessment approach to mismatch-measurement 
has the advantage that it produces mismatch-rates that can be meaningfully 
compared across time and contexts (Capsada-Munsech, 2019a). 
In the GSOEP, respondents are queried “What type of education or training 
is usually required for this type of work?” to prompt their assessment of qual-
ification requirements. This item focuses on skill-requirements to perform the 
job. In the UKSES, by contrast, the question used to elicit respondents’ assess-
ment is “If they were applying today, what qualifications, if any, would some-
one need to get the type of job you have now?”. This is a question about entry-
requirements to get the job. Based on these measures, levels of mismatch can 
therefore not be directly compared between the two countries. Note that using 
the UKSES-question will yield lower levels of overqualification, higher levels 
of underqualification and higher levels of matches than the GSOEP question 
in a labour market where education is a positional good. Likewise, the UKSES 
indicator will react more slowly to credential inflation than the German one. 





In the main analysis, I limit the analytical sample to employed people between 
the ages of 30 and 60, who are currently not enrolled in full-time education or 
training. I concentrate on prime-age workers in order to rule out that later en-
tries into employment caused by longer education phases affect my results. In 
the GSOEP, which is a panel study, I only use information from the first wave 
in which a respondent was interviewed. This is to ensure better comparability 
with the UKSES data, which follows a repeated cross-section design. However, 
robustness analyses in Section C of the Appendix III demonstrate that the re-
sults are substantively unchanged if I use all observations or select observa-
tions within respondents randomly. I use a case-wise deletion approach to deal 
with item non-response. However, with just 0.4% (UKSES) and 0.05% 
(GSOEP) of cases showing missing values on at least one of my variables, this 
is only a minor issue. All in all, I can draw on 17878 (United Kingdom) and 
21048 (Germany) cases for the overqualification, and on 16560 (United King-
dom) and 17591 (Germany) cases for the underqualification analyses. 
Analytic strategy and independent variables 
My approach is to compare members of different cohorts, at the same point in 
time, and in the same region. This allows me to estimate the relationship be-
tween educational expansion as a cohort-phenomenon and the contempora-
neous qualification mismatch rate in different cohorts. In doing so, I adjust for 
individuals’ own highest qualification obtained, which rules out that compo-
sition effects influence my results. Based on the available survey data I distin-






• no qualifications,  
• (non-minimal) secondary qualifications,  
• two categories of vocational qualifications  
o in the United Kingdom:  
▪ lower vocational qualifications from short programmes, 
i.e. level 1 or 2 in the NVQ classification, and  
▪ more advanced vocational qualifications (NVQ level 3), 
e.g. apprenticeships or SCOTEC/SCOTBEC qualifica-
tions;  
o in Germany:  
▪ workers with vocational training, and  
▪ workers with higher vocational training, i.e. Meister and 
Techniker,  
• lower tertiary certificates  
o United Kingdom: NVQ level 4, e.g. university certificates or 
nursing degrees;  
o Germany: universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschule), 
and  
• university graduates.  
Workers who are not eligible for mismatch (university graduates cannot be 
underqualified and people without qualifications cannot be overqualified) are 
excluded from the respective models. I limit the comparison to cohort-varia-
tion by including year-region fixed-effects into my model, i.e. one fixed-effect 
for each year-region combination. This rids my estimates of any period and 
region variation. The rationale for this approach is that if changes in the rela-
tive demand for qualifications, due to, for example, business-cycle effects, 
technological change or offshoring, play out exclusively across historical time 
and geographical regions, i.e. that they do not differ across cohorts, it offers a 
way to isolate the effect of educational expansion across cohorts from that of 
occupational change. This approach also controls for supply-side confounders 
such as possible displacement dynamics due to immigration. I further discuss 




In addition to these fixed-effects, I adjust for a range of other variables that 
might confound estimates of the effects of educational expansion. At the indi-
vidual level, I control for respondents’ migration background (Germany; “na-
tive”, “born to at least one immigrant parent” and “born abroad”), or their eth-
nic group (United Kingdom; “white”, “asian”, “black” and “other”), respectively, 
and an interaction of gender with their partnership status (partnered vs. not-
partnered). Gender-specific results can be found in Section A of the Online 
Supplement. At the period-region-cohort level, I adjust for the size of a cohort 
(people born within +- 3 years from the base year), relative to the entire work-
ing age population 30 to 65 in that year in that region. This is to account for 
the possibility that members of relatively larger cohorts might face increased 
competition in accessing matching jobs or (Easterlin, 1968). While the selec-
tion of covariates is based on common practice and theory, the specification 
of the final model always reflects subjective choices made by the researcher. In 
order to transparently communicate these choices’ implications, I report spec-
ification curves for the main results, which show the full range of estimates 
obtained for all plausible specifications, in Section D of the Online Supple-
ment. 
My main independent variables are indicators of the share of people of a 
given qualification level at a given point in time, in a given region, in a given 
cohort (again defined as above as people born within +- 3 years from one an-
other). In the United Kingdom, I distinguish six categories (below secondary 
education, any non-minimal secondary education qualification, lower voca-
tional qualifications, vocational qualifications including trade apprentice-
ships, lower tertiary qualifications, and tertiary qualifications) and in Germany 
three (secondary or lower, vocational qualifications, and tertiary qualifica-
tions). These coding choices reflect a compromise between two different goals: 




spaces of the respective systems and need to be codable in a consistent way 
across the time-series of labour force surveys.  
To estimate the relationship between educational expansion, measured as the 
cohort-specific share of qualification 𝑄𝑙, and the probability to be mis-
matched, I use the following random-effects linear probability model: 






+ δ𝑟×𝑡 +  𝑢𝑐 + ϵ𝑖. 
This model estimates the probability that an individual 𝑖, member of cohort 𝑐, 
surveyed in region 𝑟 (9 English government office regions, Wales, Northern 
Ireland and Scotland in  the United Kingdom, and 10 Länder in West Germany) 
at historical time 𝑡 will be mismatched, i.e. 𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑟,𝑐,𝑡 = 1. In this model δ𝑟×𝑡 
represents the period-region fixed-effects, 𝑢𝑐 is a cohort-level random effect to 
account for the clustering of observations and measures within cohorts, ϵ𝑖 an 
individual error term, and the term ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖)
𝑘=𝐾
𝑘=1  represents 𝐾 control varia-
bles including individual education as explained above. The quantities of in-
terest in this model are the 𝛼𝑙, the estimates of the partial relationship between 
the cohort-specific share of qualification 𝑄𝑙 in 𝑟, at 𝑡 (𝑙 indexes the qualifica-
tion levels) and the corrsponding mismatch-probability. If 𝛼𝑙 is positive, mis-
matches are more likely, where 𝑄𝑙 is more common. Below, I estimate different 
versions of this equation, and discuss the respective interpretation of 𝛼𝑙. 
Results 
I proceed by analysing descriptive trends in mismatch prevalence in the 






What insights do trends in mismatch rates hold for the debate on skill-short-
ages and credential inflation? Figure 4-1 offers a first assessment.27 Figure 4-1 
documents that mismatch-trends in the United Kingdom and in Germany 
have been strikingly different. While there are signs of credential inflation in 
the United Kingdom, Germany’s labour market seems to be moving into a mild 
skill-shortage. Overall overqualification rates rose in the United Kingdom but 
declined in Germany. The opposite is true for underqualification. The second 
difference between the two countries is that there are only small differences 
between cohorts in Germany, whereas British cohorts face vastly different sit-
uations, even at the same point in time. In fact, cohort differences in mismatch 
at any one point in time are often as large as the development that members of 
a single cohort experienced over their entire career. Respective younger cohorts 
faced the highest risk to be overqualified, and the lowest risk to be underqual-
ified during almost all survey-years. Rising rate of overqualification and the 
declining rate of underqualification thus appear to be mainly driven by cohort-
replacement. Trends in Germany, on the other hand, appear to take place 
mainly at the period-level, with mismatch rates of different cohorts being al-
most indistinguishable. If anything, younger cohorts appear to show lower 
overqualification rates from the late 2000s onward. Note that country differ-
ences thus evolve in the opposing direction to any possible bias introduced by 
the slightly differing item-wording in the United Kingdom and in Germany. 
 
27 Note that the first round of the British survey was not carried out in all regions. 1986 fig-










Educational expansion and qualification mismatch at the cohort 
level 
Figure 4-1 suggests that skill-shortages and credential-inflations are a highly 
context-dependent phenomena. However, any definite conclusion at this point 
would be premature. The results in Figure 1 do not account for the fact that 
with educational expansion, a higher share of workers becomes eligible for 
overqualification in the first place, and likewise is no longer at risk of under-
qualification. What is more, the analysis in Figure 1 is largely silent about  the 
source of differing trends in the two countries. At this point, it is unclear, as to 
whether mismatch trends are predominantly driven by the demand or the sup-
ply side. I thus now turn to models that link mismatch-incidence to cohort-
level qualification shares, in order to probe explicitly whether educational ex-
pansion has been absorbed on the British and German labour markets. Table 
4-2 gives the relationship between region-cohort qualification shares and the 
respective mismatch rate obtained from the model described in Equation 1, 
that is, net of individual education, other controls, and all variation between 
period-regions. Table 4-2 reports coefficients obtained from a reduced model, 





Table 4-2: Relationship between educational expansion and qualification mismatch, individual RE-LPM results 
United Kingdom Germany 
 Overqualification Underqualification Overqualification Underqualification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Expansion of                   
… no qualifications -0.301***      0.383***      0.195   -0.0758   
 (-4.21)      (6.15)      (1.51)   (-0.88)   
                   
…secondary  0.233***      -0.270***           
  (3.86)      (-5.06)           
                   
…lower voc.   -0.657**      0.623***          
   (-3.22)      (3.35)          
                   
…vocational    -0.458**      0.638***    0.399**   0.0295  
    (-2.98)      (4.83)    (2.89)   (0.31)  
                   
…lower tert.     -0.170      0.396        
     (-0.60)      (1.49)        
                   
…tertiary      0.280**      -0.580***   -0.607***   0.0634 
qualifications      (2.96)      (-6.16)   (-4.44)   (0.67) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 17878 17878 17878 17878 17878 17878 16560 16560 16560 16560 16560 16560 21489 21489 21489 17971 17971 17971 
NYears 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 29 29 29 29 29 29 
NRegions 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 
NCohorts 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Variance components                  
VarIntercept 0.0000957 0.000104 0.000117 0.000158 0.000279 0.000218 0.0000214 0.0000167 0.000125 0.0000357 0.000360 0.000105 0.0000620 8.00e-14 6.25e-10 1.83e-23 1.43e-22 1.67e-17 
VarResidual 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.154 0.154 0.153 0.0610 0.0610 0.0610 
t statistics in parentheses. Cohort random effects. Individual controls: Interaction gender and partnership status, and ethnicity. Cohort controls: relative size of cohort. Results controlled 
for period-region fixed-effects. 





Using a conceptually different approach, Table 4-2 confirms the significant 
difference in the relationship between expansion and mismatch in the two 
countries: credential inflation in Britain, but an overall balance in Germany. 
Starting with overqualification, the most important finding from these speci-
fications is that a larger share of university graduates in a region-cohort is as-
sociated with rising overqualification in the United Kingdom, but with sinking 
overqualification in Germany. Vice versa, more people without qualifications 
in a cohort went together with less overqualification in that cohort in the 
United Kingdom. Interestingly, a higher share of people with middling voca-
tional qualifications is associated with less, not more overqualification. Turn-
ing to underqualification, the results are the mirror-image of those for over-
qualification in the United Kingdom. Underqualification sank, where and 
when graduation from university expanded and those without any qualifica-
tions became less common. In Germany there is hardly any relationship be-
tween changing qualification patterns and underqualification at the region-
cohort-level. 
Results from the reduced specification presented in Table 4-2 accurately 
convey relationships at the cohort-level. However, they do not reflect the fact 
that qualification shares are mutually dependent. A rise in university gradu-
ates also implies a sinking share of workers with qualifications below univer-
sity-level. Single coefficients as in Table 4-2 confound these two forces. Table 
4-3 therefore reports results, when all qualification-shares are entered simul-
taneously. Of course, these models are only identified when one reference cat-
egory is omitted. Here, I present results for omitting the “no qualification”-
category. The counterfactual evoked by my models is thus one, where expan-
sion in any one category happens at the expense of the “no qualification”-cat-
egory. Results for using other references can be found in Section C of the 






 United Kingdom Germany 
 Overqualification Underqualification Overqualification Underqualification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Expansion of…     
…secondary 0.192* -0.195*   
 (1.98) (-2.29)   
     
…lower voc. -0.264 0.151   
 (-0.96) (0.61)   
     
…vocational 0.0293 0.0953 0.173 0.0636 
 (0.14) (0.54) (1.14) (0.61) 
     
…lower tert. -0.175 0.382   
 (-0.58) (1.40)   
     
…tertiary 0.259* -0.495*** -0.535*** 0.0879 
education (2.41) (-4.89) (-3.55) (0.85) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 17878 16560 21489 17971 
NYears 7 7 29 29 
NRegions 12 12 10 10 
NCohorts 61 61 56 56 
Variance components    
VarIntercept 0.0000668 2.22e-20 1.51e-15 3.18e-17 
VarResidual 0.227 0.170 0.153 0.0610 
 
t statistics in parentheses. Cohort random effects. Individual controls: Interaction gender and partnership status, and 
ethnicity. Cohort controls: relative size of cohort. Results controlled for period-region fixed-effects. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Table 4-3 Relationship between educational expansion and qualification mismatch, jointly 
estimated RE-LPM results 
Table 4-3 suggests that British expansion at both the lower and the upper 
end of the qualification hierarchy was only partially absorbed by labour mar-
kets. Expansion also severely limited previous opportunities for the upward 
mobility of less qualified workers, i.e. for underqualification. Importantly, I do 
not find any evidence of a comparable credential-inflation in the German data. 
The specifications reported in Table 4-3 are thus in line with my previous find-
ings: tertiary expansion went along with rising overqualification and sinking 




in Germany. At the same time, where secondary qualifications increased at the 
expense of the share of people without qualifications in the United Kingdom, 
underqualification decreased and overqualification increased. The effect sizes 
I find are large: I estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in the number of 
graduates has historically been associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase 
in overqualified and a 5 percentage point reduction in underqualified workers 
in the United Kingdom. In Germany, overqualification reduced at more than 
half the rate at which tertiary education expanded. 
How did British displacement dynamics play out across different levels of 
education? And what kinds of workers found it easier to move out of overqual-
ification in Germany? Figure 4-22 breaks down the association between ex-
pansion and mismatch for different qualification groups. Like Table 4-3 it is 
based on a random-effects linear probability model but includes additional 
terms for the interaction between own education and region-cohort qualifica-
tion shares. In Figure 4-2, rows correspond to the qualification group analysed 
and columns to the outcome and the country analysed. Markers give the mar-
ginal effects of the expansion of different levels of education, relative to the 
“no qualifications”-category.  
The first interesting take-away is that the overqualification-increasing ef-
fect of tertiary expansion in the United Kingdom is not driven by people with 
a university diploma themselves. Rather, displacement seems to have occurred 
for people with lower tertiary degrees and for workers with vocational qualifi-
cations. These groups were more affected by overqualification, where and 
when university education expanded. It is important to note that this pattern 
might be related to the phrasing of the UKSES qualification requirement item 
(see above). If credential inflation caused firms’ hiring standards to rise, a uni-
versity degree might be needed to get even if it may not be needed to do many 
jobs. In this case, there would be a displacement of lower tertiary and voca-




that is indeed consistent with Figure 4-2. My analysis should therefore not be 
taken to imply that the likelihood of British graduates to find fitting work has 
not changed, but rather as demonstrating that displacement dynamics trickle 
down the qualification hierarchy. In a similar vein, tertiary expansion also 
meant that British workers of all qualification levels became less likely to be 
underqualified, suggesting that high and medium-skill jobs are increasingly 
saturated with graduates.  
In Germany, I find that overqualification decreased among those with vo-
cational training, including those with advanced vocational qualifications 
(Meister, and Techniker), where and when tertiary education expanded, but 
not among the tertiary educated themselves. While I cannot determine the 
final cause of this pattern, I note that it is consistent with a process, where 
accelerating demand for higher qualified workers across region-cohorts is met 
at the tertiary level (hence the absence of a relationship there), but less so in 
the middle of the qualification hierarchy, leading to falling overqualification 
among people with these qualifications. This explanation is consistent with 
the observation of rising underqualification among workers with lower quali-
fications. These figures would thus indicate a decline in the provision of voca-
tional training relative to demand for it in dynamic regions. Taken together, 
these results suggest that British degree inflation had implications for workers 
in large parts of the qualification structure. Germany, on the other hand, faces 
a mild skill-shortage – however not at the top, but rather in the middle of the 
qualification structure. 
These findings provide a clear answer to my research question. But can my 
estimates also be interpreted as causal effects? That is, can we base quantita-
tive predictions what mismatch patterns would have looked like under alter-
native education policies on this study? These questions are interesting ones, 
but space constraints force me to move their discussion into the Online Sup-




the principal assumptions necessary for a causal interpretation of Table 4-3 
and Figure 4-2. I conclude that while the German results should not be treated 
as causal parameters, such an interpretation is in principal possible for the 
British data. Section B also discusses two more specific sources of bias: endog-
enous migration and selection-bias related to unemployment. I address these 
issues using three strategies. First, I tackle endogenous migration, the possi-
bility that people at risk of it move across regions to avoid overqualification, 
by replacing possibly endogenous indicators of expansion with an exogenous 
one, the historic share of a region’s cohort in (academic) full time education at 
age 17. Second, I restrict the analysis to exogenous variation in the expansion 
measure by using the historic share as an instrument for the contemporaneous 
share. Third, analyses using an encompassing indicator of qualification under-
utilization, being either unemployed or overqualified, address sample-section 
bias. Results obtained from these alternative specifications confirm my previ-
ous findings. Educational expansion in a cohort is associated with higher over-
qualification and lower underqualification-rates in this cohort in the United 
Kingdom, but with less overqualification in Germany. Point estimates ob-
tained from an IV-analysis suggest that the coefficients Table 4-2 are likely not 
strongly underestimated in the United Kingdom, as both approaches yield co-
efficients that are very similar in magnitude. In Germany, IV-estimation is less 
successful, all but preventing interpretation. Finally, using the alternative 
measure of qualification-underutilization, I find that the negative relationship 
between educational expansion and skill-underutilization in Germany is even 
more pronounced than appears from Table 4-2. These results demonstrate that 




Figure 4-1 Relationship between educational expansion and qualification mismatch at dif-




Discussion and conclusion  
This study seeks to advance the debate on the absorption of educational ex-
pansion on the labour markets of Western countries. The two most prominent 
hypotheses on this question do not only differ in the mechanisms they empha-
size, their assessment of what is to be explained are strikingly different: SBTC 
sees a shortage of well-trained workers on the labour market, whereas creden-
tial inflation theorists think there are too many workers with advanced educa-
tion for all of them to find adequate work. I have argued that traditional wage-
based analyses of this question need to be supported by studies using more 
direct measures of absorption and have proposed rates of self-assessed mis-
match as such an indicator. 
The results of the present study indeed shed new light on this debate, 
sometimes in unexpected ways. Most importantly, I find evidence for creden-
tial inflation in the United Kingdom and for a mild skill-shortage in Germany. 
This finding contrasts with much conventional wisdom, which is often in-
formed by wage-trends and SBTC theory. While it is widely accepted that Ger-
many has witnessed relatively modest increases in wage inequality (between 
qualification groups), the United Kingdom is among the countries with the 
strongest increases during the last quarter of the 20th century (Nolan et al., 
2014). From the perspective of SBTC one would hence expect more of a skill-
shortage in the United Kingdom than in Germany. However, my empirical re-
sults consistently show the opposite pattern. No matter whether I look at 
trends across historical time or across cohorts, in simple descriptive or in a 
wide range of multivariate analyses, the conclusion is the same: during the 
second half of the 20th century overqualification rose strongly and underqual-
ification declined in the United Kingdom, and this is linked to educational 
expansion across cohorts. In Germany the opposite is true in many respects. 




the expansion of their numbers was associated with more overqualification, 
suggests that wage-trends alone are a poor measure of skill-demand and sup-
ply. My study therefore adds to a growing literature that puts the SBTC inter-
pretation of educational expansion, skill-needs of the economy and wage-ine-
quality into question (Cappelli, 2015; Kristal and Cohen, 2017; Horowitz, 2018). 
It is worth noting that the striking differences in mismatch prevalence and 
trends between the two countries coincide with different patterns of educa-
tional expansion, which are in turn linked to vastly different institutions of the 
education system. This study is therefore in line with scholarship on educa-
tional systems (Bol and van de Werfhorst, 2011; Busemeyer, 2009; Heisig, 2018). 
Many elements of the German system – its strict tracking, its vocationalism, 
the occupational specificity even of tertiary education – act as a brake on edu-
cational expansion. In the United Kingdom, vice versa, education has become 
a positional good so that expansion fuels the need for yet more expansion (Di 
Stasio, 2017; Di Stasio et al., 2016). This paper does not attempt to disentangle 
the complex workings of different institutions. But it illustrates the different 
trends experienced and likely produced by different systems and therefore 
complements research on the matching between qualifications and jobs by of-
fering a novel temporal dimension (Bol et al., 2019). 
A third contribution of this study is to take a holistic approach by studying 
mismatch and expansion across levels of education. This perspective affords 
important nuanced insights. I find that tertiary expansion in Britain was not 
associated with overqualification of university graduates (at least with respect 
to nominal requirements to get the job), but of graduates of lower tertiary in-
stitutions and vocational programmes – suggesting a labour queue model, in 
which expansion at the top also affects workers with middling qualifications, 
as jobs are increasingly filled with graduates. My analysis of the German data 
suggests that any possible skill-shortage is not to be found among the most 




(advanced) vocational qualifications. If this interpretation is correct, educa-
tional policy in Germany should focus on shoring up the vocational sector, ra-
ther than expanding university access further. 
The analysis I base these conclusions on are not without limitations. First, 
the dependent variable was not measured in the same way in the two coun-
tries. While Germans were asked what was necessary to do their job, Britons 
were asked what it would take to get their job. However, the country differences 
I find run opposite to any possible bias introduced by this difference, suggest-
ing that they are under- rather than overstated. Second, since the main explan-
atory variable in my analyses, educational composition, was not assigned ran-
domly across cohorts, the degree to which my estimates can be interpreted as 
causal rather than as descriptive relationships depends on several strong as-
sumptions. Relatedly, my analysis cannot account for general equilibrium ef-
fects, like the educational composition in one cohort affecting mismatch in 
another. I discuss these issues extensively in the Online Supplement and offer 
a number of robustness checks. These supplementary analyses show that the 
substantive conclusions of this paper likely hold despite these issues. 
Trends in mismatch-prevalence can tell us something about the workings 
of educational systems and labour markets. They are, however, also important 
for people in their own right (Vaisey, 2006). Underqualification can be experi-
enced as redemption of the promise of upward mobility through hard work; 
its decline may offer fewer of such experiences to the less educated. Vice versa, 
overqualification can be experienced as a promise of social status not kept 
(Wiedner, 2020). My analyses have documented that the prevalence of both 
types of mismatch have changed dramatically since the 1980s. Future research 
should investigate what the wider societal consequences are for countries, 
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Vertical qualification mismatches are an important aspect of social stratifica-
tion. They change the well-being, wages, and identities of workers affected by 
it, even on top of occupational effects. Underqualified people are more satis-
fied with their lives and jobs and attach greater significance to their profes-
sional identity. Overqualification, on the other hand, has a marked negative 
effect on these outcomes. Who ends up mismatched is moreover far from ran-
dom. While there is a significant role of individual merit in the form of  
(non-) cognitive skills, underqualification is enjoyed overwhelmingly by peo-
ple of privileged backgrounds. Previous research has shown that overqualifi-
cation can, vice versa, be avoided predominantly by people of higher class or-
igins (Capsada-Munsech 2015; 2020). Taken together, this demonstrates that 
the social stratification of mismatch is a powerful mode of the intergenera-
tional reproduction of social status. Vertical qualification mismatches shape 
the lives of large numbers of people in highly unequal ways. 
In some sense this finding is the core message of this dissertation. In the 
introductory essay I noted that mismatch is a somewhat controversial concept 
among scholars of social stratification. If the proof of the cake is in the eating, 
I hope that the three empirical essays presented here can convince critics that 
the concept is useful. Social scientists are often encouraged to think that edu-
cation is destiny. But while it is not to be disputed that education is a highly 
important social determinant of individuals’ life chances, attitudes and funda-
mental to how they perceive the world, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
for most people education phases end relatively early, but that life continues 
to leave its impression on them. My research on mismatches shows that pro-
cesses of social mobility and reproduction continue after leaving education—




Research findings and implications 
In the introductory chapter I raised four questions about mismatches and their 
role for social stratification. How can mismatches be explained, first, at the 
micro-, and, second, at the macro-level? What are its consequences for work-
ers? And how does it differ over time and countries? In the following, I bring 
together the answers to these questions my research has yielded and relate my 
contributions to the existing literature. In doing so, I emphasize interrelation-
ships between the various answers by grouping them thematically. 
Tailwinds, invisible hands and the strength to grab them 
Previous research has shown that overqualification is socially selective. Edu-
cational pioneers, those who are the first from their family to attain a certain 
level of qualification, find it harder than their more established colleagues to 
convert their formal qualification into a well-salaried, qualification-adequate 
job (Capsada-Munsech 2015; 2020). Is the same true for underqualification? As 
I have noted in the introduction, it is far from clear a priori, whether under-
qualification is in the main an employment situation representative of upward 
mobility or of status maintenance. The empirical research in this dissertation, 
however, conclusively shows that underqualification is more often enjoyed by 
people, who already started from relatively advantageous positions. Under-
qualification thus has a significant part in reproducing pre-existing status dif-
ferences between families.  
From a life-course perspective, socially selective underqualification can be 
interpreted as a rebound after the setback of a disappointing school-career. 
Volumes of research attest to the advantages of children from relatively privi-
leged backgrounds in the education system(Hillmert and Jacob 2010; 2003; 
Pfeffer 2008; Bukodi, Erikson, and Goldthorpe 2014; Schoon 2010; Breen, Er-




these advantages, still do not attain the qualification level they can be expected 
to, based on their background, underqualification provides yet another chance 
for status maintenance. Many of the underqualified have used this second 
chance. Socially selective underqualification thus means that class-gaps in oc-
cupational attainment apply to even more people than implied by the already 
significant class-effects on educational attainment. Not only are they less likely 
to fall—if they do, privileged children are more likely to spring back as well. 
The class-gradient in underqualification demonstrates that children of up-
per classes do not only profit from a head start over their less fortunate peers, 
as consistently documented by work in educational sociology. They enjoy a 
continuous tailwind throughout their life. The findings in Chapter 2 demon-
strate that this tailwind does not only operate at the beginning of careers that 
is when people enter new employment relationships, it continuous into typical 
mid-career situations like promotions. During all these important switch-
points, those from advantaged backgrounds have a higher chance to end up in 
an occupation supposedly beyond their reach. An assessment of the social 
mechanisms behind these patterns within the confines of a survey framework 
such as adopted here is hard, even with the high-quality longitudinal data at 
my disposable. Nevertheless, my research shows that outright patronage is un-
likely to be the driving mechanism behind these patterns. Underqualification 
does not seem to come about by relatives or their friends bluntly securing face-
keeping jobs for their underachieving kin. The results are, however, consistent 
with qualitative research on the mechanisms of class-based advantage in pro-
fessional careers(Friedman and Laurison 2019, Chapter 6). In their interviews 
Friedman and Laurison identify one element frequently shared by highly suc-
cessful career trajectories of people of privileged backgrounds. This element is 
the invisible hand of an informal sponsor in a senior position. Invisible hands 
are disproportionately extended to people whose backgrounds resemble the 




more subtle ways than the nepotism covered by the survey item I draw on. It 
is likely that such processes explain part of the class-based difference in mis-
match-mobility I document even at later stages of the career.  
Importantly, Friedman and Laurison argue that invisible hands target 
sponsees not simply because of who they know, but because of their qualities. 
These qualities may include the aesthetic judgements and life-style choices 
highlighted by Bourdieusian sociology in the wake of La distinction (Bourdieu 
1984). Critically, however, merit, i.e. skills and abilities themselves, trigger 
sponsors’ attention—if they are showcased in the right way. In other words, 
the social capital mechanisms identified by Friedman and Laurison to explain 
the continuing importance of ascribed characteristics (social origin) in the 
course of a career, rely on achieved characteristics (merit, cognitive and non-
cognitive skills) and on class-specific ways of self-presentation to become ef-
fective. My quantitative results in Chapter 2 are in line with this qualitative 
observation. First, I find that social origin does not offer a one-off, but a con-
tinuing benefit. This is compatible with the interpretation centered on durable 
individual qualities proposed here. Second, individual cognitive and non-cog-
nitive skills partially account for the importance of social background. Of 
course, this also means that part of the individual-merit component of mis-
match can in the final analysis be traced back to class-origin differences. In 
order to benefit from the pull of the invisible hands up, workers need to have 
the individual strength to grab it. In this sense, the effects on unusual under-
qualification careers of achieved and ascribed characteristics, of individual 
skill and inherited privilege should be seen less as competing or opposing 
forces, but as something that often comes together. 
It is quite clear from our results that the underqualified are also genuinely 
more able than the average person with the same education. In line with the 
literature on overqualification (Levels, van der Velden, and Allen 2014), under-




with the same nominal level of education. Of course, this begs the question, 
how a significant share of students ends-up leaving education with qualifica-
tions that understate their cognitive ability as it can be measured in standard-
ized tests. Future work should investigate this important topic.28 
Returning to my first research question, how mismatch can be explained 
at the micro-level, the answers of my research are clear: First, by workers suc-
cessfully exploiting and signaling unusual abilities, second, by drawing on the 
resources of an advantaged social origin. One first answer to my question on 
the consequences of mismatch has also become apparent: One important ef-
fect of mismatches is to reproduce existing status-differences between fami-
lies. 
Failing and surpassing 
Mismatch is not only a mode of changing one’s objective position in the occu-
pational structure, its experience has significant effects on subjective out-
comes as well. Under-, and even more strongly, overqualification affect well-
being and identities. In other words, post-education occupational mobility has 
distinct effects on people. This finding, too, serves to highlight the fact that 
people’s prospects are not set in stone, once they leave the education system. 
The identity and well-being effects of educational mismatch thus parallel the 
effects of over- and underachieving set goals for educational attainment in im-
portant respects. Status maintenance theory in social mobility research argues 
 
28 Such a pattern is of course the logical result of secondary effects of social origin on educa-
tional attainment, i.e. of differences in educational levels by social origin that are not ex-
plained by differences in ability or performance (Boudon 1974). If students drop out early 
because they are from underprivileged origins, regardless of their innate ability, then early 
school-leavers from disadvantaged backgrounds possess on average higher cognitive ability 
(under some assumptions which I discuss below). If this were the driving factor, however, 
we would expect more underqualification among the children of the working classes. My 





that class-differences in educational choices reflect children’s and parents’ de-
sire to maintain family status (Keller and Zavalloni 1964; Breen and 
Goldthorpe 1997). For students, achieving at least their parents’ level of edu-
cation is paramount (Stocké 2007). In line with prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979), parents’ education constitutes the reference point, relative 
to which offspring’s status attainment is evaluated. Recent research similarly 
shows that people of immigrant origin, who do not reach their parents’ level 
of education report higher levels of perceived discrimination. The assumed 
mechanism for this pattern is that disappointment over unfulfilled attainment 
aspirations are externalized and attributed to a hostile social context (Schaeffer 
2019).  
The research presented in Chapter 3 provides evidence that such processes 
are not limited to educational attainment and to ethnic minorities. Educa-
tional attainment itself provides an important reference point. Occupational 
attainment is judged relative to it. The analyses using my novel bounding tech-
nique document that failing, but also surpassing these conditional expecta-
tions have significant independent effects on measures of well-being and pro-
fessional identify that cannot be reduced to working in different occupations 
under plausible assumptions. People who work in jobs that do not require their 
formal education are less satisfied with their jobs, attach less importance to 
their professional roles and are overall less satisfied with their lives, and of 
course they earn less then adequately employed colleagues with the same ed-
ucation. These findings are the second answer to my research question on the 
individual-level consequences of mismatch.  
These results have important implications for educational policy. They 
suggests that expanding education beyond the capacity of labor markets to 
employ new graduates in fitting jobs risks producing a growing group of dis-
satisfied citizens. While my research also shows that the initial apocalyptic 




1954; 1967; Portes 1972)—ranging from disengagement to communist upris-
ing—are overstated, systematic consequences for workers’ well-being need to 
be born in mind, when deciding upon future expansion. Especially a “skills-
lead strategy”, which seeks to foster economic growth by systematically up-
grading labor market entrants’ educational credentials, such as that pro-
claimed by British governments since New Labour (see Leitch 2006 for an im-
portant document from that era), appears to be riskier than appreciated in this 
regard. Forcing technological upgrading via the supply-side of the labor mar-
ket by producing ever higher number of graduates, comes at the cost of those, 
who will not be able to find adequate employment. Unmet educational expan-
sion instills expectations in many young people that the labor market cannot 
satisfy. Educational policy makers have to tread a tightrope between overex-
pansion, which leads to overqualification and dissatisfaction caused by it, and 
skill-undersupply, which may act as a break on technological upgrading and 
risks increasing unemployment and wage inequality. Educational expansion is 
desirable for many reasons, but the fact that its positive effects can be coun-
teracted by growing overqualification needs to be spelled out. 
Neither having a cake, nor eating it 
Given these findings on the consequences of mismatch, it is perhaps disheart-
ening that the central result of Chapter 4 is that educational expansion in the 
United Kingdom has to a significant degree not been absorbed by the labor 
market. The skills-strategy pursued by the United Kingdom has resulted in 
precisely the scenario I have sketched as a cautionary tale above. Nominally, 
education expanded significantly, meaning that ever higher proportions of the 
population hold ever higher credentials. Notwithstanding tremendous 
changes, the labor market, by contrast, did not expand its demand for higher 
qualified workers at the same rate, or at least not at all levels and in all sectors. 




and cohorts since the beginning of the dataset used in these analyses, and un-
derqualification declined. Even more worrisome is that over the same period 
income inequality in the United Kingdom rose as well, as is well documented 
in the literature (OECD 2011a; Nolan et al. 2014). It is now the highest in West-
ern Europe. British education and labor market policy thus combine, as it 
were, the worst of both worlds: high wage inequality and high and rising over-
qualification.  
The research presented in this dissertation suggests that skills-policy alone 
is not enough to ensure equitable growth. This conclusion is in strong contrast 
to the conventional wisdom derived from analysis carried out by economists, 
where improvement of individuals’ and nations’ human capital has long been 
hailed as the prime solution to rising levels of income inequality (e.g. by the 
OECD in the press release to their 2011 report, OECD 2011b; or, more cautiously, 
in OECD 2015). In this view, educational expansion improves the lot of the 
least fortunate in a country’s labor market in two ways. Firstly, it offers them a 
direct way to improve their skills and consequently engage in more demanding 
and thus better paid work. Secondly, by increasing the number of skilled rela-
tive to less-skilled workers, it shifts the market situation in the favor of the 
less-skilled group and allows them to command higher relative wages (Goldin 
and Katz 2010). For these predictions to work out, however, a very flexible labor 
market has to be assumed. In other words, explanations for, and policies to 
address, rising inequality that limit themselves exclusively to human capital 
mechanisms have to gloss over many of the institutional features of real-world 
labor markets. This orthodox perspective, which has been embraced notably 
by New Labour under Tony Blair (for a critical assessment, see Wolf 2002), is 
at odds with my empirical results. In Britain, despite educational expansion 
beyond the labor market’s absorbing capacity, incomes nevertheless diverged.  
On the level of theory, this finding suggests that the orthodox perspective 




related to the institutional regulation of industrial relations and the world of 
work. It is noteworthy that the most significant increases in labor market in-
equity in Britain coincided with the pro-market reforms of the Thatcher-era 
that dramatically curbed unions’ coverage and bargaining power (Gosling and 
Lemieux 2004). Naturally, the educational composition of the labor force, vice 
versa, stayed more or less constant during the same period, at least in the short 
run. As a description of the actual forces shaping people’s experience on the 
labor market, the orthodox theory is simply not valid in its generality. On the 
level of policy, my results imply that if the goal is to ensure that labor markets 
evolve in directions that profit all qualification groups, policy makers need to 
look beyond skills policy. More direct interventions into labor markets and re-
invigoration of unions may be needed next to education policy. 
At the same time, the data also show that underqualification declined in 
Britain. As chapter 3 has argued, underqualification can bring about distinct 
benefits with regards to wages and well-being to people with less education. 
The decline of underqualification in Britain is noteworthy, because Britain is 
often regarded, along with the United States, as an exemplar case of high labor 
market mobility in the comparative stratification and political economy liter-
ature (Longhi and Brynin 2010; Hall and Soskice 2001; Marsden 1990; Diprete 
et al. 1997). My results suggest show this mobility is now rather down- than 
upward, relative to workers’ educational attainment. Notwithstanding the 
highly unequal social patterning of underqualification documented in Chap-
ter 2, undereducation is always a route to and a testimony of occupational suc-
cess that circumvents the, as it were, official way through the education sys-
tem. This route used to be open to able but not academically inclined types—
just think of Philipp Green, with whose example this dissertation opened. In 
Britain, such routes are now present less and less. More than ever, decent work 
in the United Kingdom is available only after significant investments into ed-




Germany has emerged as an interesting counterexample to this pessimistic 
assessment from my country comparison. In contrast to the British, there is no 
evidence in the German data that overqualification has risen with educational 
expansion in West Germany. If anything, underqualification has increased 
slightly. I take this finding to suggest that some of the oft-criticized features of 
the German education system—it’s strict tracking, it’s continuing reliance on 
vocational training programs, the relatively low share of students it admits to 
university—sustain a system of education-to-job linkages that is more effec-
tive than the choice-driven British one, and that in contrast to some analysists’ 
concerns (Wren 2013), it continues to function well even in the face of sus-
tained labor market change (similar: Bol et al. 2019; Bol and van de Werfhorst 
2013). Compared to their British peers, German students can be relatively sure 
that their educational investments will land them an adequate job.  
Considering mismatch may even reverse some widely held believes about 
the much-criticized lack of intergenerational fairness in the German educa-
tion system. More British students of relatively disadvantaged origins may be 
able to attain university, but if overqualification is highly stratified by social 
origin, as my research on underqualification and the international evidence 
suggest (Capsada-Munsech 2015; 2020), the more selective German model may 
turn out to be just as fair, or unfair, in allocating life-chances on net. While this 
conjecture remains purely speculative, it illustrates how a dedicated focus on 
mismatch may lead to putting some of the established findings of educational 
sociology in perspective. 
Returning to my research questions, my analysis at the macro-level shows 
two things: First, regarding the macro-conditions suitable to mismatch, I find 
that individual overqualification is more frequent when educational expan-
sion exceeds labor markets’ absorption capacity. Underqualification, vice 
versa, can be found, when a dynamic and relatively knowledge-intensive econ-




qualifications. In other words, individual-level mismatch reflects a mismatch 
of skill-, and thus qualification-demand and -supply at the societal level. Sec-
ond, regarding country-differences and institutional effects, the macro-analy-
sis shows that the two country-cases have experienced vastly different mis-
match-trends that can be traced back to their different patterns of educational 
expansion and labor market change. These are rooted in turn in different in-
stitutional setups in the way that is consistent with my discussion in the intro-
duction. The overall low levels of mismatch in Germany depend on a system 
that sorts students into educational tracks and occupational fields early and 
that limits access to university. The more fluid British system, where tertiary 
education is strongly encouraged, on the other hand, has resulted in a strong 
prevalence of overqualification. 
Puzzles and future research 
This dissertation has provided clear answers to the research questions I intro-
duced in Chapter 1. However, the findings generated by my research also pose 
some important puzzles for social stratification research that should be ad-
dressed by future work. The first puzzle is how my findings on the relationship 
between social origin, underqualification and cognitive ability can be recon-
ciled with established theories in educational sociology and social mobility 
research . I find that people from privileged backgrounds are more likely to be 
underqualified. I also find that part of this association is mediated by cognitive 
ability. This implies that given a level of education (below university), people 
from advantaged backgrounds have, on average, higher cognitive ability. The 
extensive literature on secondary effects of social origin on educational attain-
ment, by contrast, implies that high-SES school-leavers below the university 
level should have lower cognitive skills (Birkelund 2020; Schindler and Lörz 
2012; Boudon 1974). This is because secondary effects ensure that even medio-




qualifications. In causal terms, educational attainment is a collider-variable in 
the relationship between social origin and innate cognitive skills (Elwert and 
Winship 2014). Holding it constant, for instance by controlling for education 
in occupational attainment or mismatch-models, should therefore introduce 
a non-causal negative association between SES-origin and cognitive ability.  
Why is this relationship positive in the SOEP and in the UKLHS data? Two 
hypotheses should be investigated. The first is that there is a strongly positive 
causal effect of social origin on measured cognitive ability, and that the effect 
of cognitive ability on educational attainment, and/or the direct effect of SES-
origin on educational attainment are relatively weak. It is in this scenario, 
which is not entirely consistent with the view in the literature, that the positive 
causal effect of SES-origin on cognitive ability overrides the non-causal rela-
tionship generated by conditioning on educational attainment.  
The second hypothesis focuses on the timing of measurement. The 
measures for cognitive skills in my data sets have been measured among the 
adult population. This opens the possibility that the relationship between cog-
nitive ability, SES-origin, and final qualification is as expected among the 
young, i.e. with low-attaining low-SES-origin youth having higher measured 
cognitive ability than low-attaining high-SES-origin youth, but somehow re-
verses as they age. This would imply either that (often adequately employed) 
low-attaining low-SES-origin people lose some of their cognitive skills as they 
move into adulthood, or that (often underqualified) low-attaining high-SES-
origin people somehow gain them. To test this hypothesis, longitudinal data 
on cognitive ability is necessary. If it was found to be true, this hypothesis 
would make a powerful efficiency argument for seeking to reduce secondary 
effects in education. 
The second puzzle concerns the country comparison in my dissertation. I 
find minimal difference between countries in Chapters 2 and 3, that is in the 




differences in Chapter 3, that is in the prevalence and trends. How can this be 
reconciled? One answer is that the first two chapters examine, as it were micro-
level processes that are unlikely to be influenced by country-level institutions. 
They focus on psychological antecedents and consequences and these are just 
too basal to be affected by, say, the stratification of education. This answer 
takes the results at face value and interprets them as a near identity in the sub-
stantive processes. There is, however, also the possibility, that really existing 
country differences are masked by the realized-matched indicator used in 
these chapters to measure mismatch. This indicator is intrinsically relative in 
that it essentially compares workers at different positions within the occupa-
tion-specific distribution of education. It answers the question, who will have 
less education than others in the same occupation, or what the effects are of 
having more education than others in the same occupation, without needing 
a measure for objective job requirements. So maybe the determinants and ef-
fects of relative mismatch understood in these terms are indeed similar be-
tween countries, but an objective measure of job-requirements would lead to 
different conclusions. While no such indicator is available in datasets that sup-
port the highly harmonized, rich analyses carried out in this project, it needs 
to be born in mind that the finding of great similarity in Chapters 2 and 3 
hinges on a relative conception of mismatch. 
The small and the big 
I began this dissertation with the story of Philipp Green, the retail Tycoon, 
whose long career is interesting, but clearly unusual. Nevertheless, my re-
search has shown that Green’s colorful life story is in many ways representative 
of the experience of mismatch and of undereducation. Green, while, according 
to his own acknowledgements, not bookish, is clearly highly intelligent and 




and despite his stylization as a self-taught self-made man, Green is actually 
from a privileged family of property developers and retailers: his first steps in 
retail he undertook in his mother’s shoe shop (Langley 2009). His case illus-
trates, as do my results, that a rise far beyond what grades and diplomas imply 
is possible—if one has the brains, the ambition, and, maybe because of family 
influences, knows one’s way in one’s chosen field. Finally, but this is specula-
tion, it can also be assumed that a career like his, whose first promotion was 
from shop assistant to wholesale buyer of shoes, would hardly be possible in 
the United Kingdom today, where even mid-level positions are advertised for 
graduates only. 
The story of Green illustrates not only that the conclusions I draw from 
highly abstract analyses of statistical data find some, however unscientific, 
confirmation in the biography of a flesh-and-blood human. It also shows that 
even the seemingly exceptional conforms to social regularities. As I explained 
in the introduction, this has been then motivation guiding this project from 
the beginning: to move what is commonly regarded as the error term, the un-
explained rest of status attainment, to the focus of attention. I hope that read-
ers agree that my endeavor has at least in parts been successful. The genesis of 
education-to-job mismatches, their contextual antecedents, and their conse-
quences all show strong and meaningful sociological patterning, Mismatch, in 
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I. Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
A. Coding of virtual years of educa-
tion 
We use information on the detailed highest qualification attained to construct 
a metric variable of years of education. We consider elementary, secondary, 
tertiary, and vocational education, in so far it results in nationally recognized 
qualifications. Further education programs that are company specific, or not 
certified, do not enter our estimation of formal education requirements. Im-
portantly, our measure is based on the typically required time for the comple-
tion of qualification as opposed to the actual time spent on attaining it 
(Schneider 2010). The conversion took place using the translation keys dis-
played in Tables A1 and A2, which are based on background information on 
countries’ education systems (DoE 2013, 2018; Jones 2016; KMK 2017a; b; 
Ofqual 2009; Schneider 2008). In cases where these background sources did 
not provide guidance on how to treat British vocational qualifications, we used 
the observed median duration needed by respondents to attain the respective 
qualifications to calculate its contribution to respondents’ years of education.  
To then derive the typical years of schooling in each occupation, we calcu-
lated the mean years of schooling and their standard deviation in 3-digit ISCO-
groups from our data. To increase precision, we pooled education information 
within a 11-year window to form a moving average of an occupation’s observed 
years of education. By dropping repeated observations of respondent- occu-
pation combinations within that window, we made sure that each respondent 




in a given year only once. We further distinguished between East/West Ger-
many and (non-)/London, respectively, and employed the appropriate cross-
sectional poststratification weights. In each country, this leaves us with around 
100 different occupations, for which we possess information on typical educa-
tion profiles. In the main article, we drop cases with an occupation-year com-
bination, for which less than 30 education observations are available to calcu-
late occupational education requirements. Appendix J shows the results for 
different cut-off points. 
Detailed as the translation key displayed in Tables A-1 and A-2 may be, the 
decision to use a metric variable to calculate undereducation may appear ques-
tionable, given the highly discrete nature of both countries’ qualification sys-
tems. However, using a metric indicator conveys significant advantages for our 
application. It allows us, for instance, to calculate occupation-specific stand-
ard deviations of education and thereby ensures that we consider only under-
education that is substantial, relative to the observed norm. This is the big 
advantage compared to other measurement strategies, for instance the self-
assessed undereducation indicator that we discuss in Appendix D below, 
where it is much less clear, how undereducation perceptions are formed. Our 
measure is also inherently relative in that actually realized education-job 
matches form the basis of our estimation of qualification requirements. This 
perspective is appropriate given our substantive questions, which focus on the 










10 school leaving certificate, standard/ordinary grade, cse, gcse/o-level 
12 a-levels and equivalents 
14 Diploma in higher education 
15 1st degree level including foundation degree, graduate of professional 
institute, 
pgce 
17 university higher degree (e.g. Msc, Phd) 
to which we added a maximum of one of the following further education qualifications if 
respondents did not report tertiary education (values based on median duration times) 
3 hnc/hnd, onc/ond 
2 modern/trade apprenticeship, scotvec, scotec, scotbec, other vocational, 
technical or professional qualification, city and guilds certificate, 
gnvq/gsvq, nvq/svq-level 1-2, btec/bec/tec/edexcel/lql,  
1 rsa/ocr, clerical/commercial qualification, youth training certificate, 
key/basic skills, entry level qualifications (wales) 
Foreign qualifications of respondents 
3 none 
5 completed primary school 
10 completed secondary school 
11 post-secondary vocational training (up to 1 year) 
12 post-secondary vocational training (2 and more years) 
14 post-secondary academic below-degree level qualification 
15 Bachelors or equivalent first degree qualification 
16 postgraduate academic below-masters level qualification 
17 Masters or equivalent higher degree level qualification 
20 PhD 
Qualifications of respondents’ parents 
4 no schooling reported 
9 left school with no qualifications or certificates 
10 left school with some qualifications or certificates 
12 post-school qualifications or certificates (e.g. City & Guilds) 





Table A-2 Virtual years of education, Germany 




9 general secondary school (Hauptschule) 
10 intermediate secondary school (Realschule) 
10.5 general secondary school + other vocational training 
11.5 intermediate secondary school + other vocational training 
12 general secondary school + apprenticeship or equivalent, voca-
tional maturity certificate (Fachabitur) 
13 general maturity certificate (Abitur), intermediate secondary 
school + apprenticeship or equivalent 
14.5 vocational maturity certificate + other vocational training 
15 vocational maturity certificate + apprenticeship or equivalent 
16 Bachelors or equivalent, general maturity certificate + appren-
ticeship or equivalent 
18 Masters/PhD or equivalent 
Qualifications of respondents’ parents 
3 none 
5 general secondary school (Hauptschule) 
10 intermediate secondary school (Realschule) 
12 vocational maturity certificate (Fachabitur) 
13 general maturity certificate (Abitur) 
to which we added the following vocational qualifications if applicable 
1 unspecified vocational training 
3 apprenticeship or equivalent 
5 crafts-master (Meister), technician-degree, technical tertiary de-
gree (FH) or equivalent 
6 university degree 





B. Full LPM regression tables 
The main article displays our results as coefficient plots to ease interpretation. 
Here we show the full regression tables underlying those plots. Table B-1 shows 
results underlying Figure 2-1, and Table B-1 shows the results displayed in Fig-
ure 2. 
Table B-1 Linear probability models of being undereducated 
 United Kingdom Germany 
Cognitive ability 2.76*** (8.19) 0.99+ (1.90) 
Conscientiousness -0.51 (-1.53) -0.88+ (-1.91) 
Neuroticism 0.030 (0.09) -0.48 (-1.16) 
Agreeableness 0.076 (0.24) 0.56 (1.30) 
Extraversion -0.035 (-0.12) -0.34 (-0.76) 
Openness 1.00** (3.18) 1.10* (2.47) 
Risk tolerance 0.21 (0.70) -0.54 (-1.36) 
Internal locus of control 0.91** (3.05) 0.67+ (1.67) 
Parents' average ISEI 1.51*** (5.58) 2.45*** (5.50) 
Controls     
Years of Schooling -20.3*** (-55.60) -16.6*** (-39.76) 
Years of schooling^2 12.3*** (66.15) 10.4*** (37.75) 
Age 0.92** (3.28) -0.0039 (-0.01) 
Age^2 -0.37 (-1.39) -0.34 (-1.05) 
Ref. Male 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Female 4.66*** (8.30) -0.072 (-0.09) 
Ref. West   0 (.) 
East   0.48 (0.59) 
Ref. UK 0 (.)   
London 4.95*** (5.00)   
Ref. Native 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Immigrant -1.69+ (-1.81) -2.58* (-1.99) 
2. generation 0.45 (0.58) 1.08 (0.69) 
Mental health 0.19 (0.59) -0.55 (-1.36) 
Physical health 0.74** (2.65) 0.56 (1.47) 
Ref. Interview 2007   0 (.) 
Ref. Interview 2012 0 (.)   
Interview 2013 -0.19 (-0.36) 1.62+ (1.65) 
Interview 2014 -1.47 (-1.15)   
Constant 0.84 (1.46) -0.14 (-0.12) 
N 10964  12348  
Imputations 100  100  
Realized matches results. All continuous predictors standardized. Robust t-values in parentheses. 






Table B-2 Linear probability models of entering undereducation 
 w/o controls for prior attainment w/ controls for prior attainment 
 UK Germany UK Germany 
 Entry Prom. Entry Prom. Entry Prom. Entry Prom. 
Cognitive ability 0.86 0.25*** 0.73 0.16 0.57 0.18** 0.53 0.053 
 (1.59) (3.93) (1.29) (1.31) (1.06) (2.85) (0.97) (0.43) 
Compliance enhancing traits 0.13 -0.069 -0.73 -0.074 0.12 -0.070 -0.66 -0.026 
 (0.26) (-1.02) (-1.34) (-0.74) (0.24) (-1.03) (-1.25) (-0.27) 
Entrepreneurialism 0.40 0.22** 0.67 0.23* 0.48 0.20** 0.47 0.11 
 (0.79) (3.25) (1.03) (2.36) (0.94) (2.95) (0.79) (1.18) 
Parents' av. ISEI 0.72 0.067 2.43*** 0.49*** 0.46 0.029 1.87** 0.35*** 
 (1.55) (1.25) (4.06) (4.90) (0.98) (0.53) (3.08) (3.58) 
Controls         
Y. of schooling -13.9*** -1.48*** -14.1*** -3.26*** -15.2*** -1.78*** -16.0*** -4.22*** 
 (-21.99) (-9.80) (-24.99) (-12.87) (-23.43) (-10.07) (-24.93) (-14.76) 
Y. of schooling^2 11.2*** 0.81*** 10.2*** 2.24*** 11.2*** 0.87*** 9.55*** 2.24*** 
 (26.29) (6.36) (26.47) (9.15) (26.79) (6.75) (23.09) (8.92) 
Age -0.45 -0.16* -0.57 -0.26* -0.80+ -0.17* -0.53 -0.23* 
 (-0.98) (-2.48) (-1.04) (-2.40) (-1.77) (-2.50) (-1.02) (-2.08) 
Age^2 -0.20 0.093 0.36 0.047 -0.24 0.12+ 0.30 0.028 
 (-0.47) (1.37) (0.86) (0.61) (-0.56) (1.66) (0.78) (0.37) 
Ref. Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female 2.94*** 0.24* 0.59 0.059 2.13* 0.078 -0.43 -0.17 
 (3.37) (2.17) (0.65) (0.34) (2.25) (0.63) (-0.43) (-0.80) 
Ref. West   0 0   0 0 
East   2.26* 0.26   3.18** 0.75*** 
   (2.20) (1.56)   (3.19) (4.19) 
Ref. UK 0 0   0 0   
London 1.67 0.16   1.67 0.088   
 (1.23) (1.23)   (1.22) (0.67)   
Ref. Native 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Immigrant 0.64 -0.17 2.21 -0.36 1.55 -0.024 4.91* 0.40 
 (0.50) (-1.13) (1.12) (-1.14) (1.24) (-0.16) (2.57) (1.19) 
2. generation 1.07 -0.13 -1.02 -0.25 0.47 -0.15 -0.66 -0.23 
 (0.90) (-1.10) (-0.73) (-0.75) (0.40) (-1.28) (-0.50) (-0.72) 
Mental health 0.40 -0.017 0.49 -0.016 0.46 -0.010 0.35 -0.034 
 (1.08) (-0.35) (1.20) (-0.21) (1.26) (-0.21) (0.85) (-0.46) 
Physical health 0.68 0.10+ 0.48 0.12+ 0.50 0.075 0.41 0.042 
 (1.62) (1.77) (1.04) (1.67) (1.19) (1.36) (0.93) (0.57) 
Tenure  -0.0025  0.016  -0.0045  -0.0017 
  (-0.25)  (1.56)  (-0.46)  (-0.16) 
Overtime l. year  -0.80  1.62  -0.69  0.49 
  (-1.48)  (1.62)  (-1.62)  (0.50) 
Part-time last year  -0.036  -0.29  0.054  -0.022 
  (-0.22)  (-1.28)  (0.35)  (-0.09) 
Last wages      -0.000014  0.0000040 
      (-0.46)  (0.09) 
Constant -0.33 0.11 -0.71 0.75+ 1.29 8.49* -3.58 5.12*** 
 (-0.21) (0.52) (-0.36) (1.87) (0.57) (2.39) (-0.81) (3.92) 
Year of interview  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of spell  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Transition origin  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Last occ. pos. FE  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Last industry FE  No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size of l. empl. FE  No No No No No Yes No Yes 
N 3698 27594 7161 53304 3698 27594 7161 53304 
Ncluster 3191 10256 4926 13904 3191 10256 4926 13904 
Imputations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 





C. Generalized linear models 
To facilitate between-country comparisons, we rely on linear probability mod-
els (LPM) in the main text. This section demonstrates that the substantive 
conclusions are identical, when we estimate generalized linear models (GLM) 
for binary outcomes instead. Table C-1 replicates the main analyses using a 
logit link function for the cross-sectional and entry-into-undereducation 
models, and a complementary log-log link function for the promotion models. 
While the logit is widely applied in the social sciences, the complementary 
log-log link is somewhat less common. It is given by 𝜂𝑖 = log(−log(1 − 𝜋𝑖)). 
The complementary log-log transformation is similar to the logit-transfor-
mation in that it maps the probability 𝜋 to observe a positive outcome from a 
[0,1] interval onto 𝜂, a random variable defined over the interval [−∞, +∞], 
which can be conveniently modelled. However, unlike the logit, the comple-
mentary log-log link is not symmetric around 𝜋 = 0.5 and it approaches zero 
slower than the logit transformation. Hence it is especially useful when pre-
dicting outcomes that are rare. For this reason, the complementary log-log is 
often used in discrete-time survival analysis. Another important property of 
the complementary log-log model in this context is that its coefficients have a 
direct interpretation in terms of effects on the hazard ratio, which makes it the 
discrete time equivalent of the continuous time Cox model. Since our promo-
tion models are in effect survival models, we opted for the complementary log-
log as the appropriate link function. 
Table C-1 shows patterns that are very similar to those reported in the main 
article. Of course, effect sizes are not directly comparable between the LPM 
and GLM specifications. If we concentrate on the pattern of t-values, however, 




Appendix B, save for the fact that estimates in the GLM tend to be substantially 
more precisely estimated (as indicated by their t-ratios). 
 
Table C-1 Generalized linear models of being in and entering undereducation 
 United Kingdom Germany 




Cognitive ability 0.35*** 0.13 0.33** 0.034*** 0.18 0.14 
 (7.18) (1.47) (3.27) (4.63) (1.33) (1.49) 
Conscientiousness -0.091+   -0.020**   
 (-1.67)   (-2.80)   
Neuroticism -0.013   -0.015*   
 (-0.25)   (-2.20)   
Agreeableness -0.00039   0.00018   
 (-0.01)   (0.03)   
Extraversion -0.047   -0.0022   
 (-0.87)   (-0.34)   
Openness 0.17**   0.026***   
 (3.19)   (3.75)   
Risk tolerance 0.044   -0.0075   
 (0.86)   (-1.23)   
Internal locus of control 0.18**   0.020**   
 (3.19)   (3.29)   
Compliance enhancing 
traits 
 0.0074 -0.15  -0.17 -0.023 
  (0.07) (-1.30)  (-1.31) (-0.32) 
Entrepreneurialism  0.099 0.37**  0.20 0.17* 
  (0.83) (3.04)  (1.28) (2.31) 
Parents' average ISEI 0.30*** 0.20 0.16 0.047*** 0.57*** 0.42*** 
 (5.56) (1.54) (1.46) (7.56) (4.22) (5.82) 





(-15.00) (6.26) (-9.01) (-21.72) 
N 10964 3697 27356 12348 7117 49060 
Ncluster  3191 10233  4926 13841 
Imputations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Realized matches results. All continuous predictors standardized.  (Cluster-)robust t-values in paren-
theses. ***P<0.001; **P<0.01; *P <0.05; +P<0.10. 






D. Self-assessed undereducation 
The most contentious methodological issue in mismatch-scholarship is the 
measurement of mismatches. It is well known that different strategies to 
measure mismatches, most prominently the realized-matches approach and 
the self-assessment approach, produce relatively low agreement on who 
should be regarded as undereducated (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011; Verhaest 
and Omey 2011). 
Fortunately, we are able to test the robustness of our core findings against 
a second indicator of undereducation that is based on the self-assessment ap-
proach in Germany. Here respondents assess the qualification requirements of 
their current job themselves, after being prompted by the question “What type 
of education or training is usually required for this type of work?”, with the 
four answers ranging from “None” to “a tertiary degree”. We define respond-
ents as undereducated if their actual formal education falls short against their 
own assessment of requirements. This approach has the advantage that it does 
not rely on years of education as a metric variable. Another advantage is that 
it captures actual mismatch-situations which are perceived by workers them-
selves. In contrast to the realized-matches approach, self-assessment also does 
not rely on the assumption that education requirements have to be constant 
within occupations as defined by ISCO-codes. Yet, this approach has the dis-
advantage that it cannot distinguish typical from untypical and thus substan-
tial undereducation. What is more, by relying on just four qualification levels, 
it identifies undereducation in relatively coarse terms. And of course, workers’ 
self-assessment can be wrong or outdated. 
Table D-1 shows results based on this alternative indicator of undereduca-
tion. Model 1 replicates the results for Germany displayed in Figure 2-1 of the 
main article. Model 2 and Model 3 replicate the career trajectories into under-




the overall pattern of results remains largely similar to the realized-matches 
approach. Yet, a clear divergence from the results reported in the main article 
is the null-result for cognitive ability and entrepreneurial traits in Model 1. Pa-
rental SES is a systematic predictor of undereducation and external entries 
into self-rated undereducation. Like in the main article, there are no benefits 
to compliance increasing traits (i.e., conscientiousness, agreeableness, and 





Table D-1 Linear probability models of being in and entering self-assessed undereducation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Overall Entry Promotion 
Cognitive ability -0.090 (-0.12) -0.16 (-0.21) -0.14 (-0.98) 
Conscientiousness -1.50* (-2.27)     
Neuroticism -0.74 (-1.29)     
Agreeableness 0.19 (0.32)     
Extraversion 0.57 (1.07)     
Openness 0.71 (1.27)     
Risk tolerance -0.55 (-1.02)     
Internal locus of control 0.14 (0.28)     
Compliance enhancing 
traits 
  -0.14 (-0.25) -0.079 (-0.67) 
Entrepreneurialism   0.33 (0.51) 0.23* (2.18) 
Parents' average ISEI 3.88*** (4.95) 1.64* (2.28) 0.24 (1.62) 
Controls       
Years of Schooling 1.92 (1.16) 0.83 (0.43) 2.28*** (5.63) 
Years of schooling^2 4.71*** (5.47) 2.94*** (3.38) 1.99*** (5.75) 
Age 0.020 (0.04) -1.49* (-2.40) -0.29* (-2.35) 
Age^2 -0.11 (-0.29) 0.18 (0.42) 0.15 (1.44) 
Ref. Male 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Female -5.66*** (-5.48) -1.55 (-1.50) -0.70** (-3.22) 
Ref. West 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 
East -1.67 (-1.45) 1.41 (1.05) -0.21 (-1.01) 
Ref. Native 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Immigrant -3.75* (-2.11) 0.34 (0.17) -0.73* (-1.96) 
2. generation -1.30 (-0.80) -2.21 (-1.60) -0.35 (-1.10) 
Mental health -0.40 (-0.76) 0.53 (1.10) -0.096 (-0.98) 
Physical health 1.44** (3.08) 0.070 (0.16) 0.15+ (1.85) 
Tenure     0.024* (2.47) 
Share overtime last year     3.77** (2.85) 
Part-time last year     -0.13 (-0.58) 
Last wages       
Constant 11.9*** (8.47) 5.57* (2.34) 2.99*** (6.51) 
Year of interview  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of spell  No  Yes  Yes  
Transition origin  No  Yes  No  
N 8995  5630  35400  
Ncluster   3855  9441  
Imputations 100  100  100  
Self-assessed undereducation results. All continuous predictors standardized. Cluster-robust t-values in parentheses. 






E. Metric depth of undereducation 
and alternative definitions 
The information on which the realized matches indicator in the main text is 
based is metric in nature: The deviation from the occupation mean years of 
education expressed in occupation-specific standard deviations. As Equation 
2-1 in the main text shows, we dichotomize this information in order to gener-
ate consistency with prior research, and to give a clear interpretation to the 
concept of transitions into undereducation. However, the choice of one stand-
ard deviation as the cut-off is largely conventional, and disposes of valuable 
information in the dependent variable. In this section, we therefore replicate 
the analyses in the main text using the original metric depth of undereduca-
tion and alternative cut-off values for dichotomisation.  
To generate a metric indicator of the depth of undereducation, we code 
workers, who have more education than the mean in their occupation with a 
zero and assign all others the deviation from their occupation mean years of 
education in units of occupation-specific standard deviations.  In the cross-
sectional models, we simply model the expected metric undereducation as a 
function of our covariates using ordinary least squares. For the promotion 
models, we regress the annual change in metric undereducation on our varia-
bles of interest. These models tell us about likely undereducation trajectories 
of people with different characteristics.  
We cannot provide a metric specification of our entry-into-undereduca-
tion models, because the transition into undereducation after job-change or 
labour market entry is not well defined as a metric variable. For these models 
to be meaningful, it is important to control undereducation in the last job, 




dichotomous case, finally, simply excluding those job-changers, who have 
been undereducated before, is impossible given the lack of a clear criterion. 
We further provide results for two alternative cut-off rules to define some-
body as undereducated in the dichotomous case in Table E-2. The first of these 
is based on simply using half a standard deviation around the occupation 
mean to define education-matched employees. This specification addresses 
the possible issue that undereducation might be too rare to be picked up effi-
ciently by our models, by somewhat balancing the distribution of the dichot-
omous outcome variable. However, this comes at the expense of a less strict 
definition of undereducation. The second rule is based on the median and on 
the inter-quartile range (IQR) instead of mean and standard deviation, respec-
tively. Here we define employees as undereducated if they have less than their 
occupation-median minus half an IQR of education. 
Tables E-1 and E-2 demonstrate that the results of the alternative specifica-
tions are largely in line with the specification presented in the main article. It 
is also apparent, however, that the metric formulation tends to have more sta-
tistical power, as standard errors are consistently smaller and t-values larger. 
Especially in Germany, we find that relationships that bordered the level of 
statistical significance in the dichotomous specification are often clearly sig-
nificant in the metric specification. This demonstrates that a lack of statistical 
significance in any one model should not be prematurely dismissed as indicat-





Table E-1 Linear models of (changes in) metric undereducation 
 United Kingdom Germany 
 Overall Promotion Overall Promotion 
Cognitive ability 0.060*** 0.0030** 0.034*** -0.0019 
 (13.00) (3.21) (4.63) (-0.77) 
Conscientiousness -0.010*  -0.020**  
 (-2.27)  (-2.80)  
Neuroticism 0.0059  -0.015*  
 (1.25)  (-2.20)  
Agreeableness 0.0047  0.00018  
 (1.04)  (0.03)  
Extraversion 0.0028  -0.0022  
 (0.68)  (-0.34)  
Openness 0.025***  0.026***  
 (5.46)  (3.75)  
Risk tolerance 0.0036  -0.0075  
 (0.87)  (-1.23)  
Internal locus of control 0.019***  0.020**  
 (4.39)  (3.29)  
Compliance enhancing traits  -0.0013  -0.000088 
  (-1.47)  (-0.05) 
Entrepreneurialism  0.00097  -0.00029 
  (1.18)  (-0.18) 
Parents' average ISEI 0.034*** 0.0010 0.047*** 0.0041* 
 (8.32) (1.34) (7.56) (2.56) 
Constant 0.17*** 0.0016 0.10*** 0.0094 
 (20.20) (0.54) (6.26) (1.16) 
N 10785 26250 12348 58173 
Ncluster  9799  14905 
Imputations 100 100 100 100 
The dependent variable is the (change in the) difference between own education and the occupation mean in occupation-
specific standard deviations. All continuous predictors standardized. (Cluster-)robust t-values in parentheses. ***P<0.001; 
**P<0.01; *P <0.05; +P<0.10. 









Table E-2 Linear probability models of being in and entering undereducation 
 United Kingdom Germany 
























Cognitive ability 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.0047 0.024*** 0.0020* 0.0034*** 0.012* 0.026*** 0.0083 0.012+ 0.0017 0.0040* 
 (7.93) (7.87) (0.81) (3.67) (2.42) (3.68) (2.24) (3.72) (1.48) (1.67) (1.58) (2.14) 
Conscientiousness -0.0031 -0.0011     -0.0078 -0.0095     
 (-0.91) (-0.27)     (-1.60) (-1.50)     
Neuroticism 0.00056 0.0072+     -0.0055 -0.010+     
 (0.16) (1.83)     (-1.26) (-1.67)     
Agreeableness -0.00052 -0.0016     0.0034 0.00075     
 (-0.15) (-0.41)     (0.73) (0.13)     
Extraversion 0.00061 0.000028     -0.0030 0.00058     
 (0.19) (0.01)     (-0.66) (0.09)     
Openness 0.011** 0.0078*     0.014** 0.021***     
 (3.04) (2.01)     (2.90) (3.39)     
Risk tolerance 0.0036 0.00053     -0.0061 -0.0053     
 (1.10) (0.14)     (-1.41) (-0.95)     
Internal locus of 
control 
0.0092** 0.0091*     0.0055 0.016**     
(2.88) (2.46)     (1.28) (2.96)     
Compliance en-
hancing traits 
  0.0012 -0.0026 -0.00041 0.00025   -0.0050 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0022 
  (0.23) (-0.38) (-0.50) (0.25)   (-0.91) (-0.18) (-1.39) (-1.25) 
Entrepreneurialism   0.0097 0.0024 0.0020* 0.00098   0.0081 0.014+ 0.0029** 0.0039* 
   (1.62) (0.35) (2.49) (0.97)   (1.37) (1.85) (3.05) (2.56) 
Parents' average 
ISEI 
0.016*** 0.018*** 0.0081 0.016** 0.00029 0.00044 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.0039*** 0.0071*** 
(5.47) (5.12) (1.61) (2.68) (0.43) (0.56) (4.82) (5.86) (3.46) (3.47) (4.05) (4.68) 
Constant 0.025*** 0.17*** 0.0025 0.14*** 0.0026 0.0082* -0.0053 0.094*** 0.0056 0.060* 0.0039 0.027*** 
 (3.87) (21.47) (0.14) (5.79) (1.07) (2.47) (-0.46) (6.48) (0.30) (2.32) (0.97) (4.39) 
N 10785 10964 3553 3458 27027 23337 12348 12014 7130 6680 51955 45868 
Ncluster   3075 3007 10048 8822   4911 4690 13642 12392 
Imputations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Realized matches results. All continuous predictors standardized.  (Cluster-)robust t-values in parentheses. ***P<0.001; **P<0.01; *P <0.05; +P<0.10. 




F. Parental education and occupa-
tion 
The main article uses average parental ISEI as the best indicator of respond-
ents’ SES backgrounds. Here we report results that instead use average years 
of parental education as well as both average parental ISEI and education as 
predictors of undereducation. The robustness test is based on the results dis-
played in Table 2 of the main manuscript. Table F-1 shows the results. Model 1 
repeats the results shown in the main article. Model 2 instead uses average 
parental years of education, based on the coding described in Appendix A, as 
alternative indicator. Just as parental ISEI, parental education is a strong and 
significant predictor of undereducation in Germany, but not in the UK. Model 
3 finally uses both parental ISEI and education as indicators in the same 
model. Because both are indicators of parental SES, their simultaneous inclu-
sion reduces their coefficients, but nevertheless both remain strong and sys-
tematic predictors of undereducation in Germany. One could therefore even 
claim that the German results discussed in the main article provide only a 
lower bound for the overall importance of parental SES, because dimensions 
not reflected in parental ISEI seem to matter as well. In the UK, by contrast, 
background effects are exclusively due to parents’ occupational standing, but 






Table F-1 Linear probability model of being undereducated 







Germany Germany Germany 
Parents' average 
ISEI 
1.51***  1.58*** 2.45***  1.69** 
 (5.58)  (5.23) (5.50)  (3.29) 
Education  0.42 -0.20  2.49*** 1.61** 
  (1.42) (-0.61)  (4.76) (2.65) 
N 10964 10964 10964 12348 12348 12348 
Imputations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Realized matches results. All continuous predictors standardized. Robust t-values in parentheses. All 







G. Relative socio-economic back-
ground 
At several points of the main text, we evoke the status maintenance motive as 
a possible explanation for higher undereducation probabilities of workers 
from high status backgrounds (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Goldthorpe 1996; 
Keller and Zavalloni 1964). However, our modelling approach considers only 
an absolute measure of social origin, whereas, strictly speaking, higher under-
education-probabilities due to the status maintenance motive should be 
driven by the differences between own attainment and parental status. An ab-
solute measure of social status, on the other hand, can be argued to provide a 
good proxy for parental resources, which may be beneficial to undereducation 
careers independently of one’s own position. Relative and absolute measures 
of status are of course strongly correlated, and so our models test both mech-
anisms jointly.  
So why do we not estimate models with relative, or relative and absolute 
measures of status simultaneously? The reason lies in the nature of our de-
pendent variable, which is itself a relative construct, based on two other vari-
ables, education and occupation, and the resulting need to control for own 
educational attainment in all models. If we were to include a relative measure 
of parental status, say the difference in own years of education from that of 
parents’, the portion of this variable’s variance that identifies parents’ attain-
ment would be strictly identical to that of the absolute measure, since own 
attainment is held constant. For the same reason—perfect collinearity—it is 
impossible to simultaneously include own attainment, parents’ attainment, 
and the difference between the two in the same model. We have thus no ana-
lytical leverage to strictly discriminate between differential effects of absolute 




However, there are two limited and imperfect strategies which might allow 
us to approximate relative status effects. The first of these exploits the fact that 
educational attainment is at least partially a positional good, i.e. that its sta-
tus-generating value depends on its relative scarcity. The status-value of a 
given qualification-level was different in the 1940s, when few people had at-
tained it, as in the 1980s, when it had become all but universal. However, in-
sofar a given qualification is consistently required to perform certain occupa-
tions or attaining it conveys a certain educational content, a given level of qual-
ification might be assumed to give access to specific resources with less 
changes over time. We exploit this ambiguity by calculating the z-standardised 
relative position of a respondent’s parents in the education distribution of 
other respondents’ parents from the same respondent-birth cohort (defined 
as an 11-year moving window). We pool all observations across survey-years 
available to us, in order to increase the leverage to detect differences by birth-
cohort, which identify our relative measure. This inflates the sample by a factor 
of about 6 and accounts for the fact that parental education is a significant 
predictor of undereducation in the results presented below (in contrast to Sec-
tion F). For this analysis, we use the highest degree of parents on the assump-
tion that this degree, rather than the average of both parents will inform status 
aspirations. The absolute, here as before in terms of parents’ average years of 
education, and the relative measures of parental education correlate at 𝑟 =
0.88 in both countries, highlighting the fact that by far most of their variance 
is actually shared.  
Table G-1 shows the results when we use this cohort-based relative measure 
of parental status alone and together with the absolute measure to predict un-
dereducation in a pooled model. It emerges that the relative measure is a con-
sistently better predictor than the conventional one, which even loses statisti-




What can we conclude from this exercise? At the very least, Table G-1 
demonstrates that parental education effects are not all due to their absolute 
value, and that there is an aspect of positionality in parental education that 
plays a role here. However, our approximate set-up does not allow us to judge 
where this positionality stems from. It might be that parents with a given qual-
ification in the 1950s inspired higher status aspirations in their children, than 
parents with the nominally same qualification did in the 1980s, due to differ-
ential status associated with the qualification. This interpretation would be 
consistent with the status maintenance motive hypothesis. It might, however, 
also be that the concrete monetary and occupational returns to a given quali-
fication are partly positional (Bol 2015). This would mean that parental educa-
tion’s positionality also influences the level of resources available to parents. 
To further discriminate between these two possibilities, we employ a sec-
ond test. Here, we investigate how the importance of parental background 
varies with one’s own education. If undereducation careers were driven by the 
motive to maintain parental status, we should witness a stronger effect of pa-
rental status at lower levels of education, where the difference to parents is 
likely to be highest. Figure G-1 shows that this is not the case. Undereducation 
is dramatically more likely for those with less education, which motivated us 
to always control for own education in the first place. However, higher parental 
status only shifts the curve up, it does not change its shape. Hence, there is no 
evidence that parental status matters any more for less educated workers than 
for others in explaining access to undereducation.  
While these two approximate tests certainly cannot provide definite an-
swers, the patterns they demonstrate are hard to square with at least a simple 





Table G-1 Linear probability model of being undereducated 







Germany Germany Germany 
Parents' average 
education 
0.17  1.10*** 0.57  2.30*** 
(0.32)  (4.72) (0.74)  (6.66) 
Relative parental 
education 
1.05+ 1.21***  1.89* 2.36***  
(1.90) (4.88)  (2.32) (6.40)  
Controlled for age 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 65782 65782 65782 76553 76553 76553 
Ncluster 16282 16282 16282 17416 17416 17416 
Imputations 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Realized matches results. All continuous predictors standardized. Cluster-robust t-values in paren-
theses. Results controlled for education, health, gender, and region. ***P<0.001; **P<0.01; *P <0.05; 
+P<0.10. 
 







H. Controls for final school grades 
Determining mismatches only with regards to levels of education overlooks the 
stratification of graduates within levels of education. An obvious example are 
school leaving grades, which are also observable to employers. From the stand-
point of our wider argument, it would be worrying, if undereducation only re-
flected within-education-group stratification in terms of grades. We are able 
to address this potential objection with the German SOEP data because it con-
tains information about the school leaving grades of respondents in German 
and Math, respectively. Results reported in Table H1 show that while good 
(German) grades do have a positive impact on the likelihood of later undered-
ucation, the coefficients of personality, SES-background and cognitive ability 
remain virtually unchanged, hence, considering grades does not put into ques-





Table H-1 Linear probability models of being in and entering undereducation 
 Overall Entry Promotion 
Cognitive ability 0.98+ (1.88) 0.70 (1.24) 0.15 (1.30) 
Conscientiousness -0.99* (-2.17)     
Neuroticism -0.43 (-1.03)     
Agreeableness 0.57 (1.34)     
Extraversion -0.27 (-0.61)     
Openess 1.12* (2.52)     
Risk tolerance -0.51 (-1.28)     
Internal locus of control 0.61 (1.55)     
Compliance enhancing 
traits 
  -0.78 (-1.42) -0.081 (-0.82) 
Entrepreneurialism   0.63 (0.98) 0.22* (2.28) 
Parents' average ISEI 2.36*** (5.31) 2.38*** (4.00) 0.48*** (4.82) 
Final grade German 1.21* (-2.06) 0.95 (-1.39) 0.22+ (-1.81) 
Final grade Math -0.66 (-1.41) -0.40 (-0.70) -0.030 (-0.29) 
Constant 5.00* (2.42) 3.03 (1.06) 1.44** (2.71) 
Year of interview  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of spell  No  Yes  Yes  
Transition origin  No  Yes  No  
N 12347  7161  53304  
Ncluster   4926  13904  
Imputations 100  100  100  
Realized matches results. All continuous predictors standardized. (Cluster-)robust t-values in paren-
theses. Controls as in Table B.1 and Table B.2 respectively. No controls for prior attainment. 





I. Tests of parental SES mecha-
nisms 
Figure 2-3 in the main article presents results of several mediation analyses. 
Here we present the full regression models underlying these results. We cal-
culated the mediation ratios visualised in Figure 2-3 of the main article as one 
minus the ratio of the SES-coefficient in the respective full model to the coef-
ficient of the baseline model. Confidence intervals were constructed from a 
non-parametric bootstrap procedure. We followed the MI-BS algorithm de-
scribed in Schomaker and Heumann (2018)  and pooled 50 bootstrap replica-
tions from each of the 100 imputed datasets. In a next step we determined the 
90% and 95% confidence intervals by calculating the 97.5th/2.5th and 95th/5th 
percentile of the resulting distribution of mediation-ratio estimates. This pro-
cedure ensures that the non-normal sampling distribution of the ratio of two 




Table I-1 Mediators of social background effects on undereducation, coefficient estimates 




tive skills Ref. 
(Non-)cogni-

























        -2.75 (-0.90) 
Job ad 




        -1.34 (-0.67) 
Former em-
ployer 
        1.67 (0.75) 
Other         2.45 (1.22) 
Constant 









 12349  12349  12349  
Imputations 100  100  100  100  100  
OLS-models of undereducation controlled for region, years of schooling, years of schooling2, gender, 
migration status, year, health, and self-employment. Realized matches results. All continuous predic-





Table I-2 Interactions of social background and potential mediators 






Parents' average ISEI 1.61*** (5.72) 2.52*** (5.60) 2.55 (1.48) 
Conscientiousness -0.54+ (-1.66) -0.87+ (-1.87)   
Openess 0.94** (3.03) 1.05* (2.33)   
Extraversion -0.024 (-0.082) -0.30 (-0.67)   
Neuroticism 0.026 (0.080) -0.46 (-1.12)   
Agreeableness 0.064 (0.21) 0.54 (1.25)   
Risk tolerance 0.21 (0.71) -0.52 (-1.32)   
Internal locus of control 0.89** (2.97) 0.60 (1.48)   
Cognitive ability 2.61*** (7.88) 0.95+ (1.83)   
Conscientiousness x par. ISEI 0.41 (1.29) 0.23 (0.59)   
Openness x par. ISEI -0.69* (-2.37) -0.64 (-1.53)   
Extraversion x par. ISEI -0.20 (-0.75) 0.75+ (1.80)   
Neuroticism x par. ISEI -0.070 (-0.25) 0.087 (0.23)   
Agreeableness x par. ISEI -0.27 (-0.90) -0.12 (-0.31)   
Risk tolerance x par. ISEI -0.11 (-0.39) 0.21 (0.55)   
Internal locus of control x par. 
ISEI 
-0.20 (-0.74) -0.60 (-1.54)   
Cognitive ability x par. ISEI -0.80** (-2.72) -0.52 (-1.28)   
Publ. empl. agency     0 (.) 
Priv. empl. agency     -2.90 (-0.96) 
Job ad     0.19 (0.092) 
Friends/family     -1.21 (-0.59) 
Back to former employer     1.83 (0.81) 
Other     2.48 (1.22) 
Priv. empl. agency x par. ISEI     -1.58 (-0.53) 
Job ad x par. ISEI     -
0.020 
(-0.011) 
Friends/family x par. ISEI     0.67 (0.34) 
Back to former employer x par. 
ISEI 
    1.12 (0.53) 
Other x par. ISEI     -0.62 (-0.33) 
Constant 1.02+ (1.75) -0.066 (-0.057) -1.29 (-0.61) 
N 10967  12349  12349  
Imputations 100  100  100  
OLS-models of undereducation controlled for region, years of schooling, years of schooling^2, gen-
der, migration status, year, health, and self-employment. Realized matches results. All continuous 






J. Sensitivity to cell density 
We use a realized matches approach and estimate the required education in 
an occupation from the data. Thus, there might be concerns that this strategy 
yields implausible results if the number of observations in a given occupation 
is small. If there is only one observation per occupation, over- and underedu-
cation are essentially ruled out. In all the analyses presented elsewhere, we re-
quire at least 30 unique observations per occupation in the 11-year window to 
rule out this problem. Here, we probe the sensitivity of our analyses to this 
choice and compare the coefficients of interest in our simplest cross-sectional 
model across different values for the minimally required observations per oc-
cupation. Reassuringly, Table J-1 demonstrates that the estimated size of coef-




Table J-1 Coefficients' sensitivity to occupation-cell density 
 
Note: LPM estimates with 95 and 90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. Esti-
mates that do not reach a marginal level of significance are displayed in grey. Results are controlled 
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K. Alternative scales for non-cogni-
tive skills 
We report a condensed version of our personality measures in our transition-
models in order to ease interpretation. This section contains results for the 
transition models using the full inventory of personality dimension and ex-
plains how the condensed scales were constructed. To arrive at a two-factor 
model of undereducation-related non-cognitive skill, we postulated two latent 
traits, entrepreneurialism and compliance, and investigated whether they 
mapped onto the personality-items at our disposal. For the two surveys, we 
used the entire sample between the ages of 20 and 60 in the survey-year during 
which the last set of personality items were collected to carry out the confirm-
atory factor analysis (CFA). While we acknowledge that mapping items that 
were designed to capture independent dimensions of personality on a two-fac-
tor structure may be questionable from a psychometric point of view, our re-
sults show that the two-factor model in fact represents covariance-patterns in 
the data satisfactorily. In any case, our purpose in this exercise is much less 
realistic than heuristic, to facilitate presentation, and full results using the de-
tailed scales are below. 
We proceed in a stepwise fashion, starting with the full set of items that 
entered our measures of non-cognitive skills, and drop items that appeared to 
be insufficiently related to the postulated latent traits. We found that the neu-
roticism and extraversion-items were largely unrelated to the compliance-di-
mension. Our final model thus uses the FFM items for openness, the internal 
locus of control item, and the question on risk tolerance to infer entrepre-
neurialism, and conscientiousness and agreeableness to infer compliance. We 
imposed no restriction on the correlation between the two factors, but the var-
iance of both latent traits is set to one. The model was estimated using a max-




missing values (which were later imputed along with other missing data). As 
Table K-1 shows, the final model has a reasonable fit to the data. The Table also 
shows that the relationship between measured and latent variables is very sim-
ilar in the two countries, and that entrepreneurialism tends to be dominated 
by the openness-items. In both countries there is a significant negative corre-





Table K-1 Regression coefficients and indices of fit in the CFA model 
  UK Germany 













 Locus of Control 0.13 0.013 0.26 0.015 
Risk 0.78 0.024 0.55 0.023 
Openness 1 1.07 0.014 0.96 0.015 
Openness 2 0.89 0.016 0.84 0.018 








 Agreeableness 1 0.40 0.013 0.63 0.008 
Agreeableness 2 -0.67 0.014 -0.72 0.014 
Agreeableness 3 0.85 0.012 0.72 0.009 
Conscientiousness 1 -0.70 0.015 -0.4 0.017 
Conscientiousness 2 0.44 0.015 0.42 0.013 
Conscientiousness 3 -0.82 0.012 -0.54 0.010 
Cor(Entrepren,Compli) -0.41 0.010 -0.36 0.011 
N  14088 13586 
RMSEA 0.083 0.093 
CFI 0.816 0.761 
TLI 0.765 0.694 
SRMR 0.061 0.072 
All coefficients are significant at P<0.001. RMSEA= Root mean squared error of approximation; 







Table K-2 Linear probability model of being undereducated using alternative scales 
 United Kingdom Germany 
Cognitive ability 2.85*** (8.54) 1.04* (2.02) 
Compliance enhancing traits -0.17 (-0.50) -0.57 (-1.25) 
Entrepreneurialism 0.84* (2.50) 1.01* (2.21) 
Parents' average ISEI 1.55*** (5.79) 2.51*** (5.76) 
Controls     
Years of Schooling -20.2*** (-56.11) -16.5*** (-40.35) 
Years of schooling^2 12.3*** (67.12) 10.4*** (38.25) 
Age 0.84** (3.04) 0.21 (0.52) 
Age^2 -0.31 (-1.16) -0.24 (-0.74) 
Ref. Male 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Female 4.51*** (8.29) 0.30 (0.42) 
Ref. West   0 (.) 
East   0.70 (0.89) 
Ref. UK 0 (.)   
London 5.12*** (5.31)   
Ref. Native 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Immigrant -1.69+ (-1.86) -2.78* (-2.20) 
2. generation 0.74 (0.93) 1.48 (0.96) 
Mental health 0.21 (0.75) -0.33 (-0.91) 
Physical health 0.79** (2.87) 0.61 (1.64) 
Ref. Interview 2007   0 (.) 
Ref. Interview 2012 0 (.)   
Interview 2013 -0.18 (-0.34) 1.52 (1.57) 
Interview 2014 -1.41 (-1.14)   
Constant 0.79 (1.38) -0.41 (-0.37) 
N 11125  12660  
Imputations 100  100  
Realized matches results. All continuous predictors standardized. Robust t-values in parentheses. 






Table K-3 Linear probability models of entering undereducation using alternative scales 
 UK Germany 
 Entry Prom. Entry Prom. 
Cognitive ability 0.86 0.23*** 0.71 0.15 
 (1.58) (3.70) (1.25) (1.25) 
Conscientiousness -0.78+ 0.057 -0.36 -0.17+ 
 (-1.66) (0.92) (-0.73) (-1.73) 
Neuroticism 0.78 0.055 0.12 -0.12 
 (1.60) (0.77) (0.23) (-1.35) 
Agreeableness 0.43 -0.12+ -0.68 0.13 
 (0.96) (-1.88) (-1.30) (1.56) 
Extraversion 0.47 -0.022 -0.19 0.093 
 (1.03) (-0.38) (-0.41) (1.08) 
Openness 0.72 0.19** 0.51 0.21* 
 (1.56) (3.18) (0.94) (2.21) 
Risk tolerance 0.52 0.085 0.50 -0.085 
 (1.09) (1.27) (1.09) (-1.06) 
Internal locus of control 0.23 0.064 0.70+ 0.20* 
 (0.51) (1.09) (1.67) (2.38) 
Parents' average ISEI 0.67 0.063 2.41*** 0.47*** 
 (1.43) (1.16) (4.00) (4.69) 
Constant -0.17 0.11 -0.74 0.77+ 
 (-0.11) (0.52) (-0.38) (1.94) 
Year of interview  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of spell  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Transition origin  Yes No Yes No 
N 3698 27594 7161 53303 
Ncluster 3191 10256 4926 13904 
Imputations 100 100 100 100 
Realized matches results w/o controls for prior attainment. Other controls as in Table B.2. Cluster-
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II. Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
A. Details on the measurement of 
variables 
Coding of virtual years of education 
We use information on the detailed highest qualification attained to construct 
a metric variable of years of education. We consider elementary, secondary, 
tertiary, and vocational education, in so far it results in nationally recognized 
qualifications. Further education programs that are company specific, or not 
certified, do not enter our estimation of formal education requirements. Im-
portantly, our measure is based on the typically required time for the comple-
tion of qualification as opposed to the actual time spent on attaining it 
(Schneider 2010). The conversion took place using the translation keys dis-
played in Tables A-1 and A-2, which are based on background information on 
countries’ education systems (DoE 2013, 2018; Jones 2016; KMK 2017a, 2017b; 
Ofqual 2009; Schneider 2008). In cases where these background sources did 
not provide guidance on how to treat British vocational qualifications, we used 
the observed median duration needed by respondents to attain the respective 
qualifications to calculate its contribution to respondents’ years of education.  
To then derive the typical years of schooling in each occupation, we calcu-
lated the mean years of schooling and their standard deviation in 3-digit ISCO-
groups from our data. To increase precision, we pooled education information 
within a 11-year window to form a moving average of an occupation’s observed 




occupation combinations within that window, we made sure that each re-
spondent contributed to the calculated mean and standard deviation of any 
occupation in a given year only once. We further distinguished between 
East/West Germany and (non-)/London, respectively, and employed the ap-
propriate cross-sectional poststratification weights. In each country, this 
leaves us with around 100 different occupations, for which we possess infor-











10 school leaving certificate, standard/ordinary grade, cse, gcse/o-level 
12 a-levels and equivalents 
14 Diploma in higher education 
15 1st degree level including foundation degree, graduate of professional 
institute, 
pgce 
17 university higher degree (e.g. Msc, Phd) 
to which we added a maximum of one of the following further education qualifications if 
respondents did not report tertiary education (values based on median duration times) 
3 hnc/hnd, onc/ond 
2 modern/trade apprenticeship, scotvec, scotec, scotbec, other vocational, 
technical or professional qualification, city and guilds certificate, 
gnvq/gsvq, nvq/svq-level 1-2, btec/bec/tec/edexcel/lql,  
1 rsa/ocr, clerical/commercial qualification, youth training certificate, 
key/basic skills, entry level qualifications (wales) 
Foreign qualifications of respondents 
3 none 
5 completed primary school 
10 completed secondary school 
11 post-secondary vocational training (up to 1 year) 
12 post-secondary vocational training (2 and more years) 
14 post-secondary academic below-degree level qualification 
15 Bachelors or equivalent first degree qualification 
16 postgraduate academic below-masters level qualification 
17 Masters or equivalent higher degree level qualification 
20 PhD 
Qualifications of respondents’ parents 
4 no schooling reported 
9 left school with no qualifications or certificates 
10 left school with some qualifications or certificates 
12 post-school qualifications or certificates (e.g. City & Guilds) 





Table A-2 Virtual years of education, Germany 




9 general secondary school (Hauptschule) 
10 intermediate secondary school (Realschule) 
10.5 general secondary school + other vocational training 
11.5 intermediate secondary school + other vocational training 
12 general secondary school + apprenticeship or equivalent, voca-
tional maturity certificate (Fachabitur) 
13 general maturity certificate (Abitur), intermediate secondary 
school + apprenticeship or equivalent 
14.5 vocational maturity certificate + other vocational training 
15 vocational maturity certificate + apprenticeship or equivalent 
16 Bachelors or equivalent, general maturity certificate + appren-
ticeship or equivalent 
18 Masters/PhD or equivalent 
Qualifications of respondents’ parents 
3 none 
5 general secondary school (Hauptschule) 
10 intermediate secondary school (Realschule) 
12 vocational maturity certificate (Fachabitur) 
13 general maturity certificate (Abitur) 
to which we added the following vocational qualifications if applicable 
1 unspecified vocational training 
3 apprenticeship or equivalent 
5 crafts-master (Meister), technician-degree, technical tertiary de-
gree (FH) or equivalent 
6 university degree 




B. Measurement of control variables 
In our analyses, we control for respondents’ cognitive and non-cognitive skills. 
A rarity in population studies, both the UKHLS and SOEP contain direct 
measures of cognitive ability, although the tests are somewhat different and 
hence not directly comparable. UKHLS respondents solved logical puzzles, 
subtraction exercises, and tests of their everyday numeracy skills (McFall 
2013). SOEP respondents had to match a range of symbols to numbers accord-
ing to a predefined key (Schupp et al. 2008). Unfortunately, only a random 25% 
sub-sample of the SOEP was assessed each time. Because the other 75% are 
missing completely at random (MCAR) we imputed their cognitive ability 
scores using a chained equation approach as explained in the main article. 
Our measures of non-cognitive skills are directly comparable across the 
UKHLS and SOEP. To assess the Big-5 personality dimensions, both surveys 
rely on identical short versions of the FFM personality inventory (Dehne and 
Schupp 2007). For each survey year, we performed a varimax rotated principal-
component analysis of the 15 items, which are measured on 7-point scales. As 
predictors in our analysis we use factor scores based on a five-component so-
lution reflecting the Big-5 personality dimensions. Two other measures of per-
sonality we take into account, risk aversion and locus of control, were meas-
ured using standard single item scales in both survey (Risk aversion: `Are you 
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks?’ with an eleven-point scale ranging from `avoid taking risks’ to 
`fully prepared”. Locus of control: `I feel that what happens in life is often de-
termined by factors beyond my control’ with a six-point scale ranging from 
`strongly disagree’ to `strongly agree”). 
We measure parental SES by using respondents’ recollection of their par-
ents’ occupation when they were 14/15 years old. In particular, we use the aver-




economic origin. For the UKHLS, we obtain ISEI-values through a translation 
routine provided by the CAMSIS project (Lambert and Prandy 2008). Parental 
education is also inferred from respondents’ reports. We use a metric variable 
that was derived from survey respondents according to the key in Appendix A. 
Like for SES, we use the average virtual years of education of respondents’ par-




C. Measurement of dependent vari-
ables 
In the following, we list the questions from the two surveys we use to measure 
our dependent variables: 
 
Table C-5-1 Dependent variable items 
Variable Item UKLHS 
Response cat-
egories 





ally a person 
who is fully 
prepared to 
take risks in 
trusting 
strangers or do 
you try to avoid 
taking such 
risks? 
0 Avoid taking 
risks in trusting 
strangers – 10 
Fully prepared 
to take risks in 
trusting 
strangers 











0 risk averse -- 
10 fully pre-





On the whole, 
are you very 
satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, a little 
dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied 
with the way 
democracy 








are you today 
with the fol-
lowing areas of 
your life: 
- With democ-
racy as it exists 
in Germany? 
Completely dis-




Please look at 
this card and 






dissatisfied – 7 
completely sat-
isfied 












Please tick the 
number which 




are with the fol-
lowing aspects 
of your current 
situation:  










about each of 
the following 
and tick the 
box that indi-
cates whether 





or not at all im-
portant to your 
sense of who 
you are: 













portant are the 
following 
















cessful in my 
career 
  
Two other dependent variables of our analyses are voting intentions for 
left-wing parties and voting intentions for far-right parties. In the UK party 
support was coded in three steps: In a first step, we used information from an 




general election tomorrow. However, about 16% of respondents answered 
“None”, yielding a total of just 53% of usable party nominations. Thus, if infor-
mation on that variable was missing, we relied on an item that asked, which 
party a respondent “felt closest to”. If again no information was recorded, we 
coded party-support using information on which party had voted for during 
the last election. In the end, 62% of respondents in our sample could be as-
signed a party affiliation.  In Germany, we were able to carry out only the sec-
ond step, yielding just over 40% of usable nominations.  
We here list the parties we counted as left and far-right, respectively: 
 
Variable UK Germany 
Left-wing voting intention 
Labour, SNP, Plaid Cymru, 
Green Party, SDLP, Sinn 
Fein 
SPD, Greens, and Die Linke 
Far-right voting intention 
Ulster Unionists, UKIP, 
BNP 
DVU, Republikaner, NPD, 
AfD 




D. Results for Different Specifica-
tions 
Figure B-1 present the results of our analysis of pooled data using three differ-
ent specifications: the E-ORU model described in the main text, the classic 
ORU decomposition, and the OEU model, where instead of education the ef-
fect of required education is assumed to be zero (see page 23 of the main man-
uscript). In the OEU model the comparison is between matched and mis-
matched workers in occupations with the same requirements. In ORU, it is 
between matched and mismatched workers with the same education. E-ORU, 
finally, aims to isolate the mismatch-effect net of education and occupation. 
All of the differences we report are net of our control variables, but essentially 
cross-sectional. 
The first take-away from Figure B-1 is that in general both education and 
occupation have sizeable true main effects on the outcomes. This is indicated 
by the fact that for virtually all dependent variables the mismatch parameters 
obtained from the OEU and the ORU specifications have different signs. This 
is because matched and mismatched workers differ not only in their mis-
match-status, they also differ in their education, or, depending on the model, 
their occupation. This pattern underlines that the main effects of occupation 
and of education cannot simply be assumed to be zero. Had we naively as-
sumed that OEU and ORU returned the effects of mismatches proper, our con-
clusions would have differed starkly between specifications. This fact illus-
trates the importance of gaining a theoretical understanding of the structural 
model implied by empirical approaches. In our view it also explains the failure 
of past research to produce consistent findings. 
Underqualified workers are more trusting, more satisfied with politics, 




political involvement, are more likely to be members of an organization, and 
less likely to intent to vote for a party of the far-right, compared to matched 
workers with the same education. However, if we compare mismatched work-
ers with matched workers in a similar occupation, we tend to find the opposite. 
Now underqualified workers appear as less trusting, less satisfied with politics, 
their lives (n.s. in the UK), attach less importance to politics and their profes-
sion, and are less likely to be members of an organization. For overqualified 





Figure D-1 Social and political attitudes, and wages among mismatched workers, results 
for different specifications 
 
Note: Constrained least squares models estimated on pooled data. Confidence intervals 






E. Gender specific results 
Figures B-1 and B-2 replicate the analyses of the main text separately for men 
and women. As can be seen, the results are largely identical for both genders. 
However, due to the reduced sample size, some of the results that were clearly 
significant in the combined analysis only border conventional levels of signif-




Note: Constrained least squares models estimated on pooled data. Confidence intervals 
based on cluster-robust standard errors and ten imputations. Logged hourly wages: ef-
fects given in log-points. Results controlled for personal characteristics. 




Figure E-2 Social and political behaviors among mismatched workers, by gender 
 
Note: Constrained linear probability models estimated on pooled data. Confidence inter-






F. Sensitivity analysis for alternative 
identifying restrictions 
Figures F-1 and F-2 replicate our main analysis employing different assump-
tions about the relative importance of education and occupation for our out-
comes of interest. In the analyses reported in the main text, mismatch-effects 




𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 3𝛽𝐸 , i.e. we assume that the 
effect of education is not three times larger or three times smaller than that of 
occupational status. Here we report results for using the factors five or ten in-
stead, which imply weaker constraints on the relative weight of education and 
occupation.  
In a final specification, we merely constrain 𝛽𝐸  and 𝛽𝑂  to have the same 
sign. This excludes the possibility, for instance, that education has a positive 
effect on life satisfaction, but that working in a job that requires more educa-
tion has a negative one. This is a very weak constraint and hence produces 
likely overly conservative bounds on the true effect size.  
As can be seen, the picture that emerges using these alternative values is 
strikingly similar to the results reported in the main text. However, in some 
instances, making weaker assumptions sometimes results in identification-
bounds crossing zero. This is true for trust, life satisfaction, the satisfaction 
with democracy, the importance of politics, and organizational membership. 
Note however, that in these cases, extreme conditions are necessary to rule out 
mismatch effects. For instance, a zero or negative impact of underqualification 
on life-satisfaction is only compatible with our data, if the direct effect of ed-
ucation is regarded as close to zero. As soon as some effect of education is 
granted, the estimates for underqualification effects turn positive. Not all es-




Figure F1 Social and political attitudes, and wages among mismatched workers, under 
different identifying assumptions 
 
Note: Constrained least squares models estimated on pooled data. Confidence intervals 
based on cluster-robust standard errors and ten imputations. Logged hourly wages: ef-





Figure F-2 Social and political behaviors among mismatched workers under different 
identifying assumptions 
 
Note: Constrained linear probability models estimated on pooled data. Confidence inter-
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III. Appendix to Chapter 4 
A. Gender specific results 
Figures A-1 and A-2 reproduce Figure 4-1 of the main text but are split by gen-
der. In Germany trends and pattern among men and women are virtually iden-
tical. In the UK, the main pattern discussed in the main article, an overall-
trend towards more overqualification and less underqualification that is 
driven by cohort-replacement, is visible for all genders. Differences between 
cohorts appear to be somewhat less pronounced than in the combined graph, 
however, especially among men. This is likely due to increased sampling error 
in the reduced sample and does not invalidate our overall conclusions. 
Table A-1 reproduces Table 4-2 of the main text. Among all genders, we find 
the pattern discussed in the main text. Effects of tertiary expansion, however, 
seem to be somewhat stronger in magnitude among women than among men. 
Vice versa, British secondary expansion has reduced underqualification and 















Table A-3 Relationship between educational expansion and qualification mismatch, jointly 
estimated RE-LPM results by gender 
 United Kingdom Germany 
 Overqualification Underqualification Overqualification Underqualification 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Expansion of…         
…secondary 0.285* 0.0973 -0.375** 0.0126     
 (2.07) (0.71) (-3.20) (0.10)     
         
…lower voc. -0.196 -0.352 0.0282 0.294     
 (-0.48) (-0.86) (0.09) (0.96)     
         
…vocational 0.304 -0.180 -0.399 0.645** 0.0113 0.258 0.106 0.0301 
 (0.93) (-0.64) (-1.57) (2.73) (0.06) (0.90) (0.84) (0.25) 
         
…lower tert. -0.493 0.196 0.151 0.573     
 (-1.24) (0.48) (0.43) (1.25)     
         
…tertiary 0.221 0.328+ -0.539*** -0.409*** -0.232 -0.983*** 0.00806 0.159 
education (1.41) (2.00) (-4.27) (-3.55) (-1.28) (-3.77) (0.05) (1.08) 
N 9109 8769 8175 8385 11739 9750 9728 8243 
NY 7 7 7 7 29 29 29 29 
NR 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 10 
NC 61 61 61 61 55 51 55 51 
t statistics in parentheses. Cohort random effects. Individual controls: Partnership status, and ethnicity. Cohort 
controls: relative size of cohort. Results controlled for period-region fixed-effects. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
B. Causal interpretation 
Necessary assumptions about labor markets 
Can we base quantitative predictions what mismatch patterns would have 
looked like under alternative education policies on this study? That is, to what 
degree can my estimates be regarded as causal? In the following, I refer to a 
causal effect as the effect that a counterfactual intervention in educational ex-
pansion would have had, given the historical pattern of demand change. Un-




The three main challenges to estimate the causal effect of expansion are 
that, first, mismatch-incidence depends on the demand as well as on the sup-
ply of qualifications, but industry’s demand for qualifications is unobserved in 
our data. Second, educational expansion was not assigned exogenously across 
cohorts. Third, equilibrium effects might spoil our central comparison. To ad-
dress these challenges in the framework of our analytic design, two crucial as-
sumptions are necessary.  
The first assumption is that in the aggregate, firms’ demand for qualifica-
tions does not discriminate between different cohorts and ages, net of our con-
trols. If this is the case, the different cohorts we are comparing in the same 
region and period essentially confront the same demand. The qualifications 
required by the economy may vary over regions (reflecting different sectoral 
compositions), across historical time (reflecting the business cycle and secular 
change), and even across the interaction of the two (reflecting differing trajec-
tories of different regions) – causal effects of educational expansion in the 
above sense would still be recoverable in our fixed-effects design. What has to 
be ruled out, however, is that the way different cohorts are affected by qualifi-
cation demand differs, e.g. because firms have a preference for younger gradu-
ates. Such preferences would essentially act as omitted variables in our design. 
The second assumption is that workers are in competition exclusively with 
others of their own cohort, i.e. that the labour market is rigidly stratified by 
cohort. If expansion of tertiary education in one cohort reduces undereduca-
tion in another, a comparison of mismatch rates of different cohorts, cannot 
be used to identify causal effects.29 This assumption amounts to assume the 
absence of equilibrium effects. It implies that the relative incidence of mis-
match in a cohort compared to others is basically determined at labour market 
 
29 In technical terms, this pattern would violate what is known as the SUTVA, the stable 
unit treatment value assumption, in the causal inference literature following the potential 
outcome framework. SUTVA holds that the treatment must not change outcomes for the 




entry. Cycles of boom and bust may shift a cohort’s qualification balance up 
and down, but relative to other cohorts, it stays constant over time. While we 
acknowledge that the absence of equilibrium effects is a strong assumption, 
we note that it receives support from the empirical finding of long lasting scar-
ring effects of conditions at labour market entry (Gangl, 2006; Raaum and 
Røed, 2006), and of substantial and stable cohort differentials in labour mar-
ket outcomes  (Easterlin, 1968).   
If the workings of the real German and British labour markets meet these 
assumptions, the coefficients in Table 4-2 of the main text correspond in prin-
ciple to the causal effects of educational expansion on mismatch rates. We ar-
gue that the necessary conditions are clearly not met for Germany but can be 
more plausibly assumed for the British labour market. Figure 4-2 shows that 
German mismatch-differences between cohorts are negligible at the begin-
ning of the time series and fan out after the mid-2000s. This suggests a viola-
tion of our first assumption in Germany, as the demand for higher qualifica-
tions has likely grown more for younger cohorts after the mid-2000s. The esti-
mates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4-2 of the main text can hence not be re-
garded as causal. This makes sense: A negative causal effect of tertiary expan-
sion on overqualification is hard to conceive of. The more cautious interpreta-
tion we can apply to columns 3 and 4 is therefore that tertiary expansion in 
Germany was not enough to stabilize overqualification, which was falling for 
other reasons in younger cohorts. In the UK, we find no obvious violations of 
the criteria for causal interpretation. Figure 4-1 of the main text shows large 
and relatively stable differences between cohorts. This suggests long lasting 
effects of cohort-level imbalances at labour market entry and is thus in line 
with both of our assumption.  
The fact that imperfect visual tests show no violations of crucial assump-
tions in the UK, does not prove that they are in fact met. We note that the bias 




which demand is heterogenous across cohorts. If the growth of demand for 
highly-qualified workers is relatively slower in younger cohorts, we might over-
state the impact of educational expansion in the UK. However, this scenario is 
unlikely, as skill-intensive innovations, if anything, are introduced with 
younger, rather than older workers. A violation of the second assumption that 
labour markets are rigidly stratified by cohort would lead to an underestima-
tion of the true mismatch-effects of educational expansion. Therefore, the 
British estimates in Table 4-2 likely provide lower bounds for the true causal 
effect of educational expansion, while no causal interpretation can be assigned 
to the German estimates. 
Endogenous migration and unemployment 
The previous section has examined basic conditions for causal interpretation. 
Yet there are two further challenges: internal migration and sample selection 
bias. The first challenge arises from the fact that the qualification composition 
of a region might be endogenous as people move to places where they are less 
likely to be overqualified, or more likely to be underqualified. If this is the case, 
we underestimate causal mismatch-effects of credential inflation. The second 
challenge is due to the fact that increased competition within education-
groups does not only increase the risk of overqualification, but also of unem-
ployment. Since our main analyses take place only among the employed pop-
ulation, we risk underestimating the effect of expansion on overqualification, 
as people decide to leave the labour market to avoid mismatch.  
To take into account migration, we follow two strategies. First, we replace 
our detailed, but potentially endogenous indicators of educational expansion 
with a measure that is arguably exogenous to any relocation decision during 
the working life: the historic share of a regional cohort that participated in 
post-compulsory full-time education at age 17 in the UK, and the share of a 




in Germany. The rationale for these alternative measures is that one’s place of 
secondary education is arguably not determined by one’s labour market pro-
spects at least 13 years into the future. Note that values of these variables per-
tain to people raised in a particular region, regardless of their current location, 
not to current residents. But since people can migrate after finishing secondary 
education, these “reduced form” figures, too, represent lower bounds.  Sec-
ondly, we therefore use this historical measure to instrument the contempo-
raneous share of university graduates, controlling for the contemporaneous 
share of other qualifications. The conditional exclusion restriction underlying 
this specification is that, net of the contemporaneous share of other qualifica-
tions, historic rates of post-compulsory education attendance of a cohort are 
related to contemporaneous mismatch rates of that cohort only through in-
creasing the share of higher educated individuals in this cohort. The addi-
tional data for this exercise comes from the UKLFS and the MZ, respectively, 
both of which feature questions on current educational activities of minors. 
For reasons of data availability, the estimates in columns 2, 4, 7, and 9 of Table 
B-1 are based on restricted samples, covering only the cohorts 1962 to 1986 





Table B-1 Relationship between educational expansion and qualification mismatch, RE-LPM results by estimation strategy and dependent variable 
 United Kingdom Germany 





















 OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV OLS IV 
Share of 17 
y.o. in FT 
education 
0.149+  -0.261**        
(1.74)  (-3.22)        





 0.531  -0.850 -1.052***   -2.220*  0.450 
 (0.93)  (-1.33) (-6.81)   (-2.49)  (0.67) 
           




     -0.329* -0.105  0.0645  
     (-2.35) (-0.71)  (0.65)  
N 8245 8245 6176 6176 22911 11349 12384 11349 9546 9546 
NYears 6 6 6 6 24 19 19 19 19 19 
NRegions 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 
NCohorts 25 25 25 25 56 19 19 19 19 19 
Variance components          
VarIntercept 0.000419  4.96e-14  5.12e-16 1.05e-18 4.18e-26  6.27e-25  
VarResidual 0.229  0.159  0.187 0.153 0.189  0.0625  
Underidentifcation statistics         
Kleibergen-Paap LM 
statistic 
61.59  57.94    32.54  31.53 
p-value  0  0    0  0 
t statistics in parentheses. Cohort random effects. Individual controls: Interaction gender and partnership status, and ethnicity. Cohort controls: relative size of cohort. 
Results controlled for period-region fixed-effects. 





To tackle sample selection bias, we provide additional results using an en-
compassing indicator of skill-underutilization in columns 5 and 7 of Table B-
1. This alternative indicator is defined for the entire workforce and not just em-
ployed people. Respondent are counted as “underemployed” if they are either 
overqualified or unemployed. If excess-expansion increased the likelihood of 
either of those conditions, it will show up in our results. This circumvents po-
tential sample selection issues among our main analyses. Since the UKSES is 
only collected among working people in the UK, however, this alternative in-
dicator is available for Germany only. In Germany, results using the alternative 
measure confirm our findings in the main text. Tertiary expansion was associ-
ated with lower levels of underemployment across cohorts. There is hence no 
evidence supporting the potential objection that the negative relationship re-
ported in the main text is due to increased unemployment of highly educated 
people at the risk of overqualification. 
 
C. Sensitivity analyses 
Selection of German observations 
Table C-1 reproduces the German estimates of Table 4-2 of the main text for 
alternative ways of selecting observations. In columns 1 and 3, we used all ob-
servations of the SOEP. Note that in this case, the random effects where esti-
mated at the level of individuals rather than at the level of cohorts. In columns 
2 and 4 we randomly selected one observation from all observations available 
for each individual. When it comes to overeducation, the results in Table C-1 
are virtually indistinguishable from the results presented in the main text. For 
undereducation, we obtain coefficients that are similar in magnitude. But due 




columns 3, we now find a significant and positive relationship between under-
education and educational expansion at all levels in Germany. Note that this 
does not change our substantive conclusion: Educational expansion in Ger-





Table C-1 Relationship between educational expansion and qualification mismatch in Germany, RE-LPM results by method of selecting observations 









 all  random  all random 
Expansion of…     
…vocational 0.00701 -0.0122 0.172*** -0.00119 
 (0.13) (-0.11) (4.88) (-0.02) 
     
…tertiary -0.369*** -0.357** 0.0958** 0.0597 
education (-6.65) (-3.15) (2.70) (0.85) 
N 160073 21815 141958 18812 
NYears 29 29 29 29 
NRegions 10 10 10 10 
NCohorts 29428 59 25698 59 
Variance Components    
VarIntercept 0.109 0.0000618 0.0353 2.80e-23 
VarResidual 0.0598 0.158 0.0263 0.0600 
t statistics in parentheses. Cohort random effects. Individual controls: Interaction gender and partnership 
status, and ethnicity. Cohort controls: relative size of cohort. Results controlled for period-region fixed-
effects. 






In the main text, we present results in Table 4-2 that use the “no qualifica-
tions”-category as a reference. It is important to note that all estimated coeffi-
cients depend on this choice. In Figure C-1, we present estimates of our central 
coefficient – the effect of tertiary expansion – using other possible references. 
As can be seen in the upper panel, the German results hardly change at all, 
when using people with vocational education as the reference group to define 
educational expansion. In the United Kingdom, the estimates do vary some-
what. However, the direction of effect is the same for all specifications. What 
is more, no single coefficient falls outside the 95%-Confidence-Interval of the 
estimate presented in the main text.  For the case of overeducation, the esti-
mate reported in the main text is in the middle of the overall range of plausible 
estimates. For undereducation it appears to be towards the lower end of the 









D. Specification curves 
How sensitive are our results to different specifications of the underlying 
model? And in how far does the timing of data collection, especially in the 
UKSES data, which was collected only about every fourth year, affect our 
conclusions? 
Figures  D-1 through D-4  answer these questions by way of specification 
plots. These plots show how the estimated coefficient of tertiary expansion on 
subjective qualification mismatch (shown in the upper panel) changes with 
different model specifications (shown in the lower panel). If our models are 
robust, we would like to see that different plausible specifications give similar 
results. For our four models, this is the case. 
Figure D-1 demonstrates that a non-significant estimate of the effect of 
tertiary expansion on overqualification in Britain can only be arrived at after 
exluding survey years. It also shows that the estimated effect size we present in 
the main article falls in the upper middle of the distribution of plausible 
estimates but is no way an outlier. Figure D-2 shows that the reported estimate 
of the effect of tertiary expansion on underqualification falls into the middle 
of plausible specifications. In order to arrive at substantially smaller estimates, 
the survey year 2012 would have to be excluded. Similarly, Figures D-3 and D-
4 demonstrate for Germany that our results are robust under different 
specifications. If at all, differing conclusions would have to be based on 
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